rgb-cln/lightningd/onchain_control.c

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#include "config.h"
#include <bitcoin/feerate.h>
#include <bitcoin/script.h>
#include <ccan/cast/cast.h>
#include <ccan/tal/str/str.h>
#include <common/htlc_tx.h>
#include <common/key_derive.h>
#include <common/psbt_keypath.h>
#include <common/type_to_string.h>
#include <db/exec.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <hsmd/capabilities.h>
#include <hsmd/hsmd_wiregen.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <lightningd/chaintopology.h>
#include <lightningd/channel.h>
#include <lightningd/channel_control.h>
#include <lightningd/coin_mvts.h>
#include <lightningd/hsm_control.h>
#include <lightningd/onchain_control.h>
#include <lightningd/peer_control.h>
#include <lightningd/subd.h>
#include <onchaind/onchaind_wiregen.h>
#include <wallet/txfilter.h>
#include <wally_bip32.h>
#include <wire/wire_sync.h>
/* We dump all the known preimages when onchaind starts up. */
static void onchaind_tell_fulfill(struct channel *channel)
{
struct htlc_in_map_iter ini;
struct htlc_in *hin;
u8 *msg;
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
for (hin = htlc_in_map_first(ld->htlcs_in, &ini);
hin;
hin = htlc_in_map_next(ld->htlcs_in, &ini)) {
if (hin->key.channel != channel)
continue;
/* BOLT #5:
*
* A local node:
* - if it receives (or already possesses) a payment preimage
* for an unresolved HTLC output that it has been offered AND
* for which it has committed to an outgoing HTLC:
* - MUST *resolve* the output by spending it, using the
* HTLC-success transaction.
* - MUST NOT reveal its own preimage when it's not the final recipient...
* - MUST resolve the output of that HTLC-success transaction.
* - otherwise:
* - if the *remote node* is NOT irrevocably committed to
* the HTLC:
* - MUST NOT *resolve* the output by spending it.
*/
/* We only set preimage once it's irrevocably committed, and
* we spend even if we don't have an outgoing HTLC (eg. local
* payment complete) */
if (!hin->preimage)
continue;
msg = towire_onchaind_known_preimage(channel, hin->preimage);
subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg));
}
}
/* If we want to know if this HTLC is missing, return depth. */
static bool tell_if_missing(const struct channel *channel,
struct htlc_stub *stub,
bool *tell_immediate)
{
struct htlc_out *hout;
/* Keep valgrind happy. */
*tell_immediate = false;
/* Don't care about incoming HTLCs, just ones we offered. */
if (stub->owner == REMOTE)
return false;
/* Might not be a current HTLC. */
hout = find_htlc_out(channel->peer->ld->htlcs_out, channel, stub->id);
if (!hout)
return false;
/* BOLT #5:
*
* - for any committed HTLC that does NOT have an output in this
* commitment transaction:
* - once the commitment transaction has reached reasonable depth:
* - MUST fail the corresponding incoming HTLC (if any).
* - if no *valid* commitment transaction contains an output
* corresponding to the HTLC.
* - MAY fail the corresponding incoming HTLC sooner.
*/
if (hout->hstate >= RCVD_ADD_REVOCATION
&& hout->hstate < SENT_REMOVE_REVOCATION)
*tell_immediate = true;
log_debug(channel->log,
"We want to know if htlc %"PRIu64" is missing (%s)",
hout->key.id, *tell_immediate ? "immediate" : "later");
return true;
}
static void handle_onchain_init_reply(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
{
struct htlc_stub *stubs;
u64 commit_num;
bool *tell, *tell_immediate;
if (!fromwire_onchaind_init_reply(msg, &commit_num)) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid onchaind_init_reply %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
return;
}
/* FIXME: We may already be ONCHAIN state when we implement restart! */
channel_set_state(channel,
FUNDING_SPEND_SEEN,
ONCHAIN,
REASON_UNKNOWN,
"Onchain init reply");
/* Tell it about any relevant HTLCs */
/* FIXME: Filter by commitnum! */
stubs = wallet_htlc_stubs(tmpctx, channel->peer->ld->wallet, channel,
commit_num);
tell = tal_arr(stubs, bool, tal_count(stubs));
tell_immediate = tal_arr(stubs, bool, tal_count(stubs));
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(stubs); i++) {
tell[i] = tell_if_missing(channel, &stubs[i],
&tell_immediate[i]);
}
msg = towire_onchaind_htlcs(channel, stubs, tell, tell_immediate);
subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg));
/* Tell it about any preimages we know. */
onchaind_tell_fulfill(channel);
}
/**
* Notify onchaind about the depth change of the watched tx.
*/
static void onchain_tx_depth(struct channel *channel,
const struct bitcoin_txid *txid,
unsigned int depth)
{
u8 *msg;
msg = towire_onchaind_depth(channel, txid, depth);
subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg));
}
/**
* Entrypoint for the txwatch callback, calls onchain_tx_depth.
