This required rewriting some of our error handling code in
command-line processing, since the toml crate now displays and
reports errors differently. (Admittedly, this code still is kind of
ugly, but at least it is nicely hidden.)
Because we want to work more on ensuring that our semver stability
story is solid, we are _not_ bumping arti-client to 1.0.0 right now.
Here are the bumps we _are_ doing. Crates with "minor" bumps have
had API breaks; crates with "patch" bumps have had new APIs added.
Note that `tor-congestion` is not bumped here: it's a new crate, and
hasn't been published before.
```
tor-basic-utils minor
fs-mistrust minor
tor-config minor
tor-rtcompat minor
tor-rtmock minor
tor-llcrypto patch
tor-bytes patch
tor-linkspec minor
tor-cell minor
tor-proto minor
tor-netdoc patch
tor-netdir minor
tor-persist patch
tor-chanmgr minor
tor-guardmgr minor
tor-circmgr minor
tor-dirmgr minor
arti-client minor
arti-hyper minor
arti major
arti-bench minor
arti-testing minor
```
We need
60b874308e6792a73cc00517a60bbef60a12e3cc
Mixed type arrays (#358)
for a test case in tor-config.
While we're here, drop the dupe entry in tor-config.
(In principle we could make this increase only in tor-config's
dev-dependencies, but that seems unnecessarily fiddly.)
These changes make sure that the errors conform to our preferred
style, and include a description of what exactly we were doing when
something went wrong.
I followed the following procedure to make these changes:
* I used maint/changed_crates to find out which crates had changed
since 0.3.0.
* I used grep and maint/list_crates to sort those crates in
topological (dependency) order.
* I looked through semver_status to find which crates were listed as
having semver-relevant changes (new APIs and breaking changes).
* I scanned through the git logs of the crates with no
semver-relevant changes listed to confirm that, indeed, they had
no changes. For those crates, I incremented their patch-level
version _without_ changing the version that other crates depend on.
* I scanned through the git logs of the crates with no
semver-relevant changes listed to confirm that, indeed, they had
no obvious breaking changes.
* I treated all crates that depend on `arti` and/or `arti-client` as
having breaking changes.
* I identified crates that depend on crates that have changed, even
if they have not changed themselves, and identified them as having
a non-breaking change.
* For all of the crates, I used `cargo set-version -p $CRATE --bump
$STATUS` (where `STATUS` is `patch` or `minor`) to update the
versions, and the depended-upon versions.
We support all of the following (in TOML notation):
```
user = "rose" # by name
user = 413 # by ID
user = false # no user
user = ":current" # A 'special' user.
user = { name: "rose" }
user = { id: 413 }
user = { special: ":none" }
user = { special: ":current" }
```
This required a bit of poking through the `users` crate, to mess
with the user and group dbs. The original goal was to "trust the
group with the same name as us", but it turned into a bit of a
production, since:
* We want to take our own name from $USER, assuming that matches
our uid. (Otherwise we want to ask getpwuid_r().)
* We only want to trust the group if we are actually a member of
that group.
* We want to cache this information.
* We want to test this code.
This crate is meant to solve #315 by giving a way to make sure that
a file or directory is only accessible by trusted users. I've tried
to explain carefully (in comments and documentation) what this crate
is doing and why, under the assumption that it will someday be read
by another person like me who does _not_ live and breathe unix file
permissions. The crate is still missing some key features, noted in
the TODO section.
It differs from the first version of the crate by taking a more
principled approach to directory checking: it emulates the path
lookup process (reading symlinks and all) one path change at a time,
thus ensuring that we check every directory which could enable
an untrusted user to get to our target file, _or_ which could
enable them to get to any symlink that would get them to the target
file.
The API is also slightly different: It separates the `Mistrust`
object (where you configure what you do or do not trust) from the
`Verifier` (where you set up a check that you want to perform on a
single object). Verifiers are set up to be a bit ephemeral,
so that it is hard to accidentally declare that _every_ object
is meant to be readable when you only mean that _some_ objects
may be readable.
Nick Mathewson
eta
trinity-1686a
Ian Jackson
Orhun Parmaksız