#include "lightningd.h" #include "peer_control.h" #include "subd.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static void destroy_peer(struct peer *peer) { list_del_from(&peer->ld->peers, &peer->list); if (peer->fd >= 0) close(peer->fd); } static void peer_reconnect(struct peer *peer) { /* FIXME: Set timer, etc. */ } void peer_fail(struct peer *peer, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); log_info(peer->log, "Peer failure: "); logv(peer->log, -1, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); /* If we haven't reached awaiting locked, we don't need to reconnect */ if (!peer_persists(peer)) { log_info(peer->log, "Only reached state %s: forgetting", peer_state_name(peer->state)); tal_free(peer); return; } /* Reconnect unless we've dropped to chain. */ if (!peer_on_chain(peer)) peer_reconnect(peer); } void peer_set_condition(struct peer *peer, enum peer_state old_state, enum peer_state state) { log_info(peer->log, "state: %s -> %s", peer_state_name(peer->state), peer_state_name(state)); if (peer->state != old_state) fatal("peer state %s should be %s", peer_state_name(peer->state), peer_state_name(old_state)); peer->state = state; } void add_peer(struct lightningd *ld, u64 unique_id, int fd, const struct pubkey *id, const struct crypto_state *cs) { struct peer *peer = tal(ld, struct peer); const char *netname, *idname; u8 *msg; peer->ld = ld; peer->unique_id = unique_id; peer->owner = NULL; peer->scid = NULL; peer->id = tal_dup(peer, struct pubkey, id); peer->fd = fd; peer->cs = tal_dup(peer, struct crypto_state, cs); peer->funding_txid = NULL; peer->seed = NULL; peer->balance = NULL; peer->state = UNINITIALIZED; idname = type_to_string(peer, struct pubkey, id); /* Max 128k per peer. */ peer->log_book = new_log_book(peer, 128*1024, get_log_level(ld->dstate.log_book)); peer->log = new_log(peer, peer->log_book, "peer %s:", idname); /* FIXME: Don't assume protocol here! */ if (!netaddr_from_fd(peer->fd, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP, &peer->netaddr)) { log_unusual(ld->log, "Failed to get netaddr for outgoing: %s", strerror(errno)); tal_free(peer); return; } netname = netaddr_name(idname, &peer->netaddr); log_info(peer->log, "Connected from %s", netname); tal_free(idname); list_add_tail(&ld->peers, &peer->list); tal_add_destructor(peer, destroy_peer); /* Let gossip handle it from here. */ peer->owner = peer->ld->gossip; tal_steal(peer->owner, peer); peer_set_condition(peer, UNINITIALIZED, GOSSIPD); msg = towire_gossipctl_new_peer(peer, peer->unique_id, peer->cs); subd_send_msg(peer->ld->gossip, take(msg)); subd_send_fd(peer->ld->gossip, peer->fd); /* Peer struct longer owns fd. */ peer->fd = -1; peer->cs = tal_free(peer->cs); } struct peer *peer_by_unique_id(struct lightningd *ld, u64 unique_id) { struct peer *p; list_for_each(&ld->peers, p, list) if (p->unique_id == unique_id) return p; return NULL; } struct peer *peer_by_id(struct lightningd *ld, const struct pubkey *id) { struct peer *p; list_for_each(&ld->peers, p, list) if (pubkey_eq(p->id, id)) return p; return NULL; } /* When a per-peer subdaemon exits, see if we need to do anything. */ static void peer_owner_finished(struct subd *subd, int status) { /* If peer has moved on, do nothing. */ if (subd->peer->owner != subd) return; subd->peer->owner = NULL; peer_fail(subd->peer, "Owning subdaemon %s died", subd->name); } static int make_listen_fd(struct lightningd *ld, int domain, void *addr, socklen_t len) { int fd = socket(domain, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (fd < 0) { log_debug(ld->log, "Failed to create %u socket: %s", domain, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (addr) { int on = 1; /* Re-use, please.. */ if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on))) log_unusual(ld->log, "Failed setting socket reuse: %s", strerror(errno)); if (bind(fd, addr, len) != 0) { log_unusual(ld->log, "Failed to bind on %u socket: %s", domain, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } } if (listen(fd, 5) != 0) { log_unusual(ld->log, "Failed to listen on %u socket: %s", domain, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } return fd; fail: close_noerr(fd); return -1; } void setup_listeners(struct lightningd *ld) { struct sockaddr_in addr; struct sockaddr_in6 addr6; socklen_t len; int fd1, fd2; if (!ld->dstate.portnum) { log_debug(ld->log, "Zero portnum, not listening for incoming"); return; } memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.sin_family = AF_INET; addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; addr.sin_port = htons(ld->dstate.portnum); memset(&addr6, 0, sizeof(addr6)); addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6; addr6.sin6_addr = in6addr_any; addr6.sin6_port = htons(ld->dstate.portnum); /* IPv6, since on Linux that (usually) binds to IPv4 too. */ fd1 = make_listen_fd(ld, AF_INET6, &addr6, sizeof(addr6)); if (fd1 >= 0) { struct sockaddr_in6 in6; len = sizeof(in6); if (getsockname(fd1, (void *)&in6, &len) != 0) { log_unusual(ld->log, "Failed get IPv6 sockname: %s", strerror(errno)); close_noerr(fd1); fd1 = -1; } else { addr.sin_port = in6.sin6_port; assert(ld->dstate.portnum == ntohs(addr.sin_port)); log_debug(ld->log, "Creating IPv6 listener on port %u", ld->dstate.portnum); io_new_listener(ld, fd1, connection_in, ld); } } /* Just in case, aim for the same port... */ fd2 = make_listen_fd(ld, AF_INET, &addr, sizeof(addr)); if (fd2 >= 0) { len = sizeof(addr); if (getsockname(fd2, (void *)&addr, &len) != 0) { log_unusual(ld->log, "Failed get IPv4 sockname: %s", strerror(errno)); close_noerr(fd2); fd2 = -1; } else { assert(ld->dstate.portnum == ntohs(addr.sin_port)); log_debug(ld->log, "Creating IPv4 listener on port %u", ld->dstate.portnum); io_new_listener(ld, fd2, connection_in, ld); } } if (fd1 < 0 && fd2 < 0) fatal("Could not bind to a network address on port %u", ld->dstate.portnum); } static void connect_failed(struct lightningd_state *dstate, struct connection *c) { tal_free(c); } static void json_connect(struct command *cmd, const char *buffer, const jsmntok_t *params) { struct lightningd *ld = ld_from_dstate(cmd->dstate); struct connection *c; jsmntok_t *host, *porttok, *idtok; const tal_t *tmpctx = tal_tmpctx(cmd); struct pubkey id; char *name, *port; if (!json_get_params(buffer, params, "host", &host, "port", &porttok, "id", &idtok, NULL)) { command_fail(cmd, "Need host, port and id to connect"); return; } if (!pubkey_from_hexstr(buffer + idtok->start, idtok->end - idtok->start, &id)) { command_fail(cmd, "id %.