These crates have had trivial changes only: typically,
changes to documentation or to clippy warnings. There's no
good reason to update which version of them other crates depend on,
so we only bump _their_ patchlevels.
```
tor-async-utils
caret
safelog
tor-events
tor-units
tor-rtcompat
tor-rpcbase
tor-llcrypto
tor-protover
tor-bytes
tor-hscrypto
tor-socksproto
tor-cert
tor-cell
tor-consdiff
tor-congestion
arti-rpcserver
arti-testing
arti-bench
arti-config
arti-hyper
```
These crates are at version 0.x.y, so we don't need to distinguish
new-feature changes from other changes:
```
tor-basic-utils
fs-mistrust
tor-error
tor-geoip
tor-checkable
tor-linkspec
tor-netdoc
tor-netdir
tor-persist
tor-ptmgr
tor-hsservice
```
This crate has a breaking change, but only when the semver-breaking
feature `experimental-api` is enabled:
```
tor-config
```
This crate is at version 1.x.y, but has no new public APIs, and
therefore does not need a minor version bump:
```
arti
```
These crates had first-order breaking changes:
```
retry-error
tor-keymgr
tor-proto
tor-hsclient
tor-rtmock
```
Additionally, these broke because they re-exposed RetryError:
```
tor-circmgr
```
Additionally, these broke because they may re-expose something from
tor-proto:
```
arti-client
tor-chanmgr
tor-dirclient
tor-dirmgr
tor-guardmgr
```
Additionally, these broke for other fiddly reasons:
`tor-ptmgr` implements traits from tor-chanmgr, which has a breaking
change above.
`arti-hyper` exposes types from arti-client in its API.
Done with the commands below.
The following crates have had various changes, and should get a
patchlevel bump. Since they are pre-1.0, we do not need to
distinguish new APIs from other changes.
```
cargo set-version --bump patch -p arti-client
cargo set-version --bump patch -p safelog
cargo set-version --bump patch -p tor-bytes
cargo set-version --bump patch -p tor-cert
cargo set-version --bump patch -p tor-circmgr
cargo set-version --bump patch -p tor-config
cargo set-version --bump patch -p tor-consdiff
cargo set-version --bump patch -p tor-dirclient
cargo set-version --bump patch -p tor-dirmgr
cargo set-version --bump patch -p tor-error
cargo set-version --bump patch -p tor-hsservice
cargo set-version --bump patch -p tor-linkspec
cargo set-version --bump patch -p tor-llcrypto
cargo set-version --bump patch -p tor-netdir
cargo set-version --bump patch -p tor-netdoc
cargo set-version --bump patch -p tor-proto
cargo set-version --bump patch -p tor-rpcbase
cargo set-version --bump patch -p tor-socksproto
```
This crate has new features, but no new non-experimental Rust APIs.
So even though it is post-1.0, it gets a patchlevel bump.
```
cargo set-version --bump patch -p arti
```
These identifiers are actually only "global" with respect to a given
`RpcMgr`, but they should not be forgeable or reusable across RpcMgr
objects. We're going to use them so that we have a kind of identifier
for `TorClient`s that we can expose to SOCKS.
We want each ID to have a unique form every time it is given out,
so that you can't use ID==ID to check whether Object==Object. (See
discussions leading to #848.)
We'd also like the form of object IDs to be a little annoying to
analyze, to discourage people from writing programs that depends on
their particular format. (We are reserving the right to change the
format whenever we want.)
We _don't_ want to use any cryptography here (yet), lest somebody
think that this is an actual security mechanism. (This isn't for
security; it's for encouraging developers to treat IDs as opaque.)
With that in mind, we now lightly obfuscate our generational indices
before returning them.
This does the following:
- Gives every crate a `full`.
- Cause every `full` to depend on `full` from the lower-level
crates.
- Makes every feature listed _directly_ in `experimental` depend
on `__is_experimental`.
Now there's a module in `arti` that runs the loop for an RPC
listener. The part of the old `listener` module that made
the framed connections is now part of the `Session` object.
There is now yet another a temporary location for the pipe; we
should pick something better. At least now it's configurable.
In the future, this will probably hold more data as well, like a
TorClient and some configuration info.
The TorClient will present an issue; I've made comments about that.
Closes#820
Per our design, every connection starts out unauthenticated, and
needs one authenticate command to become authenticated.
Right now the only authentication type is "This is a unix named
socket where everybody who can connect has permission."
Ordinarily you can cancel a future just by dropping it, but we'll
want the ability to cancel futures that we no longer own (because we
gave them to a `FuturesUnordered`).
Nick Mathewson