*/
static enum watch_result onchain_tx_watched(struct lightningd *ld,
struct channel *channel,
const struct bitcoin_txid *txid,
const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
unsigned int depth)
{
u32 blockheight = get_block_height(ld->topology);
if (tx != NULL) {
struct bitcoin_txid txid2;
bitcoin_txid(tx, &txid2);
if (!bitcoin_txid_eq(txid, &txid2)) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "Txid for %s is not %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx,
struct bitcoin_tx,
tx),
type_to_string(tmpctx,
struct bitcoin_txid,
txid));
return DELETE_WATCH;
}
}
if (depth == 0) {
log_unusual(channel->log, "Chain reorganization!");
channel_set_owner(channel, NULL);
/* We will most likely be freed, so this is a noop */
return KEEP_WATCHING;
}
/* Store the channeltx so we can replay later */
wallet_channeltxs_add(ld->wallet, channel,
WIRE_ONCHAIND_DEPTH, txid, 0, blockheight);
onchain_tx_depth(channel, txid, depth);
return KEEP_WATCHING;
}
static void watch_tx_and_outputs(struct channel *channel,
const struct bitcoin_tx *tx);
/**
* Notify onchaind that an output was spent and register new watches.
*/
static void onchain_txo_spent(struct channel *channel, const struct bitcoin_tx *tx, size_t input_num, u32 blockheight)
{
u8 *msg;
/* Onchaind needs all inputs, since it uses those to compare
* with existing spends (which can vary, with feerate changes). */
struct tx_parts *parts = tx_parts_from_wally_tx(tmpctx, tx->wtx,
-1, -1);
watch_tx_and_outputs(channel, tx);
msg = towire_onchaind_spent(channel, parts, input_num, blockheight);
subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg));
}
/**
* Entrypoint for the txowatch callback, stores tx and calls onchain_txo_spent.
*/
static enum watch_result onchain_txo_watched(struct channel *channel,
const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
size_t input_num,
const struct block *block)
{
struct bitcoin_txid txid;
bitcoin_txid(tx, &txid);
/* Store the channeltx so we can replay later */
wallet_channeltxs_add(channel->peer->ld->wallet, channel,
WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPENT, &txid, input_num,
block->height);
onchain_txo_spent(channel, tx, input_num, block->height);
/* We don't need to keep watching: If this output is double-spent
* (reorg), we'll get a zero depth cb to onchain_tx_watched, and
* restart onchaind. */
return DELETE_WATCH;
}
/* To avoid races, we watch the tx and all outputs. */
static void watch_tx_and_outputs(struct channel *channel,
const struct bitcoin_tx *tx)
{
struct bitcoin_outpoint outpoint;
struct txwatch *txw;
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
bitcoin_txid(tx, &outpoint.txid);
/* Make txwatch a parent of txo watches, so we can unwatch together. */
txw = watch_tx(channel->owner, ld->topology, channel, tx,
onchain_tx_watched);
for (outpoint.n = 0; outpoint.n < tx->wtx->num_outputs; outpoint.n++)
watch_txo(txw, ld->topology, channel, &outpoint,
onchain_txo_watched);
}
static void handle_onchain_log_coin_move(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
{
struct chain_coin_mvt *mvt = tal(NULL, struct chain_coin_mvt);
if (!fromwire_onchaind_notify_coin_mvt(msg, mvt)) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid onchain notify_coin_mvt");
return;
}
/* Any 'ignored' payments get registed to the wallet */
if (!mvt->account_name)
mvt->account_name = type_to_string(mvt, struct channel_id,
&channel->cid);
else
mvt->originating_acct = type_to_string(mvt, struct channel_id,
&channel->cid);
notify_chain_mvt(channel->peer->ld, mvt);
tal_free(mvt);
}
/** handle_onchain_broadcast_rbf_tx_cb
*
* @brief suppresses the rebroadcast of a
* transaction.
*
* @desc when using the `bitcoin_tx` function,
* if a callback is not given, the transaction
* will be rebroadcast automatically by
* chaintopology.
* However, in the case of an RBF transaction
* from `onchaind`, `onchaind` will periodically
* create a new, higher-fee replacement, thus
* `onchaind` will trigger rebroadcast (with a
* higher fee) by itself, which the `lightningd`
* chaintopology should not repeat.
* This callback exists to suppress the
* rebroadcast behavior of chaintopology.
*
* @param channel - the channel for which the
* transaction was broadcast.
* @param success - whether the tx was broadcast.
* @param err - the error received from the
* underlying sendrawtx.
*/
static void handle_onchain_broadcast_rbf_tx_cb(struct channel *channel,
bool success,
const char *err)
{
/* Victory is boring. */
if (success)
return;
/* Failure is unusual but not broken: it is possible that just
* as we were about to broadcast, a new block came in which
* contains a previous version of the transaction, thus
* causing the higher-fee replacement to fail broadcast.
*
* ...or it could be a bug in onchaind which prevents it from
* successfully RBFing out the transaction, in which case we
* should log it for devs to check.
