We used to have a `struct chan` while we're waiting for an update; now we
keep that internally. So a `struct chan` without a channel_announcement
in the store is private, and other is public.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Reload them from disk if they do listnodes.
MCP results from 5 runs, min-max(mean +/- stddev):
store_load_msec:35390-38659(37336.4+/-1.3e+03)
vsz_kb:1780516
store_rewrite_sec:13.800000-16.800000(15.02+/-0.98)
listnodes_sec:1.280000-1.530000(1.382+/-0.096)
listchannels_sec:28.700000-30.440000(29.34+/-0.68)
routing_sec:30.120000-31.080000(30.526+/-0.35)
peer_write_all_sec:65.910000-76.850000(69.462+/-4.1)
MCP notable changes from previous patch (>1 stddev):
-vsz_kb:1792996
+vsz_kb:1780516
-listnodes_sec:1.030000-1.120000(1.068+/-0.032)
+listnodes_sec:1.280000-1.530000(1.382+/-0.096)
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We currently create a struct chan when we receive a `channel_announcement`,
but we can only broadcast once we have a `channel_update` (since that
provides the timestamp).
This means a `struct chan` can be in a weird state where it exists,
but is unusable (can't use without an update), and also means we need to
keep the channel_announcement message around until an update arrives, so
we can put it in the gossip_store.
Instead, keep track of these "unupdated" channels separately, and check
for them in all the places we search for a specific channel to update.
MCP results from 5 runs, min-max(mean +/- stddev):
store_load_msec:30640-33236(32202+/-8.7e+02)
vsz_kb:1812956
store_rewrite_sec:13.410000-16.970000(14.438+/-1.3)
listnodes_sec:0.590000-0.660000(0.62+/-0.033)
listchannels_sec:28.140000-29.560000(28.816+/-0.56)
routing_sec:29.530000-32.590000(30.352+/-1.1)
peer_write_all_sec:60.380000-61.320000(60.836+/-0.37)
MCP notable changes from previous patch (>1 stddev):
-vsz_kb:1812904
+vsz_kb:1812956
-store_rewrite_sec:21.390000-27.070000(23.596+/-2.4)
+store_rewrite_sec:13.410000-16.970000(14.438+/-1.3)
-listnodes_sec:1.120000-1.230000(1.176+/-0.044)
+listnodes_sec:0.590000-0.660000(0.62+/-0.033)
-listchannels_sec:38.900000-50.580000(44.716+/-3.9)
+listchannels_sec:28.140000-29.560000(28.816+/-0.56)
-routing_sec:45.080000-48.160000(46.814+/-1.1)
+routing_sec:29.530000-32.590000(30.352+/-1.1)
-peer_write_all_sec:58.780000-87.150000(72.278+/-9.7)
+peer_write_all_sec:60.380000-61.320000(60.836+/-0.37)
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
If we have a channel_announcement, we catch any node_announcement for
either end while we validate the channel_announcement. But if we have
multiple channel_announcements and the first one failed to verify, it
would remove this catch, meaning we'd discard following node_announcements
even though there was a pending channel_announcement.
The answer is to use a simple reference count, and as a further
optimization, only place the `pending_node_announce` if there's no
node already.
We also move the process_pending_node_announcement() calls lower down,
so *any* new channel creation checks it. This is more robust, and
will prove useful for the next patch, where we can use the same
mechanism to handle node_announcements on channel_announcements which
are verified, but don't yet have a channel_update.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is currently done higher up, in handle_channel_update(), but
that's one reason why handle_channel_update() has to do a channel
lookup. Moving the check down means handle_channel_update() can do a
minimal "get node id for this channel" so it can check the signature.
This helps, because the chan lookup semantics are changing in the next
few patches.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
If we need the payload, pull it from the gossip store.
