/* FIXME: Handle incoming gossip messages! */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* Stdout == status, stdin == requests, 3 == peer */ #define STATUS_FD STDOUT_FILENO #define REQ_FD STDIN_FILENO #define PEER_FD 3 struct points { struct pubkey funding_pubkey; struct pubkey revocation_basepoint; struct pubkey payment_basepoint; struct pubkey delayed_payment_basepoint; }; struct secrets { struct privkey funding_privkey; struct privkey revocation_basepoint_secret; struct privkey payment_basepoint_secret; struct privkey delayed_payment_basepoint_secret; }; struct state { struct crypto_state cs; struct pubkey next_per_commit[NUM_SIDES]; /* Funding and feerate: set by opening peer. */ u64 funding_satoshis, push_msat; u32 feerate_per_kw; struct sha256_double funding_txid; u8 funding_txout; /* Secret keys and basepoint secrets. */ struct secrets our_secrets; /* Our shaseed for generating per-commitment-secrets. */ struct sha256 shaseed; struct channel_config localconf, *remoteconf; /* Limits on what remote config we accept */ u32 max_to_self_delay; u64 min_effective_htlc_capacity_msat; struct channel *channel; }; static void derive_our_basepoints(const struct privkey *seed, struct points *points, struct secrets *secrets, struct sha256 *shaseed, struct pubkey *first_per_commit) { struct sha256 per_commit_secret; struct keys { struct privkey f, r, p, d; struct sha256 shaseed; } keys; hkdf_sha256(&keys, sizeof(keys), NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(*seed), "c-lightning", strlen("c-lightning")); secrets->funding_privkey = keys.f; secrets->revocation_basepoint_secret = keys.r; secrets->payment_basepoint_secret = keys.p; secrets->delayed_payment_basepoint_secret = keys.d; if (!pubkey_from_privkey(&keys.f, &points->funding_pubkey) || !pubkey_from_privkey(&keys.r, &points->revocation_basepoint) || !pubkey_from_privkey(&keys.p, &points->payment_basepoint) || !pubkey_from_privkey(&keys.d, &points->delayed_payment_basepoint)) status_failed(WIRE_OPENING_KEY_DERIVATION_FAILED, "seed = %s", type_to_string(trc, struct privkey, seed)); /* BOLT #3: * * A node MUST select an unguessable 256-bit seed for each connection, * and MUST NOT reveal the seed. */ *shaseed = keys.shaseed; /* BOLT #3: * * the first secret used MUST be index 281474976710655, and then the * index decremented. */ shachain_from_seed(shaseed, 281474976710655ULL, &per_commit_secret); /* BOLT #3: * * The `per-commitment-point` is generated using EC multiplication: * * per-commitment-point = per-commitment-secret * G */ if (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(secp256k1_ctx, &first_per_commit->pubkey, per_commit_secret.u.u8) != 1) status_failed(WIRE_OPENING_KEY_DERIVATION_FAILED, "first_per_commit create failed, secret = %s", type_to_string(trc, struct sha256, &per_commit_secret)); } static void check_config_bounds(struct state *state, const struct channel_config *remoteconf) { u64 capacity_msat; u64 reserve_msat; /* BOLT #2: * * The receiving node MUST fail the channel if `to-self-delay` is * unreasonably large. */ if (remoteconf->to_self_delay > state->max_to_self_delay) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_BAD_CONFIG, "to_self_delay %u larger than %u", remoteconf->to_self_delay, state->max_to_self_delay); /* BOLT #2: * * The receiver MAY fail the channel if `funding-satoshis` is too * small, and MUST fail the channel if `push-msat` is greater than * `funding-amount` * 1000. The receiving node MAY fail the channel * if it considers `htlc-minimum-msat` too large, * `max-htlc-value-in-flight` too small, `channel-reserve-satoshis` * too large, or `max-accepted-htlcs` too small. */ /* We accumulate this into an effective bandwidth minimum. */ /* Overflow check before capacity calc. */ if (remoteconf->channel_reserve_satoshis > state->funding_satoshis) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_BAD_CONFIG, "Invalid channel_reserve_satoshis %"PRIu64 " for funding_satoshis %"PRIu64, remoteconf->channel_reserve_satoshis, state->funding_satoshis); /* Consider highest reserve. */ reserve_msat = remoteconf->channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000; if (state->localconf.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 > reserve_msat) reserve_msat = state->localconf.