*/
log_unusual(channel->log,
"Broadcast of RBF tx failed, "
"did a new block just come in? "
"error: %s",
err);
}
static void handle_onchain_broadcast_tx(struct channel *channel,
const u8 *msg)
{
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
struct wallet *w = channel->peer->ld->wallet;
bool is_rbf;
if (!fromwire_onchaind_broadcast_tx(msg, msg, &tx, &is_rbf)) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid onchain_broadcast_tx");
return;
}
tx->chainparams = chainparams;
wallet_transaction_add(w, tx->wtx, 0, 0);
/* We don't really care if it fails, we'll respond via watch. */
/* If the onchaind signals this as RBF-able, then we also
* set allowhighfees, as the transaction may be RBFed into
* high feerates as protection against the MAD-HTLC attack. */
broadcast_tx(channel->peer->ld->topology, channel,
chaintopology: allow minblock for broadcast_tx. Fun story. We're changing onchaind to hand txs to us, and we will construct them and do the broadcast for it. lightningd tells onchaind the witness it used (with flags to indicate which fields were signatures so should be ignored) so onchaind can recognize the tx when/if it is mined. And when onchaind was waiting for a CLTV delay, it wouldn't tell lightningd yet, but wait until the parent was sufficiently deep But this caused bugs! In particular, on replay, onchaind would see transactions which it hasn't sent yet. This was not a problem before, as onchaind had created the tx, even if it hadn't told lightningd to broadcast it, so recognized the variant when it came in. When we're relying on lightningd to tell us what the tx will look like, this doesn't work any more. The cause of this is that we fire off txowatches ("this output was spent!") while we process blocks, and only fire off txwatches ("this tx increased depth") once all the current blocks are processed. Often this didn't matter, since we replay messages to onchaind from the database, *but* we trim the last few blocks on restart (or, if there's a small reorg while we're stopped), and we can hit this misordering. Changing our topology code to only ever process one block at a time would be a solution, but slows down catchup (and tests, where we often mine a run of blocks). So, this seems like a premature optimization, but it's really required! And in future, lightningd can use this knowledge of pending transactions to combine them in more clever ways. Note that if a tx is valid at block N, we broadcast it once we see block N-1, to get it in the mempool for block N. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2023-03-23 05:47:52 +00:00
tx, NULL, is_rbf, 0,
is_rbf ? &handle_onchain_broadcast_rbf_tx_cb : NULL,
NULL, NULL);
}
static void handle_onchain_unwatch_tx(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
{
struct bitcoin_txid txid;
struct txwatch *txw;
if (!fromwire_onchaind_unwatch_tx(msg, &txid)) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid onchain_unwatch_tx");
return;
}
/* Frees the txo watches, too: see watch_tx_and_outputs() */
txw = find_txwatch(channel->peer->ld->topology, &txid, channel);
if (!txw)
log_unusual(channel->log, "Can't unwatch txid %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_txid, &txid));
tal_free(txw);
}
static void handle_extracted_preimage(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
{
struct preimage preimage;
if (!fromwire_onchaind_extracted_preimage(msg, &preimage)) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid extracted_preimage");
return;
}
onchain_fulfilled_htlc(channel, &preimage);
}
static void handle_missing_htlc_output(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
{
struct htlc_stub htlc;
if (!fromwire_onchaind_missing_htlc_output(msg, &htlc)) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid missing_htlc_output");
return;
}
/* We only set tell_if_missing on LOCAL htlcs */
if (htlc.owner != LOCAL) {
channel_internal_error(channel,
"onchaind_missing_htlc_output: htlc %"PRIu64" is not local!",
htlc.id);
return;
}
/* BOLT #5:
*
* - for any committed HTLC that does NOT have an output in this
* commitment transaction:
* - once the commitment transaction has reached reasonable depth:
* - MUST fail the corresponding incoming HTLC (if any).
* - if no *valid* commitment transaction contains an output
* corresponding to the HTLC.
* - MAY fail the corresponding incoming HTLC sooner.
*/
onchain_failed_our_htlc(channel, &htlc, "missing in commitment tx", false);
}
static void handle_onchain_htlc_timeout(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
{
struct htlc_stub htlc;
if (!fromwire_onchaind_htlc_timeout(msg, &htlc)) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid onchain_htlc_timeout");
return;
}
/* It should tell us about timeouts on our LOCAL htlcs */
if (htlc.owner != LOCAL) {
channel_internal_error(channel,
"onchaind_htlc_timeout: htlc %"PRIu64" is not local!",
htlc.id);
return;
}
/* BOLT #5:
*
* - if the commitment transaction HTLC output has *timed out* and
* hasn't been *resolved*:
* - MUST *resolve* the output by spending it using the HTLC-timeout
* transaction.