MCP results from 5 runs, min-max(mean +/- stddev):
store_load_msec:30189-52561(39416.4+/-8.8e+03)
vsz_kb:1812904
store_rewrite_sec:21.390000-27.070000(23.596+/-2.4)
listnodes_sec:1.120000-1.230000(1.176+/-0.044)
listchannels_sec:38.900000-50.580000(44.716+/-3.9)
routing_sec:45.080000-48.160000(46.814+/-1.1)
peer_write_all_sec:58.780000-87.150000(72.278+/-9.7)
MCP notable changes from previous patch (>1 stddev):
-vsz_kb:2288784
+vsz_kb:1812904
-store_rewrite_sec:38.060000-39.130000(38.426+/-0.39)
+store_rewrite_sec:21.390000-27.070000(23.596+/-2.4)
-listnodes_sec:0.750000-0.850000(0.794+/-0.042)
+listnodes_sec:1.120000-1.230000(1.176+/-0.044)
-listchannels_sec:30.740000-31.760000(31.096+/-0.35)
+listchannels_sec:38.900000-50.580000(44.716+/-3.9)
-routing_sec:29.600000-33.560000(30.472+/-1.5)
+routing_sec:45.080000-48.160000(46.814+/-1.1)
-peer_write_all_sec:49.220000-52.690000(50.892+/-1.3)
+peer_write_all_sec:58.780000-87.150000(72.278+/-9.7)
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Instead of an arbitrary counter, we can use the file offset for our
partial ordering, removing a field. It takes some care when we compact
the store, however, as this field changes.
MCP results from 5 runs, min-max(mean +/- stddev):
store_load_msec:34271-35283(34789.6+/-3.3e+02)
vsz_kb:2288784
store_rewrite_sec:38.060000-39.130000(38.426+/-0.39)
listnodes_sec:0.750000-0.850000(0.794+/-0.042)
listchannels_sec:30.740000-31.760000(31.096+/-0.35)
routing_sec:29.600000-33.560000(30.472+/-1.5)
peer_write_all_sec:49.220000-52.690000(50.892+/-1.3)
MCP notable changes from previous patch (>1 stddev):
-store_load_msec:35685-38538(37090.4+/-9.1e+02)
+store_load_msec:34271-35283(34789.6+/-3.3e+02)
-vsz_kb:2288768
+vsz_kb:2288784
-peer_write_all_sec:51.140000-58.350000(55.69+/-2.4)
+peer_write_all_sec:49.220000-52.690000(50.892+/-1.3)
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is more compact, but also required once we replace the arbitrary
"index" with an actual offset into the gossip store. That will let us
remove the in-memory variants entirely.
MCP results from 5 runs, min-max(mean +/- stddev):
store_load_msec:35685-38538(37090.4+/-9.1e+02)
vsz_kb:2288768
store_rewrite_sec:35.530000-41.230000(37.904+/-2.3)
listnodes_sec:0.720000-0.810000(0.762+/-0.041)
listchannels_sec:30.750000-35.990000(32.704+/-2)
routing_sec:29.570000-34.010000(31.374+/-1.8)
peer_write_all_sec:51.140000-58.350000(55.69+/-2.4)
MCP notable changes from previous patch (>1 stddev):
-vsz_kb:2621808
+vsz_kb:2288768
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We used an s64 so we could use -1 and save a check, but that's just
silly as we have adjacent non-u64 fields: wastes 7 bytes per node
and 16 per channel.
Interestingly, this seemed to make us a little slower for some reason.
MCP results from 5 runs, min-max(mean +/- stddev):
store_load_msec:35569-38776(37169.8+/-1.2e+03)
vsz_kb:2621808
store_rewrite_sec:35.870000-40.290000(38.14+/-1.6)
listnodes_sec:0.740000-0.800000(0.768+/-0.023)
listchannels_sec:29.820000-32.730000(30.972+/-0.99)
routing_sec:30.110000-30.590000(30.346+/-0.18)
peer_write_all_sec:52.420000-59.160000(54.692+/-2.5)
MCP notable changes from previous patch (>1 stddev):
-store_load_msec:32825-36365(34615.6+/-1.1e+03)
+store_load_msec:35569-38776(37169.8+/-1.2e+03)
-vsz_kb:2637488
+vsz_kb:2621808
-store_rewrite_sec:35.150000-36.200000(35.59+/-0.4)
+store_rewrite_sec:35.870000-40.290000(38.14+/-1.6)
-listnodes_sec:0.590000-0.710000(0.682+/-0.046)
+listnodes_sec:0.740000-0.800000(0.768+/-0.023)
-peer_write_all_sec:49.020000-52.890000(50.376+/-1.5)
+peer_write_all_sec:52.420000-59.160000(54.692+/-2.5)
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Don't turn them to/from pubkeys implicitly. This means nodeids in the store
don't get converted, but bitcoin keys still do.
