When they propose an HTLC to us, they need to be able to cover both it,
and the associated fees. When it gets acked and applied to them, however,
they may no longer be able to afford the fees; this is OK and expected.
So add a flag to say whether they can dig into fees or not: without
this patch the code calls fatal() on the next patch which tests it.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We create a logging object when we connect, then carry it through. If
it comes from the database, we just use the peerid as the log prefix.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
If we haven't received their closing signature yet, we might try to
send the closing packet anyway (and segfault). Make sure we have
their signature before trying that.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is less convenient to use, but makes far more sense for a real
user (like a wallet). It can ask about the route, then decide whether
to use it or not.
This will make even more sense once we add a parameter to control how
long we let the HTLC be delayed for, so a client can query for high,
medium and low tolerances and compare results.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We stopped automatically retransmitting locally-generated add/removes
after a reconnect, but this breaks the "pay" interface as it stands.
The correct solution to this is to make the pay interface idempotent:
you can trigger it as many times as you want and it will only succeed
once.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
If we've not relayed a failure yet (ie. we relayed it instantly, but it
wasn't confirmed), we need to redo it.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
It's not currently encrypted, but at least you get some idea now why
an HTLC failed. We (ab)use HTTP error codes for the moment.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
These low level commands we restarted on reconnect for ease of
testing. Don't do that, and check that we're connected when those
commands occur.
This introduces subtle issues with --manual-commit --reconnect: restarting
node1 also forgets uncommitted things from node2, requiring reordering for
some tests.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
If we send an HTLC #1, then get disconnected before a confirm, we will
forget it. But we've incremented peer->htlc_id_counter, so when we offer
it again we'll make it HTLC #2, which is non-consecutive.
To make this clear, we always start htlc ids at 0 now. That revealed
the bugs handled in the previous patch.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
I originally overloaded struct htlc for this, as they go through the
same states, but separating them turned out to be clearer.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This makes more sense eventually: we may know the network addresses of
many peers, not just those we're connecting to. So keep a mapping, and
update it when we successfully connect outwards.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Testing this revealed that we can't just reconnect when we have something to
send, as we might be NATed; we should try to reconnect anyway.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
1. Fix #ifdef DEBUG code in signature.c so it compiles.
2. Don't set peer->closing.our_script in queue_pkt_close_shutdown: it's
assigned in caller already.
3. Wrap setting of htlc's rval in set_htlc_rval() function.
4. Log where we were when unexpected packet comes in.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
More of a pure allocator, for when we load peers from db. Also moves
shachain_init out of secrets and into new_peer where it logically
belongs.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
So if there are no HTLCs, and the receiver can't spend anyway, don't
sign. This has the added benefit that no two signed commitment
transactions will ever be identical (the revocation preimage changes).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This gives us a clear way to indicate "invalid", and also sqlite3 stores
signed 64-bit numbers, so it's clearer this way.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is dumb, since one side will never succeed. But in future when
there is a method for nodes to broadcast their public address (or send
their address inline to connected nodes), either side should try to
connect.
Importantly though, there are places which will queue packets at
various times (eg. HTLC timeout), so we need to clear the queue just
before re-transmitting, not when disconnecting.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
To do this we keep an order counter so we know how to retransmit. We
could simply keep old packets, but this is a little clearer for now.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This avoids us having to query it when we create anchor transaction, and
lets us always use dynamic fee information.
The config options for max and min are now percentages, rather than absolute.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We no longer need it anywhere. This simplifies things to the point where
we might as well just not include dust outputs as we go, rather than
explicitly removing them, which gets rid of remove_dust.c as well.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Similar to the way we derive which outputs are which for old transactions
we steal, we derive them even for their current transaction.
We keep track of this information in peer->closing.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
At the moment, for our or their unilateral close, we create a resolved[]
entry for our output, their output, and each HTLC, in cstate order. Some
of these outputs might not exist (too small), so it's actually better
to simply keep a resolved[] entry for each of the tx's actual outputs.
(We already changed the steal resolved[] array to work like this, but
these are trickier, since we rely on that order if we need to fulfill an
on-chain HTLC).
It also helps as we are weaning off knowing the cstate and permutation
mapping for each commitment transaction.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We want to stop keeping old commitment information (except the minimal
txid to commitment-number mapping). One place we currently use it is
after sending a commitment signature, and before we've received the
revocation for the old commitment. For this duration, there are two
valid commitment transactions.
So we store "their_prev_revocation_hash" explicitly for this duration.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
It's a data-leak to send ack before we have verified identity of peer.
Plus, we can't send it until we know which peer it is, anyway!