*/
onchain_failed_our_htlc(channel, &htlc, "timed out", true);
}
static void handle_irrevocably_resolved(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg UNUSED)
{
/* FIXME: Implement check_htlcs to ensure no dangling hout->in ptrs! */
free_htlcs(channel->peer->ld, channel);
log_info(channel->log, "onchaind complete, forgetting peer");
/* This will also free onchaind. */
delete_channel(channel);
}
/**
* onchain_add_utxo -- onchaind is telling us about an UTXO we own
*/
static void onchain_add_utxo(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
{
struct chain_coin_mvt *mvt;
u32 blockheight;
struct bitcoin_outpoint outpoint;
u32 csv_lock;
struct amount_sat amount;
struct pubkey *commitment_point;
u8 *scriptPubkey;
if (!fromwire_onchaind_add_utxo(
tmpctx, msg, &outpoint, &commitment_point,
&amount, &blockheight, &scriptPubkey,
&csv_lock)) {
log_broken(channel->log,
"onchaind gave invalid add_utxo message: %s",
tal_hex(msg, msg));
return;
}
assert(blockheight);
outpointfilter_add(channel->peer->ld->wallet->owned_outpoints,
&outpoint);
log_debug(channel->log, "adding utxo to watch %s, csv %u",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_outpoint, &outpoint),
csv_lock);
wallet_add_onchaind_utxo(channel->peer->ld->wallet,
&outpoint, scriptPubkey,
blockheight, amount, channel,
commitment_point,
csv_lock);
mvt = new_coin_wallet_deposit(msg, &outpoint, blockheight,
amount, DEPOSIT);
mvt->originating_acct = type_to_string(mvt, struct channel_id,
&channel->cid);
notify_chain_mvt(channel->peer->ld, mvt);
}
static void onchain_annotate_txout(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
{
struct bitcoin_outpoint outpoint;
enum wallet_tx_type type;
if (!fromwire_onchaind_annotate_txout(msg, &outpoint, &type))
fatal("onchaind gave invalid onchain_annotate_txout "
"message: %s",
tal_hex(msg, msg));
wallet_annotate_txout(channel->peer->ld->wallet, &outpoint, type,
channel->dbid);
}
static void onchain_annotate_txin(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
{
struct bitcoin_txid txid;
enum wallet_tx_type type;
u32 innum;
if (!fromwire_onchaind_annotate_txin(msg, &txid, &innum, &type))
fatal("onchaind gave invalid onchain_annotate_txin "
"message: %s",
tal_hex(msg, msg));
wallet_annotate_txin(channel->peer->ld->wallet, &txid, innum, type,
channel->dbid);
}
/* All onchaind-produced txs are actually of the same form: */
struct onchain_signing_info {
/* Fields common to every callback: */
struct channel *channel;
/* Minimum block */
u32 minblock;
/* Block we want this mined by */
u32 deadline_block;
/* Witness script for tx */
u8 *wscript;
/* Trailing element for witness stack */
const tal_t *stack_elem;
/* Tagged union (for sanity checking!) */
enum onchaind_wire msgtype;
union {
/* WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPEND_HTLC_TIMEDOUT */
struct {
u64 commit_num;
} htlc_timedout;
/* WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPEND_PENALTY */
struct {
struct secret remote_per_commitment_secret;
} spend_penalty;
/* WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPEND_HTLC_SUCCESS */
struct {
u64 commit_num;
struct bitcoin_signature remote_htlc_sig;
struct preimage preimage;
} htlc_success;
} u;
};
/* If we don't care / don't know */
static u32 infinite_block_deadline(const struct chain_topology *topo)
{
return get_block_height(topo) + 300;
}
static struct onchain_signing_info *new_signing_info(const tal_t *ctx,
struct channel *channel,
enum onchaind_wire msgtype)
{
struct onchain_signing_info *info = tal(ctx, struct onchain_signing_info);
info->channel = channel;
info->msgtype = msgtype;
return info;
}
static u8 *sign_tx_to_us(const tal_t *ctx,
const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
const struct onchain_signing_info *info)
{
assert(info->msgtype == WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPEND_TO_US);
return towire_hsmd_sign_any_delayed_payment_to_us(ctx,
info->u.htlc_timedout.commit_num,
tx, info->wscript,
0,
&info->channel->peer->id,
info->channel->dbid);
}
static u8 *sign_penalty(const tal_t *ctx,
const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
const struct onchain_signing_info *info)
{
assert(info->msgtype == WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPEND_PENALTY);
return towire_hsmd_sign_any_penalty_to_us(ctx,
&info->u.spend_penalty.remote_per_commitment_secret,
tx, info->wscript,
0,
&info->channel->peer->id,
info->channel->dbid);
}
static u8 *sign_htlc_success(const tal_t *ctx,
const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
const struct onchain_signing_info *info)
{
const bool anchor_outputs = channel_has(info->channel, OPT_ANCHOR_OUTPUTS);
assert(info->msgtype == WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPEND_HTLC_SUCCESS);
return towire_hsmd_sign_any_local_htlc_tx(ctx,
info->u.htlc_success.commit_num,
tx, info->wscript,
anchor_outputs,
0,
&info->channel->peer->id,
info->channel->dbid);
}
/* Matches bitcoin_witness_sig_and_element! */
static const struct onchain_witness_element **
onchain_witness_sig_and_element(const tal_t *ctx, u8 **witness)
{
struct onchain_witness_element **welements;
welements = tal_arr(ctx, struct onchain_witness_element *,
tal_count(witness));
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(welements); i++) {
welements[i] = tal(welements, struct onchain_witness_element);
/* See bitcoin_witness_sig_and_element */
welements[i]->is_signature = (i == 0);
welements[i]->witness = tal_dup_talarr(welements[i], u8,
witness[i]);
}
return cast_const2(const struct onchain_witness_element **, welements);
}
/* Matches bitcoin_witness_htlc_success_tx & bitcoin_witness_htlc_timeout_tx! */
static const struct onchain_witness_element **
onchain_witness_htlc_tx(const tal_t *ctx, u8 **witness)
{
struct onchain_witness_element **welements;
welements = tal_arr(ctx, struct onchain_witness_element *,
tal_count(witness));
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(welements); i++) {
welements[i] = tal(welements, struct onchain_witness_element);
/* See bitcoin_witness_htlc_success_tx / bitcoin_witness_htlc_timeout_tx */
welements[i]->is_signature = (i == 1 || i == 2);
welements[i]->witness = tal_dup_talarr(welements[i], u8,
witness[i]);
}
return cast_const2(const struct onchain_witness_element **, welements);
}
/* Always sets *welements, returns tx. Sets *worthwhile to false if
* it wasn't worthwhile at the given feerate (and it had to drop feerate).
