We sweep looking for pointers to tal objects; we don't look for pointers
inside them. Thus lists only work transparently if they're at the head
of the object; so far this has been sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
1. Move the list to the start of `struct peer`: memleak walks the
list correctly this way.
2. Don't create tal parent loop daemon->conn->daemon.
The second one is silly anyway: we exit via master_gone when the master
conn is closed.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We're going to call out to subds for memleak detection, and the disabler
looks like a memleak if we're inside a callback.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We want to exclude the child from being entered into the htable:
if we wanted the parent we could do this outside the loop.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
memleak can't see into htables, as it overloads unused pointer bits.
And it can't see into intmap, since they use malloc (it only looks for tal
pointers).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
1. The handle pointer is always set to handle_client: just call direclty.
2. Call the root 'client' variable master.
3. We never exit the io_loop: we exit via master_gone instead, so cleanup there.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
The comment was wrong: the channel being locked in was triggering
the fee update and hence the disconnect. But that can actually
happen before fund_channel returns, as that waits for the gossipd
to see the channel active.
Best to do the fee update manually, so it's exactly what we want.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
If feerates change, L2 sends L3 a commit for that, which causes us to
fail the assert (which says we won't send a commitment_signed).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We use feerate in several places, and each one really should react
differently when it's not available (such as when bitcoind is still
catching up):
1. For general fee-enforcement, we use the broadest possible limits.
2. For closingd, we use it as our opening negotiation point: just use half
the last tx feerate.
3. For onchaind, we can use the last tx feerate as a guide for our own txs;
it might be too high, but at least we know it was sufficient to be mined.
4. For withdraw and fund_channel, we can simply refuse.
Fixes: #1836
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Manipulate fees via fake-bitcoin-cli. It's not quite the same, as
these are pre-smoothing, so we need a restart to override that where
we really need an exact change. Or we can wait until it reaches a
certain value in cases we don't care about exact amounts.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Not just during startup: we could have bitcoind not give estimates until
later, but we don't want to smooth with zero.
The test changes in next patch trigger this, so I didn't write a test
with this patch.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We don't respond to fee changes until we're locked in: make sure we catch
up at that point.
Note that we use NORMAL fees during opening, but IMMEDIATE after, so
this often sends a fee update. The tests which break, we set those
feerates to be equal.
This (sometimes) changes the behavior of test_permfail, as we now
get an immediate commit, so that is fixed too so we always wait for
that to complete.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is a noop if we're opening a new channel (channel_fees_can_change(channel)
is false until funding locked in), but important if we're restarting.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We don't update a channel's feerate on reestablishment: we insert a restart
in test_onchain_different_fees() (which we'll need soon anyway) to show it.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
When in this state, we send a canned error "Awaiting unilateral close".
We enter this both when we drop to chain, and when we're trying to get
them to drop to chain due to option_data_loss_protect.
As this state (unlike channel errors) is saved to the database, it means
we will *never* talk to a peer again in this state, so they can't
confuse us.
Since we set this state in channel_fail_permanent() (which is the only
place we call drop_to_chain for a unilateral close), we don't need to
save to the db: channel_set_state() does that for us.
This state change has a subtle effect: we return WIRE_UNKNOWN_NEXT_PEER
instead of WIRE_TEMPORARY_CHANNEL_FAILURE as soon as we get a failure
with a peer. To provoke a temporary failure in test_pay_disconnect we
take the node offline.
Reported-by: Christian Decker @cdecker
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This means we don't try to unilaterally close after a restart, *and*
we can tell onchaind to try to use the point to recover funds when the
peer unilaterally closes.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Firstly, if they claim to know a future value, we ask the HSM; if
they're right, we tell master what the per-commitment-secret it gave
us (we have no way to validate this, though) and it will not broadcast
a unilateral (knowing it will cause them to use a penalty tx!).
Otherwise, we check the results they sent were valid. The spec says
to do this (and close the channel if it's wrong!), because otherwise they
could continually lie and give us a bad per-commitment-secret when we
actually need it.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
For option_data_loss_protect, the peer can prove to us that it's ahead;
it gives us the (hopefully honest!) per_commitment_point it will use,
and we make sure we don't broadcast the commitment transaction we have.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Currently it works for any secret (we don't know the current secret),
but importantly it doesn't leak timing information when checking.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
I managed to crash the HSM by asking for point -1 (shachain_index has an
assert). Fail in this case, instead.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
To be safe, we should never memcmp secrets. We don't do this
currently outside tests, but we're about to.
The tests to prove this as constant time are the tricky bit.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Tests were failing when in the same thread after a test which set
log_all_io=True, because SIGUSR1 seemed to be turning logging *off*.
This is due to Python using references not copies for assignment.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is required for the next test, which has to log messages from channeld
as soon as it starts (so might be too late if it sends SIGUSR1).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We ignore incoming for now, but this means we advertize the option and
we send the required fields.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is a wrapper around shachain_get_hash, which converts the
commit_num to an index and returns a 'struct secret' rather than a
'struct sha256' (which is really an internal detail).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
peer features are only kept for connected peers (as they can change),
but we didn't update them on reconnect. The main effect was that
after a restart we displayed the features as empty, even after
reconnect.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We quote BOLT 2 on *local* above the *remote* checks (we quote it
again below when we do the local checks).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Rusty Russell