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000; capacity_msat = state->funding_satoshis * 1000 - reserve_msat; if (remoteconf->max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < capacity_msat) capacity_msat = remoteconf->max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat; if (remoteconf->htlc_minimum_msat * (u64)1000 > capacity_msat) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_BAD_CONFIG, "Invalid htlc_minimum_msat %u" " for funding_satoshis %"PRIu64 " capacity_msat %"PRIu64, remoteconf->htlc_minimum_msat, state->funding_satoshis, capacity_msat); if (capacity_msat < state->min_effective_htlc_capacity_msat) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_BAD_CONFIG, "Channel capacity with funding %"PRIu64" msat," " reserves %"PRIu64"/%"PRIu64" msat," " max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat %"PRIu64 " is %"PRIu64" msat, which is below %"PRIu64" msat", state->funding_satoshis * 1000, remoteconf->channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, state->localconf.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, remoteconf->max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, capacity_msat, state->min_effective_htlc_capacity_msat); /* We don't worry about how many HTLCs they accept, as long as > 0! */ if (remoteconf->max_accepted_htlcs == 0) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_BAD_CONFIG, "max_accepted_htlcs %u invalid", remoteconf->max_accepted_htlcs); /* BOLT #2: * * It MUST fail the channel if `max-accepted-htlcs` is greater * than 511. */ if (remoteconf->max_accepted_htlcs > 511) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_BAD_CONFIG, "max_accepted_htlcs %u too large", remoteconf->max_accepted_htlcs); } static bool check_commit_sig(const struct state *state, const struct pubkey *our_funding_key, const struct pubkey *their_funding_key, struct bitcoin_tx *tx, const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *remotesig) { u8 *wscript; bool ret; wscript = bitcoin_redeem_2of2(state, our_funding_key, their_funding_key); ret = check_tx_sig(tx, 0, NULL, wscript, their_funding_key, remotesig); tal_free(wscript); return ret; } static secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sign_remote_commit(const struct state *state, const struct pubkey *our_funding_key, const struct pubkey *their_funding_key, struct bitcoin_tx *tx) { u8 *wscript; secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; wscript = bitcoin_redeem_2of2(state, our_funding_key, their_funding_key); /* Commit tx only has one input: funding tx. */ sign_tx_input(tx, 0, NULL, wscript, &state->our_secrets.funding_privkey, our_funding_key, &sig); tal_free(wscript); return sig; } /* We always set channel_reserve_satoshis to 1%, rounded up. */ static void set_reserve(u64 *reserve, u64 funding) { *reserve = (funding + 99) / 100; } static u8 *open_channel(struct state *state, const struct points *ours, u32 max_minimum_depth) { struct channel_id tmpid, tmpid2; u8 *msg; struct bitcoin_tx *tx; struct points theirs; secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; set_reserve(&state->localconf.channel_reserve_satoshis, state->funding_satoshis); /* BOLT #2: * * A sending node MUST set the most significant bit in * `temporary-channel-id`, and MUST ensure it is unique from any other * channel id with the same peer. */ /* We don't support more than one channel, so this is easy. */ memset(&tmpid, 0xFF, sizeof(tmpid)); /* BOLT #2: * * The sender MUST set `funding-satoshis` to less than 2^24 satoshi. */ if (state->funding_satoshis >= 1 << 24) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_BAD_PARAM, "funding_satoshis must be < 2^24"); /* BOLT #2: * * The sender MUST set `push-msat` to equal or less than to 1000 * * `funding-satoshis`. */ if (state->push_msat > 1000 * state->funding_satoshis) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_BAD_PARAM, "push-msat must be < %"PRIu64, 1000 * state->funding_satoshis); msg = towire_open_channel(state, &tmpid, state->funding_satoshis, state->push_msat, state->localconf.dust_limit_satoshis, state->localconf.