* Returns NULL iff it called channel_internal_error().
*/
static struct bitcoin_tx *onchaind_tx(const tal_t *ctx,
struct channel *channel,
const struct bitcoin_outpoint *out,
struct amount_sat out_sats,
u32 to_self_delay,
u32 locktime,
u32 feerate,
u8 *(*sign)(const tal_t *ctx,
const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
const struct onchain_signing_info *info),
const struct onchain_signing_info *info,
bool *worthwhile,
const struct onchain_witness_element ***welements)
{
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
struct amount_sat fee, min_out, amt;
struct bitcoin_signature sig;
size_t weight;
u8 *msg;
u8 **witness;
struct pubkey final_key;
struct ext_key final_wallet_ext_key;
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
bip32_pubkey(ld, &final_key, channel->final_key_idx);
if (bip32_key_from_parent(ld->bip32_base,
channel->final_key_idx,
BIP32_FLAG_KEY_PUBLIC,
&final_wallet_ext_key) != WALLY_OK) {
channel_internal_error(channel,
"Could not derive final_wallet_ext_key %"PRIu64,
channel->final_key_idx);
return NULL;
}
tx = bitcoin_tx(ctx, chainparams, 1, 1, locktime);
bitcoin_tx_add_input(tx, out, to_self_delay,
NULL, out_sats, NULL, info->wscript);
bitcoin_tx_add_output(
tx, scriptpubkey_p2wpkh(tmpctx, &final_key), NULL, out_sats);
psbt_add_keypath_to_last_output(tx, channel->final_key_idx, &final_wallet_ext_key);
/* Worst-case sig is 73 bytes */
weight = bitcoin_tx_weight(tx) + 1 + 3 + 73 + 0 + tal_count(info->wscript);
weight += elements_tx_overhead(chainparams, 1, 1);
fee = amount_tx_fee(feerate, weight);
/* Result is trivial? Spend with small feerate, but don't wait
* around for it as it might not confirm. */
if (!amount_sat_add(&min_out, channel->our_config.dust_limit, fee))
fatal("Cannot add dust_limit %s and fee %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat, &channel->our_config.dust_limit),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat, &fee));
if (amount_sat_less(out_sats, min_out)) {
/* FIXME: We should use SIGHASH_NONE so others can take it? */
fee = amount_tx_fee(feerate_floor(), weight);
*worthwhile = false;
} else
*worthwhile = true;
/* This can only happen if feerate_floor() is still too high; shouldn't
* happen! */
if (!amount_sat_sub(&amt, out_sats, fee)) {
amt = channel->our_config.dust_limit;
log_broken(channel->log, "TX can't afford minimal feerate"
"; setting output to %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
&amt));
*worthwhile = false;
}
bitcoin_tx_output_set_amount(tx, 0, amt);
bitcoin_tx_finalize(tx);
/* Now sign, and set witness */
msg = sign(NULL, tx, info);
if (!wire_sync_write(ld->hsm_fd, take(msg)))
fatal("Writing sign request to hsm");
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, ld->hsm_fd);
if (!msg || !fromwire_hsmd_sign_tx_reply(msg, &sig))
fatal("Reading sign_tx_reply: %s", tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
witness = bitcoin_witness_sig_and_element(NULL, &sig, info->stack_elem,
tal_bytelen(info->stack_elem),
info->wscript);
*welements = onchain_witness_sig_and_element(ctx, witness);
bitcoin_tx_input_set_witness(tx, 0, take(witness));
return tx;
}
static bool consider_onchain_rebroadcast(struct channel *channel,
const struct bitcoin_tx **tx,
struct onchain_signing_info *info)
{
/* FIXME: Implement rbf! */
return true;
}
static bool consider_onchain_htlc_tx_rebroadcast(struct channel *channel,
const struct bitcoin_tx **tx,
struct onchain_signing_info *info)
{
/* FIXME: Implement rbf! */
return true;
}
/* We want to mine a success tx before they can timeout */
static u32 htlc_incoming_deadline(const struct channel *channel, u64 htlc_id)
{
struct htlc_in *hin;
hin = find_htlc_in(channel->peer->ld->htlcs_in, channel, htlc_id);
if (!hin) {
log_broken(channel->log, "No htlc IN %"PRIu64", using infinite deadline",
htlc_id);
return infinite_block_deadline(channel->peer->ld->topology);
}
return hin->cltv_expiry - 1;
}
/* Create the onchain tx and tell onchaind about it */
static void create_onchain_tx(struct channel *channel,
const struct bitcoin_outpoint *out,
struct amount_sat out_sats,
u32 to_self_delay,
u32 locktime,
u32 initial_feerate,
u8 *(*sign)(const tal_t *ctx,
const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
const struct onchain_signing_info *info),
struct onchain_signing_info *info STEALS,
const char *caller)
{
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
const struct onchain_witness_element **welements;
bool worthwhile;
tx = onchaind_tx(tmpctx, channel,
out, out_sats, to_self_delay, locktime, initial_feerate,
sign, info, &worthwhile, &welements);
if (!tx)
return;
log_debug(channel->log, "Broadcast for onchaind tx %s%s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx, tx),
worthwhile ? "" : "(NOT WORTHWHILE, LOWBALL FEE!)");
broadcast_tx(channel->peer->ld->topology,
channel, take(tx), NULL, false, info->minblock,
NULL, consider_onchain_rebroadcast, take(info));
subd_send_msg(channel->owner,
take(towire_onchaind_spend_created(NULL,
worthwhile,
welements)));
}
static void handle_onchaind_spend_to_us(struct channel *channel,
const u8 *msg)
{
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
struct onchain_signing_info *info;
struct bitcoin_outpoint out;
struct amount_sat out_sats;
u32 initial_feerate;
info = new_signing_info(msg, channel, WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPEND_TO_US);
/* BOLT #3:
* #### `to_local` Output
*...
