Most HTLCs we offer are triggered by an incoming HTLC from a different
peer. Save this "source" htlc, so we can fail/fulfill it when we
fail/fulfill this one.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
No more copies!
I tried changing the cstate->side[].htlcs to htlc_map rather than a
simple pointer array, but we rely on those array indices heavily for
permutation mapping, and it turned into a major rewrite (especially
for the steal case).
Eventually, we're going to want to reconstruct the commit info for
older commit txs rather than keeping all the permutation and
per-commit-info HTLC information in memory, so we can do the work
then.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
It's a more logical name, and a more logical place. We change
"funding" to "channel" in the remaining exposed symbols, too.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is the logical place for it to belong: with the HTLC. For the manually-created
HTLCs, we create a simple one-hop route.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
The protocol still supports both, but we now only support blocks.
It's hard to do risk management with timeouts in seconds, given block
variance. This is also signficantly simpler, as HTLC timeouts are
always fired in response to blocks, not wall-clock times.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We need to know when changes are fully committed by both sides:
1) For their HTLC_ADDs, this is when we can fulfill/fail/route.
2) For their HTLC_FAILs, this is when we can fail incoming.
For HTLC_FULFULL we don't need to wait: as soon as we know the preimage
we can propogate it.
For the moment, we simply log and assert; acting on it comes later.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
While the pointer is only valid until the funding changes, that's also
true of the offset; and a pointer has a convenient "not found"
sentinal value.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We've been stuffing these into sha256s, but they're actually nonces.
Create a new structure for that for clarity.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
And make the add/fail/fulfill arg a pointer to a union htlc_staging
directly, removing struct htlc_progress.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We don't want anyone to think the commitment tx is signed, so only
assign ci->sig after validation.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We don't have to, but helps debugging. Language in latest rev of BOLT#2
has been tightened too (aa2e1919de0826beaf92e0b3b441a6ab9fce6261)
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We're about to allow changes while we're waiting for a commit ack.
This means we can't have a single "unacked changes" queue; when we
receive the revocation reply, we need to apply the unacked changes
known at the time we sent the commit, not any we've created since
then.
Note that we still only have a single staged_commit; we never have two
outstanding commits, since for simplicity we will still block
following update_commit pending the reply to the current one.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
As per lightning-rfc commit b8469aa758a1a7ebbd73c987be3e5207b778241b
("re-protocol: don't hand signature to non-funding side initially.")
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We already removed the on-chain states, now we remove the "clearing" state
(which wasn't fully implemented anyway).
This turns into two smaller state machines: one for clearing, which
still allows HTLCs to be failed and fulfilled, and one for mutual
close negotiation which only allows close_signature messages.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Previous to this, we kept the remote side's 'struct channel_state'
backwards: peer->remote.commit->cstate.side[OURS] was their HTLCs,
and [THEIRS] was our HTLCs. This made some things easier, but was
horrible for readability.
This inverts things so we keep track of the remote side's state from
our point of view: [OURS] is ours, [THEIRS] is theirs. Which makes
much more sense.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
As per lightning-rfc commit 8ee09e749990a11fa53bea03d5961cfde4be4616,
we remove the acks from the protocol now they're no longer needed (and
all the infrastructure).
We also place the commit number in the commit_info where it logically
belongs, removing it from the peer struct.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
From BOLT#2 (rev 8ee09e749990a11fa53bea03d5961cfde4be4616):
Thus each node (conceptually) tracks:
...
3. Two *unacked changesets*: one for the local commitment (their proposals) and one for the remote (our proposals)
4. Two *acked changesets*: one for the local commitment (our proposals, acknowledged) and one for the remote (their proposals, acknowledged).
(Note that an implementation MAY optimize this internally, for
example, pre-applying the changesets in some cases).
In our case, we apply the unacked changes immediately into
staging_cstate, and save them in an unacked_changes array. That array
gets applied to staging_cstate as soon as it's acked (we only allow
one outstanding update_commit, so we only need one array).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
While useful for testing, it doesn't make sense to have an explicit commit
command; we should commit whenever there are outstanding changes.
We have a 10ms timer to allow limited batching, however.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
It's not quite true: if we offer the anchor, we have a commitinfo
without their signature yet. So make it a pointer again. Since we
always allocate struct commit_info with talz, it starts as a NULL
pointer.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We just use a p2sh to a single address for the moment, but that's simply for
non-segwit wallets; we'll pay to whatever the other side specifies.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Rather than p2sh of a 2of2, it's now a version 0 witness program.
This means that the commit transaction input and mutual close
transaction input are both different.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We always set *matches to false (outside the branch, oops). We also
distinguish the case where we ack from the case where they acked,
which removes a FIXME and makes it work.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We now keep a list of commitment transaction states for "us" and
"them", as well as a "struct channel_state" for staged changes.
We manipulate these structures as we send out packets, receive
packets, or receive acknowledgement of packets. In particular, we
update the other nodes' staging_cstate as we send out our requests,
and update our own staging_cstate are we receive acks. When we
receive a request, we update both (as we immediately send out our
ack).
The RPC output is changed; rather than expose the complexity, we
expose our last committed state: what would happen if we have to drop
to the blockchain now.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Rather than creating packets then queueing them, call out to functions
which do both. This moves us towards doing more work in those functions
where we send out a request, which is sometimes clearer.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
And divide fees as specified there.
We still use fixed values rather than floating, and we don't send or
handle update_fee messages.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We don't actually implement closing when we have HTLCs (we should
allow it, as that's what the clearing phase is for), since soon we'll
rewrite HTLC to match the async HTLC protocol of BOLT #2.
Note that this folds the close paths, using a simple check if we have
a close transaction. That's a slight state layer violation, but
reduces code duplication.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This means we send the first two revocation hashes; this is important
once we move to a commit model as we need to send (unsolicited) the
signature for the *next* commit tx so we need its commit hash.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This encapsulates proposals more cleanly, and is important when we change
the protocol to have more than one outstanding at a time.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
The channel funding code needs to know who offered the anchor, as they
are responsible for paying fees until the other side is able to. This
is actually a hack, but at least now it's internal to funding and not
passed in at every funding_delta() call.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
It currently points into freed memory once we've make_commit_txs; we
don't currently dereference it after that, but I did in some test code
and got a surprise. Make a copy in all cases where we set it, so
there can't be lifetime problems.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is only for the simple case where there are no HTLCs.
We group the current commit information together in the struct;
this involves a trivial transform from peer->cur_commit_theirsig to
peer->cur_commit.theirsig.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We do the simplest thing: a timer goes off, and we check all HTLCs for
one which has expired more than 30 seconds ago.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This lets us implement accept_pkt_anchor().
Also had to predeclare sha256 in commit_tx.h, revealed by the new
includes.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Rusty Russell
sstone