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, state->localconf.channel_reserve_satoshis, state->localconf.htlc_minimum_msat, state->feerate_per_kw, state->localconf.to_self_delay, state->localconf.max_accepted_htlcs, &ours->funding_pubkey, &ours->revocation_basepoint, &ours->payment_basepoint, &ours->delayed_payment_basepoint, &state->next_per_commit[LOCAL]); if (!sync_crypto_write(&state->cs, PEER_FD, msg)) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_WRITE_FAILED, "Writing open_channel"); state->remoteconf = tal(state, struct channel_config); msg = sync_crypto_read(state, &state->cs, PEER_FD); if (!msg) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_READ_FAILED, "Reading accept_channel"); /* BOLT #2: * * The receiver MUST fail the channel if `funding-pubkey`, * `revocation-basepoint`, `payment-basepoint` or * `delayed-payment-basepoint` are not valid DER-encoded compressed * secp256k1 pubkeys. */ if (!fromwire_accept_channel(msg, NULL, &tmpid2, &state->remoteconf->dust_limit_satoshis, &state->remoteconf ->max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, &state->remoteconf ->channel_reserve_satoshis, &state->remoteconf->minimum_depth, &state->remoteconf->htlc_minimum_msat, &state->remoteconf->to_self_delay, &state->remoteconf->max_accepted_htlcs, &theirs.funding_pubkey, &theirs.revocation_basepoint, &theirs.payment_basepoint, &theirs.delayed_payment_basepoint, &state->next_per_commit[REMOTE])) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_READ_FAILED, "Parsing accept_channel %s", tal_hex(msg, msg)); /* BOLT #2: * * The `temporary-channel-id` MUST be the same as the * `temporary-channel-id` in the `open_channel` message. */ if (!structeq(&tmpid, &tmpid2)) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_READ_FAILED, "accept_channel ids don't match: sent %s got %s", type_to_string(msg, struct channel_id, &tmpid), type_to_string(msg, struct channel_id, &tmpid2)); /* BOLT #2: * * The receiver MAY reject the `minimum-depth` if it considers it * unreasonably large. * * Other fields have the same requirements as their counterparts in * `open_channel`. */ if (state->remoteconf->minimum_depth > max_minimum_depth) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_BAD_PARAM, "minimum_depth %u larger than %u", state->remoteconf->minimum_depth, max_minimum_depth); check_config_bounds(state, state->remoteconf); /* Now, ask master create a transaction to pay those two addresses. */ msg = towire_opening_open_resp(state, &ours->funding_pubkey, &theirs.funding_pubkey); wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, msg); /* Expect funding tx. */ msg = wire_sync_read(state, REQ_FD); if (!fromwire_opening_open_funding(msg, NULL, &state->funding_txid, &state->funding_txout)) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_READ_FAILED, "Expected valid opening_open_funding: %s", tal_hex(trc, msg)); state->channel = new_channel(state, &state->funding_txid, state->funding_txout, state->funding_satoshis, state->push_msat, state->feerate_per_kw, &state->localconf, state->remoteconf, &ours->revocation_basepoint, &theirs.revocation_basepoint, &ours->payment_basepoint, &theirs.payment_basepoint, &ours->delayed_payment_basepoint, &theirs.delayed_payment_basepoint, LOCAL); if (!state->channel) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_BAD_PARAM, "could not create channel with given config"); /* BOLT #2: * * ### The `funding_created` message * * This message describes the outpoint which the funder has created * for the initial commitment transactions. After receiving the * peer's signature, it will broadcast the funding transaction. */ tx = channel_tx(state, state->channel, &state->next_per_commit[REMOTE], NULL, REMOTE); sig = sign_remote_commit(state, &ours->funding_pubkey, &theirs.funding_pubkey, tx); status_trace("signature %s on tx %s using key %s", type_to_string(trc, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature, &sig), type_to_string(trc, struct bitcoin_tx, tx), type_to_string(trc, struct pubkey, &ours->funding_pubkey)); msg = towire_funding_created(state, &tmpid, &state->funding_txid.sha, state->funding_txout, &sig); if (!sync_crypto_write(&state->cs, PEER_FD, msg)) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_WRITE_FAILED, "Writing funding_created"); /* BOLT #2: * * ### The `funding_signed` message * * This message gives the funder the signature they need for the first * commitment transaction, so they can broadcast it knowing they can * redeem their funds if they need to. */ msg = sync_crypto_read(state, &state->cs, PEER_FD); if (!msg) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_READ_FAILED, "Reading funding_signed"); if (!fromwire_funding_signed(msg, NULL, &tmpid2, &sig)) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_READ_FAILED, "Parsing funding_signed (%s)", wire_type_name(fromwire_peektype(msg))); if (!structeq(&tmpid, &tmpid2)) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_READ_FAILED, "funding_signed ids don't match: sent %s got %s", type_to_string(msg, struct