* The output is spent by an input with `nSequence` field set to `to_self_delay` (which can only be valid after that duration has passed) and witness:
*
* <local_delayedsig> <>
*/
/* BOLT #3:
* ## HTLC-Timeout and HTLC-Success Transactions
*
* These HTLC transactions are almost identical, except the HTLC-timeout transaction is timelocked.
*...
* To spend this via penalty, the remote node uses a witness stack
* `<revocationsig> 1`, and to collect the output, the local node uses
* an input with nSequence `to_self_delay` and a witness stack
* `<local_delayedsig> 0`.
*/
info->stack_elem = NULL;
if (!fromwire_onchaind_spend_to_us(info, msg,
&out, &out_sats,
&info->minblock,
&info->u.htlc_timedout.commit_num,
&info->wscript)) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid onchaind_spend_to_us %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
return;
}
/* FIXME: Be more sophisticated! */
initial_feerate = delayed_to_us_feerate(ld->topology);
if (!initial_feerate)
initial_feerate = tx_feerate(channel->last_tx);
/* No real deadline on this, it's just returning to our wallet. */
info->deadline_block = infinite_block_deadline(ld->topology);
create_onchain_tx(channel, &out, out_sats,
channel->channel_info.their_config.to_self_delay, 0,
initial_feerate, sign_tx_to_us, info,
__func__);
}
static void handle_onchaind_spend_penalty(struct channel *channel,
const u8 *msg)
{
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
struct onchain_signing_info *info;
struct bitcoin_outpoint out;
struct amount_sat out_sats;
u32 initial_feerate;
u8 *stack_elem;
info = new_signing_info(msg, channel, WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPEND_PENALTY);
/* We can always spend penalty txs immediately */
info->minblock = 0;
if (!fromwire_onchaind_spend_penalty(info, msg,
&out, &out_sats,
&info->u.spend_penalty.remote_per_commitment_secret,
&stack_elem,
&info->wscript)) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid onchaind_spend_penalty %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
return;
}
/* info->stack_elem is const void * */
info->stack_elem = stack_elem;
/* FIXME: Be more sophisticated! */
initial_feerate = penalty_feerate(ld->topology);
if (!initial_feerate)
initial_feerate = tx_feerate(channel->last_tx);
/* FIXME: deadline for HTLCs is actually a bit longer, but for
* their output it's channel->our_config.to_self_delay after
* the commitment tx is mined. */
info->deadline_block = *channel->close_blockheight
+ channel->our_config.to_self_delay;
create_onchain_tx(channel, &out, out_sats,
0, 0,
initial_feerate, sign_penalty, info,
__func__);
}
static void handle_onchaind_spend_htlc_success(struct channel *channel,
const u8 *msg)
{
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
struct onchain_signing_info *info;
struct bitcoin_outpoint out;
struct amount_sat out_sats, fee;
u64 htlc_id;
u8 *htlc_wscript;
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
u8 **witness;
struct bitcoin_signature sig;
const struct onchain_witness_element **welements;
const bool anchor_outputs = channel_has(channel, OPT_ANCHOR_OUTPUTS);
info = new_signing_info(msg, channel, WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPEND_HTLC_SUCCESS);
info->minblock = 0;
if (!fromwire_onchaind_spend_htlc_success(info, msg,
&out, &out_sats, &fee,
&htlc_id,
&info->u.htlc_success.commit_num,
&info->u.htlc_success.remote_htlc_sig,
&info->u.htlc_success.preimage,
&info->wscript,
&htlc_wscript)) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid onchaind_spend_htlc_success %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
return;
}
/* BOLT #3:
* * locktime: `0` for HTLC-success, `cltv_expiry` for HTLC-timeout
*/
tx = htlc_tx(NULL, chainparams, &out, info->wscript, out_sats, htlc_wscript, fee,
0, anchor_outputs);
tal_free(htlc_wscript);
if (!tx) {
/* Can only happen if fee > out_sats */
channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid onchaind_spend_htlc_success %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
return;
}
/* FIXME: tell onchaind if HTLC is too small for current
* feerate! */
info->deadline_block = htlc_incoming_deadline(channel, htlc_id);
/* Now sign, and set witness */
msg = sign_htlc_success(NULL, tx, info);
if (!wire_sync_write(ld->hsm_fd, take(msg)))
fatal("Writing sign request to hsm");
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, ld->hsm_fd);
if (!msg || !fromwire_hsmd_sign_tx_reply(msg, &sig))
fatal("Reading sign_tx_reply: %s", tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
witness = bitcoin_witness_htlc_success_tx(NULL, &sig,
&info->u.htlc_success.remote_htlc_sig,
&info->u.htlc_success.preimage,
info->wscript);
welements = onchain_witness_htlc_tx(tmpctx, witness);
bitcoin_tx_input_set_witness(tx, 0, take(witness));
log_debug(channel->log, "Broadcast for onchaind tx %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx, tx));
broadcast_tx(channel->peer->ld->topology,
channel, take(tx), NULL, false,
info->minblock, NULL,
consider_onchain_htlc_tx_rebroadcast, take(info));
msg = towire_onchaind_spend_created(NULL, true, welements);
subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg));