MCP results from 5 runs, min-max(mean +/- stddev):
store_load_msec:33934-35251(34531.4+/-5e+02)
vsz_kb:2637488
store_rewrite_sec:34.720000-35.130000(34.94+/-0.14)
listnodes_sec:1.020000-1.290000(1.146+/-0.086)
listchannels_sec:51.110000-58.240000(54.826+/-2.5)
routing_sec:30.000000-33.320000(30.726+/-1.3)
peer_write_all_sec:50.370000-52.970000(51.646+/-1.1)
MCP notable changes from previous patch (>1 stddev):
-store_load_msec:46184-47474(46673.4+/-4.5e+02)
+store_load_msec:33934-35251(34531.4+/-5e+02)
-vsz_kb:2638880
+vsz_kb:2637488
-store_rewrite_sec:46.750000-48.280000(47.512+/-0.51)
+store_rewrite_sec:34.720000-35.130000(34.94+/-0.14)
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
I tried to just do gossipd, but it was uncontainable, so this ended up being
a complete sweep.
We didn't get much space saving in gossipd, even though we should save
24 bytes per node.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Allocating a htable is overkill for most nodes; we can fit 11 pointers
in the same space (10, since we use 1 to indicate we're using an array).
MCP results from 5 runs, min-max(mean +/- stddev):
store_load_msec:45947-47016(46683.4+/-4e+02)
vsz_kb:2639240
store_rewrite_sec:46.950000-49.830000(48.048+/-0.95)
listnodes_sec:1.090000-1.350000(1.196+/-0.095)
listchannels_sec:48.960000-57.640000(53.358+/-2.8)
routing_sec:29.990000-33.880000(31.088+/-1.4)
peer_write_all_sec:49.360000-53.210000(51.338+/-1.4)
MCP notable changes from previous patch (>1 stddev):
- vsz_kb:2641316
+ vsz_kb:2639240
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Makes the next step easier.
MCP results from 5 runs, min-max(mean +/- stddev):
store_load_msec:45791-46917(46330.4+/-3.6e+02)
vsz_kb:2641316
store_rewrite_sec:47.040000-48.720000(47.684+/-0.57)
listnodes_sec:1.140000-1.340000(1.2+/-0.072)
listchannels_sec:50.970000-54.250000(52.698+/-1.3)
routing_sec:29.950000-31.010000(30.332+/-0.37)
peer_write_all_sec:51.570000-52.970000(52.1+/-0.54)
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Either private or simply not enough confirms. They would have been added
on reconnect, but that's not ideal.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This lets us benchmark without a valid blockchain.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Header from folded patch 'fixup!_gossipd__dev_option_to_allow_unknown_channels.patch':
fixup! gossipd: dev option to allow unknown channels.
Suggested-by: @cdecker
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
For giant nodes, it seems we spend a lot of time memmoving this array.
Normally we'd go for a linked list, but that's actually hard: each
channel has two nodes, so needs two embedded list pointers, and when
iterating there's no good way to figure out which embedded pointer
we'd be using.
So we (ab)use htable; we don't really need an index, but it's good for
cache-friendly iteration (our main operation). We can actually change
to a hybrid later to avoid the extra allocation for small nodes.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
If we asked `bitcoind` for a txout and it failed we were not storing that
information anywhere, meaning that when we see the channel announcement the
next time we'd be reaching out to `lightningd` and `bitcoind` again, just to
see it fail again. This adds an in-memory cache for these failures so we can
just ignore these the next time around.