*s not valid", idtok->end - idtok->start, buffer + idtok->start); return; } c = new_connection(cmd, ld, cmd, &id); name = tal_strndup(tmpctx, buffer + host->start, host->end - host->start); port = tal_strndup(tmpctx, buffer + porttok->start, porttok->end - porttok->start); if (!dns_resolve_and_connect(cmd->dstate, name, port, connection_out, connect_failed, c)) { command_fail(cmd, "DNS failed"); return; } tal_free(tmpctx); } static const struct json_command connect_command = { "connect", json_connect, "Connect to a {host} at {port} expecting node {id}", "Returns the {id} on success (once channel established)" }; AUTODATA(json_command, &connect_command); struct log_info { enum log_level level; struct json_result *response; }; /* FIXME: Share this with jsonrpc.c's code! */ static void log_to_json(unsigned int skipped, struct timerel diff, enum log_level level, const char *prefix, const char *log, struct log_info *info) { if (level < info->level) return; if (level != LOG_IO) json_add_string(info->response, NULL, log); } static void json_getpeers(struct command *cmd, const char *buffer, const jsmntok_t *params) { struct lightningd *ld = ld_from_dstate(cmd->dstate); struct peer *p; struct json_result *response = new_json_result(cmd); jsmntok_t *leveltok; struct log_info info; json_get_params(buffer, params, "?level", &leveltok, NULL); if (!leveltok) ; else if (json_tok_streq(buffer, leveltok, "debug")) info.level = LOG_DBG; else if (json_tok_streq(buffer, leveltok, "info")) info.level = LOG_INFORM; else if (json_tok_streq(buffer, leveltok, "unusual")) info.level = LOG_UNUSUAL; else if (json_tok_streq(buffer, leveltok, "broken")) info.level = LOG_BROKEN; else { command_fail(cmd, "Invalid level param"); return; } json_object_start(response, NULL); json_array_start(response, "peers"); list_for_each(&ld->peers, p, list) { json_object_start(response, NULL); json_add_u64(response, "unique_id", p->unique_id); json_add_string(response, "state", peer_state_name(p->state)); json_add_string(response, "netaddr", netaddr_name(response, &p->netaddr)); if (p->id) json_add_pubkey(response, "peerid", p->id); if (p->owner) json_add_string(response, "owner", p->owner->name); if (p->scid) json_add_short_channel_id(response, "channel", p->scid); if (p->balance) { json_add_u64(response, "msatoshi_to_us", p->balance[LOCAL]); json_add_u64(response, "msatoshi_to_them", p->balance[REMOTE]); } if (leveltok) { info.response = response; json_array_start(response, "log"); log_each_line(p->log_book, log_to_json, &info); json_array_end(response); } json_object_end(response); } json_array_end(response); json_object_end(response); command_success(cmd, response); } static const struct json_command getpeers_command = { "getpeers", json_getpeers, "List the current peers, if {level} is set, include {log}s", "Returns a 'peers' array" }; AUTODATA(json_command, &getpeers_command); struct peer *peer_from_json(struct lightningd *ld, const char *buffer, jsmntok_t *peeridtok) { struct pubkey peerid; if (!pubkey_from_hexstr(buffer + peeridtok->start, peeridtok->end - peeridtok->start, &peerid)) return NULL; return peer_by_id(ld, &peerid); } struct funding_channel { struct peer *peer; struct command *cmd; u64 satoshi; const struct utxo **utxomap; u64 change; u32 change_keyindex; struct pubkey local_fundingkey, remote_fundingkey; struct bitcoin_tx *funding_tx; /* We prepare this when channeld exits, and hold until HSM replies. */ u8 *channel_init_msg; }; static void fail_fundchannel_command(struct funding_channel *fc) { /* FIXME: More details? */ command_fail(fc->cmd, "Peer died"); } static void funding_broadcast_failed(struct peer *peer, int exitstatus, const char *err) { log_unusual(peer->log, "Funding broadcast exited with %i: %s", exitstatus, err); /* FIXME: send PKT_ERR to peer if this happens. */ tal_free(peer); } static enum watch_result funding_announce_cb(struct peer *peer, unsigned int depth, const struct sha256_double *txid, void *unused) { if (depth < ANNOUNCE_MIN_DEPTH) { return KEEP_WATCHING; } if (peer->state != CHANNELD_NORMAL || !peer->owner) { return KEEP_WATCHING; } subd_send_msg(peer->owner, take(towire_channel_funding_announce_depth(peer))); return DELETE_WATCH; } static enum watch_result funding_lockin_cb(struct peer *peer, unsigned int depth, const struct sha256_double *txid, void *unused) { const char *txidstr = type_to_string(peer, struct sha256_double, txid); struct txlocator *loc; log_debug(peer->log, "Funding tx %s depth %u of %u", txidstr, depth, peer->minimum_depth); tal_free(txidstr); if (depth < peer->minimum_depth) return KEEP_WATCHING; /* In theory, it could have been buried before we got back * from accepting openingd or disconnected: just wait for next one. */ if (!peer->owner || peer->state != CHANNELD_AWAITING_LOCKIN) { log_unusual(peer->log, "Funding tx confirmed, but peer state %s %s", peer_state_name(peer->state), peer->owner ? peer->owner->name : "unowned"); return KEEP_WATCHING; } loc = locate_tx(peer, peer->ld->topology, txid); peer->scid = tal(peer, struct short_channel_id); peer->scid->blocknum = loc->blkheight; peer->scid->txnum = loc->index; peer->scid->outnum = peer->funding_outnum; tal_free(loc); subd_send_msg(peer->owner, take(towire_channel_funding_locked(peer, peer->scid))); /* BOLT #7: * * If sent, `announcement_signatures` messages MUST NOT be sent until * `funding_locked` has been sent, and the funding transaction is has * at least 6 confirmations. */ if (depth >= ANNOUNCE_MIN_DEPTH) { subd_send_msg(peer->owner, take(towire_channel_funding_announce_depth(peer))); } else { watch_txid(peer, peer->ld->topology, peer, txid, funding_announce_cb, NULL); } return DELETE_WATCH; } /* FIXME: Reshuffle. */ static void peer_start_channeld(struct peer *peer, const u8 *initmsg); static bool opening_got_hsm_funding_sig(struct subd *hsm, const u8 *resp, const int *fds, struct funding_channel *fc) { secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sigs; struct bitcoin_tx *tx = fc->funding_tx; size_t i; if (!fromwire_hsmctl_sign_funding_reply(fc, resp, NULL, &sigs)) fatal("HSM gave bad sign_funding_reply %s", tal_hex(fc, resp)); if (tal_count(sigs) != tal_count(tx->input)) fatal("HSM gave %zu sigs, needed %zu", tal_count(sigs), tal_count(tx->input)); /* Create input parts from signatures. */ for (i = 0; i < tal_count(tx->input); i++) { struct pubkey key; if (!bip32_pubkey(fc->peer->ld->bip32_base, &key, fc->utxomap[i]->keyindex)) fatal("Cannot generate BIP32 key for UTXO %u", fc->utxomap[i]->keyindex); /* P2SH inputs have same witness. */ tx->input[i].witness = bitcoin_witness_p2wpkh(tx, &sigs[i], &key); } peer_set_condition(fc->peer, GETTING_SIG_FROM_HSM, OPENINGD_AWAITING_LOCKIN); /* Send it out and watch for confirms. */ broadcast_tx(hsm->ld->topology, fc->peer, tx, funding_broadcast_failed); watch_tx(fc->peer, fc->peer->ld->topology, fc->peer, tx, funding_lockin_cb, NULL); /* We could defer until after funding locked, but makes testing * harder. */ tal_del_destructor(fc, fail_fundchannel_command); command_success(fc->cmd, null_response(fc->cmd)); /* Start normal channel daemon. */ peer_start_channeld(fc->peer, fc->channel_init_msg); tal_free(fc); return true; } struct decoding_htlc { struct peer *peer; u64 id; u32 amount_msat; u32 cltv_expiry; struct sha256 payment_hash; u8 onion[TOTAL_PACKET_SIZE]; struct secret shared_secret; }; static void fail_htlc(struct peer *peer, struct htlc_end *hend, const u8 *msg) { u8 *reply = wrap_onionreply(hend, hend->shared_secret, msg); subd_send_msg(peer->owner, take(towire_channel_fail_htlc(peer, hend->htlc_id, reply))); if (taken(msg)) tal_free(msg); } static void fail_local_htlc(struct peer *peer, struct htlc_end *hend, const u8 *msg) { u8 *reply; enum onion_type failcode = fromwire_peektype(msg); log_broken(peer->log, "failed htlc %"PRIu64" code 0x%04x (%s)", hend->htlc_id, failcode, onion_type_name(failcode)); reply = create_onionreply(hend, hend->shared_secret, msg); fail_htlc(peer, hend, reply); } static u8 *make_failmsg(const tal_t *ctx, const struct htlc_end *hend, enum onion_type failcode) { struct sha256 *onion_sha = NULL; u8 *channel_update = NULL; if (failcode & BADONION) { /* FIXME: need htlc_end->sha? */ } if (failcode & UPDATE) { /* FIXME: Ask gossip daemon for channel_update. */ } switch (failcode) { case WIRE_INVALID_REALM: return towire_invalid_realm(ctx); case WIRE_TEMPORARY_NODE_FAILURE: return towire_temporary_node_failure(ctx); case WIRE_PERMANENT_NODE_FAILURE: return towire_permanent_node_failure(ctx); case WIRE_REQUIRED_NODE_FEATURE_MISSING: return towire_required_node_feature_missing(ctx); case WIRE_INVALID_ONION_VERSION: return towire_invalid_onion_version(ctx, onion_sha); case WIRE_INVALID_ONION_HMAC: return towire_invalid_onion_hmac(ctx, onion_sha); case WIRE_INVALID_ONION_KEY: return towire_invalid_onion_key(ctx, onion_sha); case WIRE_TEMPORARY_CHANNEL_FAILURE: return towire_temporary_channel_failure(ctx, channel_update); case WIRE_PERMANENT_CHANNEL_FAILURE: return towire_permanent_channel_failure(ctx); case WIRE_REQUIRED_CHANNEL_FEATURE_MISSING: return towire_required_channel_feature_missing(ctx); case WIRE_UNKNOWN_NEXT_PEER: return towire_unknown_next_peer(ctx); case WIRE_AMOUNT_BELOW_MINIMUM: return towire_amount_below_minimum(ctx, hend->msatoshis, channel_update); case WIRE_FEE_INSUFFICIENT: return towire_fee_insufficient(ctx, hend->msatoshis, channel_update); case WIRE_INCORRECT_CLTV_EXPIRY: /* FIXME: ctlv! */ return towire_incorrect_cltv_expiry(ctx, 0, channel_update); case WIRE_EXPIRY_TOO_SOON: return towire_expiry_too_soon(ctx, channel_update); case WIRE_UNKNOWN_PAYMENT_HASH: return towire_unknown_payment_hash(ctx); case WIRE_INCORRECT_PAYMENT_AMOUNT: return towire_incorrect_payment_amount(ctx); case WIRE_FINAL_EXPIRY_TOO_SOON: return towire_final_expiry_too_soon(ctx); case WIRE_FINAL_INCORRECT_CLTV_EXPIRY: /* FIXME: ctlv! */ return towire_final_incorrect_cltv_expiry(ctx, 0); case WIRE_FINAL_INCORRECT_HTLC_AMOUNT: return towire_final_incorrect_htlc_amount(ctx, hend->msatoshis); } abort(); } /* BOLT #4: * * * `amt_to_forward` - The amount in milli-satoshi to forward to the next * (outgoing) hop specified within the routing information. * * This value MUST factor in the computed fee for this particular hop. When * processing an incoming Sphinx packet along with the HTLC message it's * encapsulated within, if the following inequality doesn't hold, then the * HTLC should be rejected as it indicates a prior node in the path has * deviated from the specified paramters: * * incoming_htlc_amt - fee >= amt_to_forward * * Where `fee` is calculated according to the receving node's advertised fee * schema as described in [BOLT 7](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/07-routing-gossip.md#htlc-fees), or 0 if this node is the * final hop. */ static bool check_amount(struct htlc_end *hend, u64 amt_to_forward, u64 amt_in_htlc, u64 fee) { if (amt_in_htlc - fee >= amt_to_forward) return true; log_debug(hend->peer->ld->log, "HTLC %"PRIu64" incorrect amount:" " %"PRIu64" in, %"PRIu64" out, fee reqd %"PRIu64, hend->htlc_id, amt_in_htlc, amt_to_forward, fee); return false; } /* BOLT #4: * * * `outgoing_cltv_value` - The CLTV value that the _outgoing_ HTLC carrying * the packet should have. * * cltv-expiry - cltv-expiry-delta = outgoing_cltv_value * * Inclusion of this field allows a node to both authenticate the information * specified by the original sender and the paramaters of the HTLC forwarded, * and ensure the original sender is using the current `cltv-expiry-delta` value. * If there is no next hop, `cltv-expiry-delta` is zero. * If the values don't correspond, then the HTLC should be failed+rejected as * this indicates the incoming node has tampered with the intended HTLC * values, or the origin has an obsolete `cltv-expiry-delta` value. * The node MUST be consistent in responding to an unexpected * `outgoing_cltv_value` whether it is the final hop or not, to avoid * leaking that information. */ static bool check_ctlv(struct htlc_end *hend, u32 ctlv_expiry, u32 outgoing_cltv_value, u32 delta) { if (ctlv_expiry - delta == outgoing_cltv_value) return true; log_debug(hend->peer->ld->log, "HTLC %"PRIu64" incorrect CLTV:" " %u in, %u out, delta reqd %u", hend->htlc_id, ctlv_expiry, outgoing_cltv_value, delta); return false; } static void fulfill_htlc(struct htlc_end *hend, const struct preimage *preimage) { u8 *msg; hend->peer->balance[LOCAL] += hend->msatoshis; hend->peer->balance[REMOTE] -= hend->msatoshis; /* FIXME: fail the peer if it doesn't tell us that htlc fulfill is * committed before deadline. */ msg = towire_channel_fulfill_htlc(hend->peer, hend->htlc_id, preimage); subd_send_msg(hend->peer->owner, take(msg)); } static void handle_localpay(struct htlc_end *hend, u32 cltv_expiry, const struct sha256 *payment_hash, u64 amt_to_forward, u32 outgoing_cltv_value) { u8 *err; struct invoice *invoice; /* BOLT #4: * * If the `amt_to_forward` does not match the `incoming_htlc_amt` of * the HTLC at the final hop: * * 1. type: 19 (`final_incorrect_htlc_amount`) * 2. data: * * [4:incoming-htlc-amt] */ if (!check_amount(hend, amt_to_forward, hend->msatoshis, 0)) { err = towire_final_incorrect_htlc_amount(hend, hend->msatoshis); goto fail; } /* BOLT #4: * * If the `outgoing_cltv_value` does not match the `ctlv-expiry` of * the HTLC at the final hop: * * 1. type: 18 (`final_incorrect_cltv_expiry`) * 2. data: * * [4:cltv-expiry] */ if (!check_ctlv(hend, cltv_expiry, outgoing_cltv_value, 0)) { err = towire_final_incorrect_cltv_expiry(hend, cltv_expiry); goto fail; } invoice = find_unpaid(hend->peer->ld->dstate.invoices, payment_hash); if (!invoice) { err = towire_unknown_payment_hash(hend); goto fail; } /* BOLT #4: * * If the amount paid is less than the amount expected, the final node * MUST fail the HTLC. If the amount paid is more than twice the * amount expected, the final node SHOULD fail the HTLC. This allows * the sender to reduce information leakage by altering the amount, * without allowing accidental gross overpayment: * * 1. type: PERM|16 (`incorrect_payment_amount`) */ if (hend->msatoshis < invoice->msatoshi) { err = towire_incorrect_payment_amount(hend); goto fail; } else if (hend->msatoshis > invoice->msatoshi * 2) { err = towire_incorrect_payment_amount(hend); goto fail; } /* BOLT #4: * * If the `cltv-expiry` is too low, the final node MUST fail the HTLC: */ if (get_block_height(hend->peer->ld->topology) + hend->peer->ld->dstate.config.deadline_blocks >= cltv_expiry) { log_debug(hend->peer->log, "Expiry cltv %u too close to current %u + deadline %u", cltv_expiry, get_block_height(hend->peer->ld->topology), hend->peer->ld->dstate.config.deadline_blocks); err = towire_final_expiry_too_soon(hend); goto fail; } connect_htlc_end(&hend->peer->ld->htlc_ends, hend); log_info(hend->peer->ld->log, "Resolving invoice '%s' with HTLC %"PRIu64, invoice->label, hend->htlc_id); fulfill_htlc(hend, &invoice->r); resolve_invoice(&hend->peer->ld->dstate, invoice); return; fail: fail_local_htlc(hend->peer, hend, take(err)); tal_free(hend); } static struct peer *peer_by_pubkey(struct lightningd *ld, const struct pubkey *id) { struct peer *peer; list_for_each(&ld->peers, peer, list) { if (pubkey_cmp(id, peer->id) == 0) return peer; } return NULL; } /* * A catchall in case outgoing peer disconnects before getting fwd. * * We could queue this and wait for it to come back, but this is simple. */ static void hend_subd_died(struct htlc_end *hend) { /* FIXME: Ask gossip daemon for channel_update. */ u8 *channel_update = NULL; u8 *failmsg = towire_temporary_channel_failure(hend->other_end, channel_update); u8 *msg = towire_channel_fail_htlc(hend->other_end, hend->other_end->htlc_id, failmsg); log_debug(hend->other_end->peer->owner->log, "Failing HTLC %"PRIu64" due to peer death", hend->other_end->htlc_id); subd_send_msg(hend->other_end->peer->owner, take(msg)); tal_free(failmsg); } static bool rcvd_htlc_reply(struct subd *subd, const u8 *msg, const int *fds, struct htlc_end *hend) { u16 failure_code; u8 *failurestr; if (!fromwire_channel_offer_htlc_reply(msg, msg, NULL, &hend->htlc_id, &failure_code, &failurestr)) { log_broken(subd->log, "Bad channel_offer_htlc_reply"); tal_free(hend); return false; } if (failure_code) { log_debug(hend->other_end->peer->owner->log, "HTLC failed from other daemon: %s (%.