channel_id, &tmpid), type_to_string(msg, struct channel_id, &tmpid2)); /* BOLT #2: * * The recipient MUST fail the channel if `signature` is incorrect. */ tx = channel_tx(state, state->channel, &state->next_per_commit[LOCAL], NULL, LOCAL); if (!check_commit_sig(state, &ours->funding_pubkey, &theirs.funding_pubkey, tx, &sig)) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_READ_FAILED, "Bad signature %s on tx %s using key %s", type_to_string(trc, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature, &sig), type_to_string(trc, struct bitcoin_tx, tx), type_to_string(trc, struct pubkey, &theirs.funding_pubkey)); /* BOLT #2: * * Once the channel funder receives the `funding_signed` message, they * must broadcast the funding transaction to the Bitcoin network. */ return towire_opening_open_funding_resp(state, state->remoteconf, &sig, &state->cs, &theirs.revocation_basepoint, &theirs.payment_basepoint, &theirs.delayed_payment_basepoint, &state->next_per_commit[REMOTE]); } /* This is handed the message the peer sent which caused gossip to stop: * it should be an open_channel */ static u8 *recv_channel(struct state *state, const struct points *ours, u32 min_feerate, u32 max_feerate, const u8 *peer_msg) { struct channel_id tmpid, tmpid2; struct points theirs; secp256k1_ecdsa_signature theirsig, sig; struct bitcoin_tx *tx; u8 *msg; state->remoteconf = tal(state, struct channel_config); /* BOLT #2: * * The receiver MUST fail the channel if `funding-pubkey`, * `revocation-basepoint`, `payment-basepoint` or * `delayed-payment-basepoint` are not valid DER-encoded compressed * secp256k1 pubkeys. */ if (!fromwire_open_channel(peer_msg, NULL, &tmpid, &state->funding_satoshis, &state->push_msat, &state->remoteconf->dust_limit_satoshis, &state->remoteconf->max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, &state->remoteconf->channel_reserve_satoshis, &state->remoteconf->htlc_minimum_msat, &state->feerate_per_kw, &state->remoteconf->to_self_delay, &state->remoteconf->max_accepted_htlcs, &theirs.funding_pubkey, &theirs.revocation_basepoint, &theirs.payment_basepoint, &theirs.delayed_payment_basepoint, &state->next_per_commit[REMOTE])) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_BAD_INITIAL_MESSAGE, "Parsing open_channel %s", tal_hex(peer_msg, peer_msg)); /* BOLT #2 FIXME: * * The receiving node ... MUST fail the channel if `funding-satoshis` * is greater than or equal to 2^24 */ if (state->funding_satoshis >= 1 << 24) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_BAD_FUNDING, "funding_satoshis %"PRIu64" too large", state->funding_satoshis); /* BOLT #2: * * The receiving node ... MUST fail the channel if `push-msat` is * greater than `funding-amount` * 1000. */ if (state->push_msat > state->funding_satoshis * 1000) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_BAD_FUNDING, "push_msat %"PRIu64 " too large for funding_satoshis %"PRIu64, state->push_msat, state->funding_satoshis); /* BOLT #2: * * The receiver MUST fail the channel if it considers `feerate-per-kw` * too small for timely processing, or unreasonably large. */ if (state->feerate_per_kw < min_feerate) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_BAD_FUNDING, "feerate_per_kw %u below minimum %u", state->feerate_per_kw, min_feerate); if (state->feerate_per_kw > max_feerate) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_BAD_FUNDING, "feerate_per_kw %u above maximum %u", state->feerate_per_kw, max_feerate); set_reserve(&state->localconf.channel_reserve_satoshis, state->funding_satoshis); check_config_bounds(state, state->remoteconf); msg = towire_accept_channel(state, &tmpid, state->localconf.dust_limit_satoshis, state->localconf .max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, state->localconf.channel_reserve_satoshis, state->localconf.minimum_depth, state->localconf.htlc_minimum_msat, state->localconf.to_self_delay, state->localconf.max_accepted_htlcs, &ours->funding_pubkey, &ours->revocation_basepoint, &ours->payment_basepoint, &ours->delayed_payment_basepoint, &state->next_per_commit[LOCAL]); if (!sync_crypto_write(&state->cs, PEER_FD, msg)) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_WRITE_FAILED, "Writing accept_channel"); msg = sync_crypto_read(state, &state->cs, PEER_FD); if (!msg) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_READ_FAILED, "Reading funding_created"); if (!fromwire_funding_created(msg, NULL, &tmpid2, &state->funding_txid.sha, &state->funding_txout, &theirsig)) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_READ_FAILED, "Parsing