Fixes#2503
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
We need to do it in various places, but we shouldn't do it lightly:
the primitives are there to help us get overflow handling correct.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Basically we tell it that every field ending in '_msat' is a struct
amount_msat, and 'satoshis' is an amount_sat. The exceptions are
channel_update's fee_base_msat which is a u32, and
final_incorrect_htlc_amount's incoming_htlc_amt which is also a
'struct amount_msat'.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
As a side-effect of using amount_msat in gossipd/routing.c, we explicitly
handle overflows and don't need to pre-prune ridiculous-fee channels.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Up until now, riskfactor was useless due to implementation bugs, and
also the default setting is wrong (too low to have an effect on
reasonable payment scenarios).
Let's simplify the definition (by assuming that P(failure) of a node
is 1), to make it a simple percentage. I examined the current network
fees to see what would work, and under this definition, a default of
10 seems reasonable (equivalent to 1000 under the old definition).
It is *this* change which finally fixes our test case! The riskfactor
is now 40msat (1500000 * 14 * 10 / 5259600 = 39.9), comparable with
worst-case fuzz is 50msat (1001 * 0.05 = 50).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We were only comparing by total msatoshis.
Note, this *still* isn't sufficient to fix our indirect problem, as
our risk values are all 1 (the minimum):
lightning_gossipd(25480): 2 hop solution: 1501990 + 2
lightning_gossipd(25480): 3 hop solution: 1501971 + 3
...
lightning_gossipd(25480): => chose 3 hop solution
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We have a seed, which is for (future!) unit testing consistency. This
makes it change every time, so our pay_direct_test is more useful.
I tried restarting the noed around the loop, but it tended to fail
rebinding to the same port for some reason?
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
As a general rule, lightningd shouldn't parse user packets. We move the
parsing into gossipd, and have it respond only to permanent failures.
Note that we should *not* unconditionally remove a channel on
WIRE_INVALID_ONION_HMAC, as this can be triggered (and we do!) by
feeding sendpay a route with an incorrect pubkey.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Currently only used by gossipd for channel elimination.
Also print them in canonical form (/[01]), so tests need to be
changed.
Suggested-by: @cdecker
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Christian and I both unwittingly used it in form:
*tal_arr_expand(&x) = tal(x, ...)
Since '=' isn't a sequence point, the compiler can (and does!) cache
the value of x, handing it to tal *after* tal_arr_expand() moves it
due to tal_resize().
The new version is somewhat less convenient to use, but doesn't have
this problem, since the assignment is always evaluated after the
resize.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is mainly just copying over the copy-editing from the
lightning-rfc repository.
[ Split to just perform changes after the UNKNOWN_PAYMENT_HASH change --RR ]
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Rusty Russell <@rustyrussell>
This is mainly just copying over the copy-editing from the
lightning-rfc repository.
[ Split to just perform changes prior to the UNKNOWN_PAYMENT_HASH change --RR ]
Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Rusty Russell <@rustyrussell>
We keep a chain_hash in struct daemon, becayse otherwise we end up with
`&peer->daemon->rstate->chainparams->genesis_blockhash` which is a bit
ridiculous.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This avoids some very ugly switch() statements which mixed the two,
but we also take the chance to rename 'towire_gossip_' to
'towire_gossipd_' for those inter-daemon messages; they're messages to
gossipd, not gossip messages.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Messages from a peer may be invalid in many ways: we send an error
packet in that case. Rather than internally calling peer_error,
however, we make it explicit by having the handle_ functions return
NULL or an error packet.
Messages from the daemon itself should not be invalid: we log an error
and close the fd to them if it is. Previously we logged an error but
didn't kill them.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
If another channel has set the optional `htlc_maximum_msat` field,
we should correctly parse that field and respect it when drawing up
routes for payments.
Rusty Russell
Christian Decker
Michael Schmoock
lisa neigut