}
static unsigned int onchain_msg(struct subd *sd, const u8 *msg, const int *fds UNUSED)
{
enum onchaind_wire t = fromwire_peektype(msg);
switch (t) {
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_INIT_REPLY:
handle_onchain_init_reply(sd->channel, msg);
break;
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_BROADCAST_TX:
handle_onchain_broadcast_tx(sd->channel, msg);
break;
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_UNWATCH_TX:
handle_onchain_unwatch_tx(sd->channel, msg);
break;
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_EXTRACTED_PREIMAGE:
handle_extracted_preimage(sd->channel, msg);
break;
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_MISSING_HTLC_OUTPUT:
handle_missing_htlc_output(sd->channel, msg);
break;
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_HTLC_TIMEOUT:
handle_onchain_htlc_timeout(sd->channel, msg);
break;
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_ALL_IRREVOCABLY_RESOLVED:
handle_irrevocably_resolved(sd->channel, msg);
break;
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_ADD_UTXO:
onchain_add_utxo(sd->channel, msg);
break;
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_ANNOTATE_TXIN:
onchain_annotate_txin(sd->channel, msg);
break;
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_ANNOTATE_TXOUT:
onchain_annotate_txout(sd->channel, msg);
break;
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_NOTIFY_COIN_MVT:
handle_onchain_log_coin_move(sd->channel, msg);
break;
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPEND_TO_US:
handle_onchaind_spend_to_us(sd->channel, msg);
break;
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPEND_PENALTY:
handle_onchaind_spend_penalty(sd->channel, msg);
break;
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPEND_HTLC_SUCCESS:
handle_onchaind_spend_htlc_success(sd->channel, msg);
break;
/* We send these, not receive them */
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_INIT:
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPENT:
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_DEPTH:
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_HTLCS:
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_KNOWN_PREIMAGE:
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPEND_CREATED:
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_DEV_MEMLEAK:
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_DEV_MEMLEAK_REPLY:
break;
}
return 0;
}
/* Only error onchaind can get is if it dies. */
static void onchain_error(struct channel *channel,
2022-01-11 01:13:59 +00:00
struct peer_fd *pps UNUSED,
const struct channel_id *channel_id UNUSED,
const char *desc,
bool warning UNUSED,
const u8 *err_for_them UNUSED)
{
channel_set_owner(channel, NULL);
/* This happens on shutdown: fine */
if (channel->peer->ld->state == LD_STATE_SHUTDOWN)
return;
/* FIXME: re-launch? */
log_broken(channel->log, "%s", desc);
channel_set_billboard(channel, true, desc);
}
/* With a reorg, this can get called multiple times; each time we'll kill
* onchaind (like any other owner), and restart */
enum watch_result onchaind_funding_spent(struct channel *channel,
const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
u32 blockheight)
{
u8 *msg;
struct bitcoin_txid our_last_txid;
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
struct pubkey final_key;
int hsmfd;
u32 feerates[4];
enum state_change reason;
/* use REASON_ONCHAIN or closer's reason, if known */
reason = REASON_ONCHAIN;
if (channel->closer != NUM_SIDES)
reason = REASON_UNKNOWN; /* will use last cause as reason */
channel_fail_permanent(channel, reason,
"Funding transaction spent");
/* If we haven't posted the open event yet, post an open */
if (!channel->scid || !channel->remote_channel_ready) {
u32 blkh;
/* Blockheight will be zero if it's not in chain */
blkh = wallet_transaction_height(channel->peer->ld->wallet,
&channel->funding.txid);
channel_record_open(channel, blkh, true);
}
tal_free(channel->close_blockheight);
channel->close_blockheight = tal_dup(channel, u32, &blockheight);
/* We could come from almost any state. */
/* NOTE(mschmoock) above comment is wrong, since we failed above! */
channel_set_state(channel,
channel->state,
FUNDING_SPEND_SEEN,
reason,
tal_fmt(tmpctx, "Onchain funding spend"));
hsmfd = hsm_get_client_fd(ld, &channel->peer->id,
channel->dbid,
HSM_CAP_SIGN_ONCHAIN_TX
| HSM_CAP_COMMITMENT_POINT);
channel_set_owner(channel, new_channel_subd(channel, ld,
"lightning_onchaind",
channel,
&channel->peer->id,
channel->log, false,
onchaind_wire_name,
onchain_msg,
onchain_error,
channel_set_billboard,
take(&hsmfd),
NULL));
if (!channel->owner) {
log_broken(channel->log, "Could not subdaemon onchain: %s",
strerror(errno));
return KEEP_WATCHING;
}
bip32_pubkey(ld, &final_key, channel->final_key_idx);
struct ext_key final_wallet_ext_key;
if (bip32_key_from_parent(
ld->bip32_base,
channel->final_key_idx,
BIP32_FLAG_KEY_PUBLIC,
&final_wallet_ext_key) != WALLY_OK) {
log_broken(channel->log, "Could not derive final_wallet_ext_key %"PRIu64,
channel->final_key_idx);
return KEEP_WATCHING;
}
/* This could be a mutual close, but it doesn't matter.
