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readme: generalize abuse of mitigation to jam

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Carla Kirk-Cohen 2024-04-11 16:19:02 -04:00
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@ -16,38 +16,41 @@ Your program should:
- Open any channels required to perform the attack, and close them - Open any channels required to perform the attack, and close them
when the attack has competed. when the attack has competed.
The final deliverable for the attackathon is a [run script](TODO) The final deliverable for the attackathon is a [run script](./setup/run.sh)
that downloads, installs and runs your attack in a kubernetes cluster. that downloads, installs and runs your attack in a kubernetes cluster.
## Jamming Definition ## Jamming Definition
The conventional definition of a jamming attack classifies a node as We're aiming to jam a routing node, which we define as:
jammed if for all of its channels:
``` ```
All of its local(/outbound) HTLC slots are occupied. The target node is unable to facillitate forwading of HTLCs on behalf
of of nodes in the network.
```
Conventionally, this is achieved when:
```
All of the target node's local(/outbound) HTLC slots are occupied.
OR OR
All of its local(/outbound) liquidity is occupied. All of the target node's local(/outbound) liquidity is occupied.
``` ```
Given that we are operating within the context of a reputation system, However, given that we are operating within the context of a specific
we extend our definition of a node being "jammed" to consider the mitigation, we need to consider the possibility that the attack may
possibility that the attack may try to use the reputation system try to use the mitigation _itself_ to disrupt quality of service.
_itself_ to disrupt quality of service.
We therefore expand our definition of a jamming attack to account for
this:
In general, our reputation and resource bucketing mitigation may be
abused by an attacker to jam a channel if:
``` ```
All of its general bucket's local(/outbound) liquidity is occupied All of its general bucket's local(/outbound) liquidity OR slots are occupied.
AND AND
All of its peers have low reputation Peers looking to use the channel have low reputation.
``` ```
This expanded definition accounts for the case where an attacker has When the attacker manages to successfully sabotage the reputation and
successfully sabotaged the reputation of all of a node's peers, so they fill up **general slots**, the channel is effectively jammed because
no longer have access to the **protected bucket** which reserves peers looking to use the channel do not have access to the
resources for high reputation peers during an attack. **projected slots** that are reserved for high reputation peers. This
may be abused in various ways, and we encourage you to explore them!
### Development Environment ### Development Environment