*s)", onion_type_name(failure_code), (int)tal_len(failurestr), (char *)failurestr); msg = make_failmsg(msg, hend->other_end, failure_code); subd_send_msg(hend->other_end->peer->owner, take(msg)); tal_free(hend); return true; } tal_del_destructor(hend, hend_subd_died); /* Add it to lookup table. */ connect_htlc_end(&hend->peer->ld->htlc_ends, hend); return true; } static void forward_htlc(struct htlc_end *hend, u32 cltv_expiry, const struct sha256 *payment_hash, u64 amt_to_forward, u32 outgoing_cltv_value, const struct pubkey *next_hop, const u8 next_onion[TOTAL_PACKET_SIZE]) { u8 *err, *msg; u64 fee; struct lightningd *ld = hend->peer->ld; struct peer *next = peer_by_pubkey(ld, next_hop); if (!next) { err = towire_unknown_next_peer(hend); goto fail; } if (!peer_can_add_htlc(next)) { log_info(next->log, "Attempt to forward HTLC but not ready"); err = towire_unknown_next_peer(hend); goto fail; } /* BOLT #7: * * The node creating `channel_update` SHOULD accept HTLCs which pay a * fee equal or greater than: * * fee-base-msat + htlc-amount-msat * fee-proportional-millionths / 1000000 */ if (mul_overflows_u64(amt_to_forward, ld->dstate.config.fee_per_satoshi)) { /* FIXME: Add channel update */ err = towire_fee_insufficient(hend, hend->msatoshis, NULL); goto fail; } fee = ld->dstate.config.fee_base + amt_to_forward * ld->dstate.config.fee_per_satoshi / 1000000; if (!check_amount(hend, amt_to_forward, hend->msatoshis, fee)) { /* FIXME: Add channel update */ err = towire_fee_insufficient(hend, hend->msatoshis, NULL); goto fail; } if (!check_ctlv(hend, cltv_expiry, outgoing_cltv_value, ld->dstate.config.deadline_blocks)) { /* FIXME: Add channel update */ err = towire_incorrect_cltv_expiry(hend, cltv_expiry, NULL); goto fail; } /* BOLT #4: * * If the ctlv-expiry is too near, we tell them the the current channel * setting for the outgoing channel: * 1. type: UPDATE|14 (`expiry_too_soon`) * 2. data: * * [2:len] * * [len:channel_update] */ if (get_block_height(next->ld->topology) + next->ld->dstate.config.deadline_blocks >= outgoing_cltv_value) { log_debug(hend->peer->log, "Expiry cltv %u too close to current %u + deadline %u", outgoing_cltv_value, get_block_height(next->ld->topology), next->ld->dstate.config.deadline_blocks); /* FIXME: Add channel update */ err = towire_expiry_too_soon(hend, NULL); goto fail; } /* Make sure daemon owns it, in case it fails. */ hend->other_end = tal(next->owner, struct htlc_end); hend->other_end->which_end = HTLC_DST; hend->other_end->peer = next; hend->other_end->other_end = hend; hend->other_end->pay_command = NULL; hend->other_end->msatoshis = amt_to_forward; tal_add_destructor(hend->other_end, hend_subd_died); msg = towire_channel_offer_htlc(next, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_hash, next_onion); subd_req(next->owner, next->owner, take(msg), -1, 0, rcvd_htlc_reply, hend->other_end); return; fail: fail_local_htlc(hend->peer, hend, take(err)); tal_free(hend); } /* We received a resolver reply, which gives us the node_ids of the * channel we want to forward over */ static bool channel_resolve_reply(struct subd *gossip, const u8 *msg, const int *fds, struct htlc_end *hend) { struct pubkey *nodes, *peer_id; if (!fromwire_gossip_resolve_channel_reply(msg, msg, NULL, &nodes)) { log_broken(gossip->log, "bad fromwire_gossip_resolve_channel_reply %s", tal_hex(msg, msg)); return false; } if (tal_count(nodes) == 0) { fail_htlc(hend->peer, hend, take(towire_unknown_next_peer(hend))); tal_free(hend); return true; } else if (tal_count(nodes) != 2) { log_broken(gossip->log, "fromwire_gossip_resolve_channel_reply has %zu nodes", tal_count(nodes)); return false; } /* Get the other peer matching the id that is not us */ if (pubkey_cmp(&nodes[0], &gossip->ld->dstate.id) == 0) { peer_id = &nodes[1]; } else { peer_id = &nodes[0]; } forward_htlc(hend, hend->cltv_expiry, &hend->payment_hash, hend->amt_to_forward, hend->outgoing_cltv_value, peer_id, hend->next_onion); /* FIXME(cdecker) Cleanup things we stuffed into hend before (maybe?) */ return true; } static int peer_accepted_htlc(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg) { bool forward; struct htlc_end *hend; u8 *req; hend = tal(msg, struct htlc_end); hend->shared_secret = tal(hend, struct secret); if (!fromwire_channel_accepted_htlc(msg, NULL, &hend->htlc_id, &hend->msatoshis, &hend->cltv_expiry, &hend->payment_hash, hend->next_onion, &forward, &hend->amt_to_forward, &hend->outgoing_cltv_value, &hend->next_channel, hend->shared_secret)) { log_broken(peer->log, "bad fromwire_channel_accepted_htlc %s", tal_hex(peer, msg)); return -1; } tal_steal(peer, hend); hend->which_end = HTLC_SRC; hend->peer = peer; hend->other_end = NULL; hend->pay_command = NULL; if (forward) { req = towire_gossip_resolve_channel_request(msg, &hend->next_channel); log_broken(peer->log, "Asking gossip to resolve channel %d/%d/%d", hend->next_channel.blocknum, hend->next_channel.txnum, hend->next_channel.outnum); subd_req(hend, peer->ld->gossip, req, -1, 0, channel_resolve_reply, hend); /* FIXME(cdecker) Stuff all this info into hend */ } else handle_localpay(hend, hend->cltv_expiry, &hend->payment_hash, hend->amt_to_forward, hend->outgoing_cltv_value); return 0; } static int peer_fulfilled_htlc(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg) { u64 id; struct preimage preimage; struct htlc_end *hend; if (!fromwire_channel_fulfilled_htlc(msg, NULL, &id, &preimage)) { log_broken(peer->log, "bad fromwire_channel_fulfilled_htlc %s", tal_hex(peer, msg)); return -1; } hend = find_htlc_end(&peer->ld->htlc_ends, peer, id, HTLC_DST); if (!hend) { log_broken(peer->log, "channel_fulfilled_htlc unknown htlc %"PRIu64, id); return -1; } /* They fulfilled our HTLC. Credit them, forward as required. */ peer->balance[REMOTE] += hend->msatoshis; peer->balance[LOCAL] -= hend->msatoshis; if (hend->other_end) fulfill_htlc(hend->other_end, &preimage); else payment_succeeded(peer->ld, hend, &preimage); tal_free(hend); return 0; } static int peer_failed_htlc(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg) { u64 id; u8 *reason; struct htlc_end *hend; enum onion_type failcode; struct onionreply *reply; if (!fromwire_channel_failed_htlc(msg, msg, NULL, &id, &reason)) { log_broken(peer->log, "bad fromwire_channel_failed_htlc %s", tal_hex(peer, msg)); return -1; } hend = find_htlc_end(&peer->ld->htlc_ends, peer, id, HTLC_DST); if (!hend) { log_broken(peer->log, "channel_failed_htlc unknown htlc %"PRIu64, id); return -1; } if (hend->other_end) { fail_htlc(hend->other_end->peer, hend->other_end, reason); } else { size_t numhops = tal_count(hend->path_secrets); struct secret *shared_secrets = tal_arr(hend, struct secret, numhops); for (size_t i=0; ipath_secrets[i]; } reply = unwrap_onionreply(msg, shared_secrets, numhops, reason); if (!reply) { log_info(peer->log, "htlc %"PRIu64" failed with bad reply (%s)", id, tal_hex(msg, msg)); failcode = WIRE_PERMANENT_NODE_FAILURE; } else { failcode = fromwire_peektype(reply->msg); log_info(peer->log, "htlc %"PRIu64" failed with code 0x%04x (%s)", id, failcode, onion_type_name(failcode)); } payment_failed(peer->ld, hend, NULL, failcode); } tal_free(hend); return 0; } /* FIXME: Encrypt! */ static u8 *malformed_msg(const tal_t *ctx, enum onion_type type, const struct sha256 *sha256_of_onion) { u8 *channel_update; /* FIXME: check the reported SHA matches what we sent! */ switch (type) { case WIRE_INVALID_ONION_VERSION: return towire_invalid_onion_version(ctx, sha256_of_onion); case WIRE_INVALID_ONION_HMAC: return towire_invalid_onion_hmac(ctx, sha256_of_onion); case WIRE_INVALID_ONION_KEY: return towire_invalid_onion_key(ctx, sha256_of_onion); default: /* FIXME: Ask gossip daemon for channel_update. */ channel_update = NULL; return towire_temporary_channel_failure(ctx, channel_update); } } static int peer_failed_malformed_htlc(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg) { u64 id; struct htlc_end *hend; struct sha256 sha256_of_onion; u16 failcode; if (!fromwire_channel_malformed_htlc(msg, NULL, &id, &sha256_of_onion, &failcode)) { log_broken(peer->log, "bad fromwire_channel_malformed_htlc %s", tal_hex(peer, msg)); return -1; } hend = find_htlc_end(&peer->ld->htlc_ends, peer, id, HTLC_DST); if (!hend) { log_broken(peer->log, "channel_malformed_htlc unknown htlc %"PRIu64, id); return -1; } if (hend->other_end) { /* Not really a local failure, but since the failing * peer could not derive its shared secret it cannot * create a valid HMAC, so we do it on his behalf */ fail_local_htlc(hend->other_end->peer, hend->other_end, malformed_msg(msg, failcode, &sha256_of_onion)); } else { payment_failed(peer->ld, hend, NULL, failcode); } tal_free(hend); return 0; } /* Create a node_announcement with the given signature. It may be NULL * in the case we need to create a provisional announcement for the * HSM to sign. */ static u8 *create_node_announcement(const tal_t *ctx, struct lightningd *ld, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *sig) { u32 timestamp = time_now().ts.tv_sec; u8 rgb[3] = {0x77, 0x88, 0x99}; u8 alias[32]; u8 *features = NULL; u8 *addresses = tal_arr(ctx, u8, 0); u8 *announcement; if (!sig) { sig = tal(ctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature); memset(sig, 0, sizeof(*sig)); } if (ld->dstate.config.ipaddr.type != ADDR_TYPE_PADDING) { towire_ipaddr(&addresses, &ld->dstate.config.ipaddr); } memset(alias, 0, sizeof(alias)); announcement = towire_node_announcement(ctx, sig, timestamp, &ld->dstate.id, rgb, alias, features, addresses); return announcement; } /* We got the signature for out provisional node_announcement back * from the HSM, create the real announcement and forward it to * gossipd so it can take care of forwarding it. */ static bool send_node_announcement_got_sig(struct subd *hsm, const u8 *msg, const int *fds, struct lightningd *ld) { tal_t *tmpctx = tal_tmpctx(hsm); secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig; u8 *announcement, *wrappedmsg; if (!fromwire_hsmctl_node_announcement_sig_reply(msg, NULL, &sig)) { log_debug(ld->log, "HSM returned an invalid node_announcement sig"); return false; } announcement = create_node_announcement(tmpctx, ld, &sig); wrappedmsg = towire_gossip_forwarded_msg(tmpctx, announcement); subd_send_msg(ld->gossip, take(wrappedmsg)); tal_free(tmpctx); return true; } /* We were informed by channeld that it announced the channel and sent * an update, so we can now start sending a node_announcement. The * first step is to build the provisional announcement and ask the HSM * to sign it. */ static void peer_channel_announced(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg) { struct lightningd *ld = peer->ld; tal_t *tmpctx = tal_tmpctx(ld); u8 *req; req = towire_hsmctl_node_announcement_sig_req( tmpctx, create_node_announcement(tmpctx, ld, NULL)); subd_req(ld, ld->hsm, take(req), -1, 0, send_node_announcement_got_sig, ld); tal_free(tmpctx); } static int channel_msg(struct subd *sd, const u8 *msg, const int *unused) { enum channel_wire_type t = fromwire_peektype(msg); switch (t) { case WIRE_CHANNEL_NORMAL_OPERATION: peer_set_condition(sd->peer, CHANNELD_AWAITING_LOCKIN, CHANNELD_NORMAL); break; case WIRE_CHANNEL_ACCEPTED_HTLC: return peer_accepted_htlc(sd->peer, msg); case WIRE_CHANNEL_FULFILLED_HTLC: return peer_fulfilled_htlc(sd->peer, msg); case WIRE_CHANNEL_FAILED_HTLC: return peer_failed_htlc(sd->peer, msg); case WIRE_CHANNEL_MALFORMED_HTLC: return peer_failed_malformed_htlc(sd->peer, msg); case WIRE_CHANNEL_ANNOUNCED: peer_channel_announced(sd->peer, msg); break; /* We never see fatal ones. */ case WIRE_CHANNEL_BAD_COMMAND: case WIRE_CHANNEL_HSM_FAILED: case WIRE_CHANNEL_CRYPTO_FAILED: case WIRE_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ERROR: case WIRE_CHANNEL_PEER_WRITE_FAILED: case WIRE_CHANNEL_PEER_READ_FAILED: case WIRE_CHANNEL_PEER_BAD_MESSAGE: /* And we never get these from channeld. */ case WIRE_CHANNEL_INIT: case WIRE_CHANNEL_FUNDING_LOCKED: case WIRE_CHANNEL_FUNDING_ANNOUNCE_DEPTH: case WIRE_CHANNEL_OFFER_HTLC: case WIRE_CHANNEL_FULFILL_HTLC: case WIRE_CHANNEL_FAIL_HTLC: case WIRE_CHANNEL_PING: /* Replies go to requests. */ case