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
And use this to resolve old transactions by comparing outputs with
HTLCs.
Rather than remembering the output ordering for every one of their
previous commitment transactions, we just remember the commitment
number for each commitment txid, and when we see it, derive all the
HTLC scriptpubkeys and the to-us and to-them scriptpubkeys, and figure
out which is which.
This avoids us having to save information on disk, except for the
txid->commitment-number mapping (and the shachain).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This makes it explicit, which is better for storing in a database (before
it was just what watch callback, plus peer->local.mindepth).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Move other logic into caller, but it's not complete (it still needs to
check some things, and still records some results).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Move other logic into caller: it grew this way because we used to have
a centralized "state" machine which knew nothing of these internal
details. But now we want to re-queue packets on reconnect, we really
want these routines to be idempotent.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We're weaning off the cstate arrays; use the htlc map. But for the
moment we keep the output basically the same.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We had an occasional race where we hadn't gotten the remote revocation
before submitting fulfill (spotted by the HTLC state transition code).
Disallow this, but also add to the json output so we can wait for
an HTLC to be irrevocably committed.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Not separate "locally-offered" and "remotely-offered" ones; we can
distinguish them by htlc->state now.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Since we only care about the latest commits, we can simply associate a
state with each HTLC, rather than using queues of HTLCs associated
with each commitment transaction.
This works far better in the context of a database.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We need SO_REUSEADDR, and we need to memset sockaddr to zero; valgrind
complains for both IPv4 and IPv6, but the invalid sin6_flowinfo causes
the IPv6 bind to fail altogether.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
From doing a code walkthrough with Christian Decker; unnecessary const in
bitcoin/tx.c, an erroneous FIXME, a missing comment, and an unused struct.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is generally redundant, since HTLC pointer is in that side's
commit_info, but makes HTLC completely self-contained.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Update libsecp256k1 has a normalize function, which allows us to test
if the signature was in low-S form.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We use libsecp256k1 to convert signatures to DER; we were creating a
temporary one, but we really should be handing the one we have in dstate
through. This does that, everywhere.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
BOLT has been updated, so update code and comments. The receiving
side check is sufficient, as the limit is per-offerer, and that's the
only way the HTLCs get back to the offerer's side.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Thus a node MUST estimate the deadline for successful redemption for
each HTLC it offers. A node MUST NOT offer a HTLC after this
deadline, and MUST fail the connection if an HTLC which it offered is
in either node's current commitment transaction past this deadline.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
There's a corner case where they had it in their commit tx, in which
case we can't fail the HTLC until our commit tx has won. Again, we
use dstate->config.min_htlc_expiry.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We now need to use bitcoin_witness_htlc with the r value, so that API
is updated to take 'struct rval' or 'struct sha256'.
We use the nc->delay amount (ie. dstate->config.min_htlc_expiry) to
wait for a timeout refund to be buried before "failing" upstream.
This should probably be made into a clearer parameter rather than
overloading this one.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Header from folded patch 'dont-use-peer-nc-in-onchain-code.patch':
peer: Don't use peer->nc->delay for onchain case.
Use the config var directly. We should be freeing peer->nc when the
connection dies anyway.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is the command an actual user would use: it figures out the fee
and route, and pays it if it can.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
If a block triggers two peers to close, we ran io_break() on both of them; the
second overrode the first and we didn't end up freeing that one.
Rather than chase such bugs in future, simply iterate to see if any
peers need freeing.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Note that the base fee is in millisatoshi, the proportional fee is
in microsatoshi per satoshi. ie. 1,000,000 means charge 1 satoshi for
every satoshi carried.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Most HTLCs we offer are triggered by an incoming HTLC from a different
peer. Save this "source" htlc, so we can fail/fulfill it when we
fail/fulfill this one.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
No more copies!
I tried changing the cstate->side[].htlcs to htlc_map rather than a
simple pointer array, but we rely on those array indices heavily for
permutation mapping, and it turned into a major rewrite (especially
for the steal case).
Eventually, we're going to want to reconstruct the commit info for
older commit txs rather than keeping all the permutation and
per-commit-info HTLC information in memory, so we can do the work
then.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
It's a more logical name, and a more logical place. We change
"funding" to "channel" in the remaining exposed symbols, too.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is the logical place for it to belong: with the HTLC. For the manually-created
HTLCs, we create a simple one-hop route.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is the more normal case; find by ID. The low-level json commands are
really just for testing.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
The protocol still supports both, but we now only support blocks.
It's hard to do risk management with timeouts in seconds, given block
variance. This is also signficantly simpler, as HTLC timeouts are
always fired in response to blocks, not wall-clock times.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Rusty Russell