funding_created"); /* BOLT #2: * * The sender MUST set `temporary-channel-id` the same as the * `temporary-channel-id` in the `open_channel` message. */ if (!structeq(&tmpid, &tmpid2)) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_READ_FAILED, "funding_created ids don't match: sent %s got %s", type_to_string(msg, struct channel_id, &tmpid), type_to_string(msg, struct channel_id, &tmpid2)); state->channel = new_channel(state, &state->funding_txid, state->funding_txout, state->funding_satoshis, state->push_msat, state->feerate_per_kw, &state->localconf, state->remoteconf, &ours->revocation_basepoint, &theirs.revocation_basepoint, &ours->payment_basepoint, &theirs.payment_basepoint, &ours->delayed_payment_basepoint, &theirs.delayed_payment_basepoint, REMOTE); if (!state->channel) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_BAD_PARAM, "could not create channel with given config"); /* BOLT #2: * * The recipient MUST fail the channel if `signature` is incorrect. */ tx = channel_tx(state, state->channel, &state->next_per_commit[LOCAL], NULL, LOCAL); if (!check_commit_sig(state, &ours->funding_pubkey, &theirs.funding_pubkey, tx, &theirsig)) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_READ_FAILED, "Bad signature %s on tx %s using key %s", type_to_string(trc, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature, &theirsig), type_to_string(trc, struct bitcoin_tx, tx), type_to_string(trc, struct pubkey, &theirs.funding_pubkey)); /* BOLT #2: * * ### The `funding_signed` message * * This message gives the funder the signature they need for the first * commitment transaction, so they can broadcast it knowing they can * redeem their funds if they need to. */ tx = channel_tx(state, state->channel, &state->next_per_commit[REMOTE], NULL, REMOTE); sig = sign_remote_commit(state, &ours->funding_pubkey, &theirs.funding_pubkey, tx); msg = towire_funding_signed(state, &tmpid, &sig); if (!sync_crypto_write(&state->cs, PEER_FD, msg)) peer_failed(PEER_FD, &state->cs, NULL, WIRE_OPENING_PEER_WRITE_FAILED, "Writing funding_signed"); return towire_opening_accept_resp(state, &state->funding_txid, state->funding_txout, state->remoteconf, &theirsig, &state->cs, &theirs.funding_pubkey, &theirs.revocation_basepoint, &theirs.payment_basepoint, &theirs.delayed_payment_basepoint, &state->next_per_commit[REMOTE]); } #ifndef TESTING int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { u8 *msg, *peer_msg; struct state *state = tal(NULL, struct state); struct privkey seed; struct points our_points; u32 max_minimum_depth; u32 min_feerate, max_feerate; if (argc == 2 && streq(argv[1], "--version")) { printf("%s\n", version()); exit(0); } subdaemon_debug(argc, argv); /* We handle write returning errors! */ signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN); secp256k1_ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY | SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN); status_setup(STATUS_FD); msg = wire_sync_read(state, REQ_FD); if (!msg) status_failed(WIRE_OPENING_BAD_COMMAND, "%s", strerror(errno)); if (!fromwire_opening_init(msg, NULL, &state->localconf, &state->max_to_self_delay, &state->min_effective_htlc_capacity_msat, &state->cs, &seed)) status_failed(WIRE_OPENING_BAD_COMMAND, "%s", strerror(errno)); tal_free(msg); /* We derive everything from the one secret seed. */ derive_our_basepoints(&seed, &our_points, &state->our_secrets, &state->shaseed, &state->next_per_commit[LOCAL]); msg = wire_sync_read(state, REQ_FD); if (fromwire_opening_open(msg, NULL, &state->funding_satoshis, &state->push_msat, &state->feerate_per_kw, &max_minimum_depth)) msg = open_channel(state, &our_points, max_minimum_depth); else if (fromwire_opening_accept(state, msg, NULL, &min_feerate, &max_feerate, &peer_msg)) msg = recv_channel(state, &our_points, min_feerate, max_feerate, peer_msg); /* Write message and hand back the fd. */ wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, msg); fdpass_send(REQ_FD, PEER_FD); status_trace("Sent %s with fd", opening_control_wire_type_name(fromwire_peektype(msg))); /* Wait for exit command (avoid state close being read before reqfd) */ msg = wire_sync_read(state, REQ_FD); if (!msg) status_failed(WIRE_OPENING_BAD_COMMAND, "%s", strerror(errno)); if (!fromwire_opening_exit_req(msg, NULL)) status_failed(WIRE_OPENING_BAD_COMMAND, "Expected exit req not %i", fromwire_peektype(msg)); tal_free(state); return 0; } #endif /* TESTING */