* We don't need this for stub channels as well */
if (!is_stub_scid(channel->scid))
bitcoin_txid(channel->last_tx, &our_last_txid);
else
/* Dummy txid for stub channel to make valgrind happy. */
bitcoin_txid_from_hex("80cea306607b708a03a1854520729d"
"a884e4317b7b51f3d4a622f88176f5e034",
64,
&our_last_txid);
/* We try to get the feerate for each transaction type, 0 if estimation
* failed. */
feerates[0] = delayed_to_us_feerate(ld->topology);
feerates[1] = htlc_resolution_feerate(ld->topology);
feerates[2] = penalty_feerate(ld->topology);
/* We check them separately but there is a high chance that if estimation
* failed for one, it failed for all.. */
for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
if (!feerates[i])
feerates[i] = tx_feerate(channel->last_tx);
}
/* This is 10x highest bitcoind estimate (depending on dev-max-fee-multiplier),
* so cap at 2x */
feerates[3] = feerate_max(ld, NULL) / 5;
log_debug(channel->log, "channel->static_remotekey_start[LOCAL] %"PRIu64,
channel->static_remotekey_start[LOCAL]);
msg = towire_onchaind_init(channel,
&channel->their_shachain.chain,
chainparams,
channel->funding_sats,
channel->our_msat,
&channel->channel_info.old_remote_per_commit,
&channel->channel_info.remote_per_commit,
/* BOLT #2:
* `to_self_delay` is the number of blocks
* that the other node's to-self outputs
* must be delayed */
/* So, these are reversed: they specify ours,
* we specify theirs. */
channel->channel_info.their_config.to_self_delay,
channel->our_config.to_self_delay,
/* delayed_to_us, htlc, penalty, and penalty_max. */
feerates[0], feerates[1], feerates[2], feerates[3],
channel->our_config.dust_limit,
&our_last_txid,
channel->shutdown_scriptpubkey[LOCAL],
channel->shutdown_scriptpubkey[REMOTE],
channel->final_key_idx,
&final_wallet_ext_key,
&final_key,
channel->opener,
&channel->local_basepoints,
&channel->channel_info.theirbase,
tx_parts_from_wally_tx(tmpctx, tx->wtx, -1, -1),
tx->wtx->locktime,
blockheight,
/* FIXME: config for 'reasonable depth' */
3,
channel->last_htlc_sigs,
channel->min_possible_feerate,
channel->max_possible_feerate,
channel->future_per_commitment_point,
&channel->local_funding_pubkey,
&channel->channel_info.remote_fundingkey,
channel->static_remotekey_start[LOCAL],
channel->static_remotekey_start[REMOTE],
channel_has(channel, OPT_ANCHOR_OUTPUTS),
feerate_min(ld, NULL));
subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg));
watch_tx_and_outputs(channel, tx);
/* We keep watching until peer finally deleted, for reorgs. */
return KEEP_WATCHING;
}
void onchaind_replay_channels(struct lightningd *ld)
{
u32 *onchaind_ids;
struct channeltx *txs;
struct channel *chan;
db_begin_transaction(ld->wallet->db);
onchaind_ids = wallet_onchaind_channels(ld->wallet, ld);
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(onchaind_ids); i++) {
log_info(ld->log, "Restarting onchaind for channel %d",
onchaind_ids[i]);
txs = wallet_channeltxs_get(ld->wallet, onchaind_ids,
onchaind_ids[i]);
chan = channel_by_dbid(ld, onchaind_ids[i]);
for (size_t j = 0; j < tal_count(txs); j++) {
if (txs[j].type == WIRE_ONCHAIND_INIT) {
onchaind_funding_spent(chan, txs[j].tx,
txs[j].blockheight);
} else if (txs[j].type == WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPENT) {
onchain_txo_spent(chan, txs[j].tx,
txs[j].input_num,
txs[j].blockheight);
} else if (txs[j].type == WIRE_ONCHAIND_DEPTH) {
onchain_tx_depth(chan, &txs[j].txid,
txs[j].depth);
} else {
fatal("unknown message of type %d during "
"onchaind replay",
txs[j].type);
}
}
tal_free(txs);
}
tal_free(onchaind_ids);
db_commit_transaction(ld->wallet->db);
}