WIRE_CHANNEL_OFFER_HTLC_REPLY: case WIRE_CHANNEL_PING_REPLY: break; } return 0; } struct channeld_start { struct peer *peer; const u8 *initmsg; }; /* We've got fd from HSM for channeld */ static bool peer_start_channeld_hsmfd(struct subd *hsm, const u8 *resp, const int *fds, struct channeld_start *cds) { cds->peer->owner = new_subd(cds->peer->ld, cds->peer->ld, "lightningd_channel", cds->peer, channel_wire_type_name, channel_msg, peer_owner_finished, cds->peer->fd, cds->peer->gossip_client_fd, fds[0], -1); if (!cds->peer->owner) { log_unusual(cds->peer->log, "Could not subdaemon channel: %s", strerror(errno)); peer_fail(cds->peer, "Failed to subdaemon channel"); return true; } cds->peer->fd = -1; cds->peer->cs = tal_free(cds->peer->cs); log_debug(cds->peer->log, "Waiting for funding confirmations"); peer_set_condition(cds->peer, GETTING_HSMFD, CHANNELD_AWAITING_LOCKIN); /* We don't expect a response: we are triggered by funding_depth_cb. */ subd_send_msg(cds->peer->owner, take(cds->initmsg)); tal_free(cds); return true; } /* opening is done, start lightningd_channel for peer. * Steals initmsg: caller prepares it because it has the information to * construct it. */ static void peer_start_channeld(struct peer *peer, const u8 *initmsg) { struct channeld_start *cds = tal(peer, struct channeld_start); /* Unowned: back to being owned by main daemon. */ peer->owner = NULL; tal_steal(peer->ld, peer); log_debug(peer->log, "Waiting for HSM file descriptor"); /* Now we can consider balance set. */ peer->balance = tal_arr(peer, u64, NUM_SIDES); peer->balance[peer->funder] = peer->funding_satoshi * 1000 - peer->push_msat; peer->balance[!peer->funder] = peer->push_msat; cds->peer = peer; cds->initmsg = tal_steal(cds, initmsg); peer_set_condition(peer, OPENINGD_AWAITING_LOCKIN, GETTING_HSMFD); /* Get fd from hsm. */ subd_req(peer, peer->ld->hsm, take(towire_hsmctl_hsmfd_channeld(peer, peer->unique_id)), -1, 1, peer_start_channeld_hsmfd, cds); } static bool opening_release_tx(struct subd *opening, const u8 *resp, const int *fds, struct funding_channel *fc) { u8 *msg; struct channel_config their_config; secp256k1_ecdsa_signature commit_sig; struct pubkey their_per_commit_point; struct basepoints theirbase; struct config *cfg = &fc->peer->ld->dstate.config; struct utxo *utxos; assert(tal_count(fds) == 1); fc->peer->fd = fds[0]; fc->peer->cs = tal(fc->peer, struct crypto_state); if (!fromwire_opening_funder_funding_reply(resp, NULL, &their_config, &commit_sig, fc->peer->cs, &theirbase.revocation, &theirbase.payment, &theirbase.delayed_payment, &their_per_commit_point, &fc->peer->minimum_depth)) { log_broken(fc->peer->log, "bad OPENING_OPEN_FUNDING_REPLY %s", tal_hex(resp, resp)); tal_free(fc->peer); return false; } log_debug(fc->peer->log, "Getting HSM to sign funding tx"); /* Get HSM to sign the funding tx. */ utxos = from_utxoptr_arr(fc, fc->utxomap); msg = towire_hsmctl_sign_funding(fc, fc->satoshi, fc->change, fc->change_keyindex, &fc->local_fundingkey, &fc->remote_fundingkey, utxos); tal_free(utxos); /* Prepare this while we have the information. */ fc->channel_init_msg = towire_channel_init(fc, fc->peer->funding_txid, fc->peer->funding_outnum, &fc->peer->our_config, &their_config, &commit_sig, fc->peer->cs, &fc->remote_fundingkey, &theirbase.revocation, &theirbase.payment, &theirbase.delayed_payment, &their_per_commit_point, fc->peer->funder == LOCAL, cfg->fee_base, cfg->fee_per_satoshi, fc->peer->funding_satoshi, fc->peer->push_msat, fc->peer->seed, &fc->peer->ld->dstate.id, fc->peer->id, time_to_msec(cfg->commit_time), cfg->deadline_blocks); fc->peer->owner = NULL; peer_set_condition(fc->peer, OPENINGD, GETTING_SIG_FROM_HSM); subd_req(fc, fc->peer->ld->hsm, take(msg), -1, 0, opening_got_hsm_funding_sig, fc); /* Tell opening daemon to exit. */ return false; } static bool opening_gen_funding(struct subd *opening, const u8 *reply, const int *fds, struct funding_channel *fc) { u8 *msg; struct pubkey changekey; log_debug(fc->peer->log, "Created funding transaction for channel"); if (!fromwire_opening_funder_reply(reply, NULL, &fc->local_fundingkey, &fc->remote_fundingkey)) { log_broken(fc->peer->log, "Bad opening_open_reply %s", tal_hex(fc, reply)); /* Free openingd and peer */ return false; } if (fc->change && !bip32_pubkey(fc->peer->ld->bip32_base, &changekey, fc->change_keyindex)) fatal("Error deriving change key %u", fc->change_keyindex); fc->funding_tx = funding_tx(fc, &fc->peer->funding_outnum, fc->utxomap, fc->satoshi, &fc->local_fundingkey, &fc->remote_fundingkey, fc->change, &changekey, fc->peer->ld->bip32_base); fc->peer->funding_txid = tal(fc->peer, struct sha256_double); bitcoin_txid(fc->funding_tx, fc->peer->funding_txid); msg = towire_opening_funder_funding(fc, fc->peer->funding_txid, fc->peer->funding_outnum); subd_req(fc, fc->peer->owner, take(msg), -1, 1, opening_release_tx, fc); return true; } static bool opening_fundee_finish_response(struct subd *opening, const u8 *reply, const int *fds, struct peer *peer) { struct channel_config their_config; secp256k1_ecdsa_signature first_commit_sig; struct basepoints theirbase; struct pubkey remote_fundingkey, their_per_commit_point; struct config *cfg = &peer->ld->dstate.config; u8 *initmsg; log_debug(peer->log, "Got opening_fundee_finish_response"); assert(tal_count(fds) == 1); peer->fd = fds[0]; peer->cs = tal(peer, struct crypto_state); if (!fromwire_opening_fundee_finish_reply(reply, NULL, &peer->funding_outnum, &their_config, &first_commit_sig, peer->cs, &remote_fundingkey, &theirbase.revocation, &theirbase.payment, &theirbase.delayed_payment, &their_per_commit_point, &peer->funding_satoshi, &peer->push_msat)) { log_broken(peer->log, "bad OPENING_FUNDEE_FINISH_REPLY %s", tal_hex(reply, reply)); return false; } initmsg = towire_channel_init(peer, peer->funding_txid, peer->funding_outnum, &peer->our_config, &their_config, &first_commit_sig, peer->cs, &remote_fundingkey, &theirbase.revocation, &theirbase.payment, &theirbase.delayed_payment, &their_per_commit_point, peer->funder == LOCAL, cfg->fee_base, cfg->fee_per_satoshi, peer->funding_satoshi, peer->push_msat, peer->seed, &peer->ld->dstate.id, peer->id, time_to_msec(cfg->commit_time), cfg->deadline_blocks); /* On to normal operation! */ peer->owner = NULL; peer_start_channeld(peer, initmsg); /* Tell opening daemon to exit. */ return false; } static bool opening_fundee_reply(struct subd *opening, const u8 *reply, const int *fds, struct peer *peer) { peer->funding_txid = tal(peer, struct sha256_double); if (!fromwire_opening_fundee_reply(reply, NULL, peer->funding_txid)) { log_broken(peer->log, "bad OPENING_FUNDEE_REPLY %s", tal_hex(reply, reply)); return false; } log_debug(peer->log, "Watching funding tx %s", type_to_string(reply, struct sha256_double, peer->funding_txid)); watch_txid(peer, peer->ld->topology, peer, peer->funding_txid, funding_lockin_cb, NULL); /* It's about to send out funding_signed, so set this now. */ peer_set_condition(peer, OPENINGD, OPENINGD_AWAITING_LOCKIN); /* Tell it we're watching. */ subd_req(peer, opening, towire_opening_fundee_finish(reply), -1, 1, opening_fundee_finish_response, peer); return true; } static void channel_config(struct lightningd *ld, struct channel_config *ours, u32 *max_to_self_delay, u32 *max_minimum_depth, u64 *min_effective_htlc_capacity_msat) { /* FIXME: depend on feerate. */ *max_to_self_delay = ld->dstate.config.locktime_max; *max_minimum_depth = ld->dstate.config.anchor_confirms_max; /* This is 1c at $1000/BTC */ *min_effective_htlc_capacity_msat = 1000000; /* BOLT #2: * * The sender SHOULD set `dust-limit-satoshis` to a sufficient * value to allow commitment transactions to propagate through * the Bitcoin network. */ ours->dust_limit_satoshis = 546; ours->max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = UINT64_MAX; /* Don't care */ ours->htlc_minimum_msat = 0; /* BOLT #2: * * The sender SHOULD set `to-self-delay` sufficient to ensure * the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction * output in case of misbehavior by the receiver. */ ours->to_self_delay = ld->dstate.config.locktime_blocks; /* BOLT #2: * * It MUST fail the channel if `max-accepted-htlcs` is greater than * 483. */ ours->max_accepted_htlcs = 483; /* This is filled in by lightningd_opening, for consistency. */ ours->channel_reserve_satoshis = 0; }; /* Peer has spontaneously exited from gossip due to msg */ void peer_fundee_open(struct peer *peer, const u8 *from_peer) { struct lightningd *ld = peer->ld; u32 max_to_self_delay, max_minimum_depth; u64 min_effective_htlc_capacity_msat; u8 *msg; /* Note: gossipd handles unknown packets, so we don't have to worry * about ignoring odd ones here. */ if (fromwire_peektype(from_peer) != WIRE_OPEN_CHANNEL) { log_unusual(peer->log, "Strange message to exit gossip: %u", fromwire_peektype(from_peer)); peer_fail(peer, "Bad message during gossiping: %s", tal_hex(peer, from_peer)); return; } peer_set_condition(peer, GOSSIPD, OPENINGD); peer->owner = new_subd(ld, ld, "lightningd_opening", peer, opening_wire_type_name, NULL, peer_owner_finished, peer->fd, -1); if (!peer->owner) { peer_fail(peer, "Failed to subdaemon opening: %s", strerror(errno)); return; } /* We handed off peer fd */ peer->fd = -1; /* They will open channel. */ peer->funder = REMOTE; /* BOLT #2: * * The sender SHOULD set `minimum-depth` to an amount where * the sender considers reorganizations to be low risk. */ peer->minimum_depth = ld->dstate.config.anchor_confirms; channel_config(ld, &peer->our_config, &max_to_self_delay, &max_minimum_depth, &min_effective_htlc_capacity_msat); peer->seed = tal(peer, struct privkey); derive_peer_seed(ld, peer->seed, peer->id); msg = towire_opening_init(peer, &peer->our_config, max_to_self_delay, min_effective_htlc_capacity_msat, peer->cs, peer->seed); peer->cs = tal_free(peer->cs); subd_send_msg(peer->owner, take(msg)); msg = towire_opening_fundee(peer, peer->minimum_depth, 7500, 150000, from_peer); /* Careful here! Their message could push us overlength! */ if (tal_len(msg) >= 65536) { peer_fail(peer, "Unacceptably long open_channel"); return; } subd_req(peer, peer->owner, take(msg), -1, 0, opening_fundee_reply, peer); } /* Peer has been released from gossip. Start opening. */ static bool gossip_peer_released(struct subd *gossip, const u8 *resp, const int *fds, struct funding_channel *fc) { struct lightningd *ld = fc->peer->ld; u32 max_to_self_delay, max_minimum_depth; u64 min_effective_htlc_capacity_msat; u64 id; u8 *msg; struct subd *opening; assert(tal_count(fds) == 2); fc->peer->fd = fds[0]; fc->peer->cs = tal(fc, struct crypto_state); fc->peer->gossip_client_fd = fds[1]; if (!fromwire_gossipctl_release_peer_reply(resp, NULL, &id, fc->peer->cs)) fatal("Gossup daemon gave invalid reply %s", tal_hex(gossip, resp)); if (id != fc->peer->unique_id) fatal("Gossup daemon release gave %"PRIu64" not %"PRIu64, id, fc->peer->unique_id); peer_set_condition(fc->peer, GOSSIPD, OPENINGD); opening = new_subd(fc->peer->ld, ld, "lightningd_opening", fc->peer, opening_wire_type_name, NULL, peer_owner_finished, fc->peer->fd, -1); if (!opening) { peer_fail(fc->peer, "Failed to subdaemon opening: %s", strerror(errno)); return true; } fc->peer->owner = opening; /* They took our fd. */ fc->peer->fd = -1; /* We will fund channel */ fc->peer->funder = LOCAL; channel_config(ld, &fc->peer->our_config, &max_to_self_delay, &max_minimum_depth, &min_effective_htlc_capacity_msat); fc->peer->seed = tal(fc->peer, struct privkey); derive_peer_seed(ld, fc->peer->seed, fc->peer->id); msg = towire_opening_init(fc, &fc->peer->our_config, max_to_self_delay, min_effective_htlc_capacity_msat, fc->peer->cs, fc->peer->seed); fc->peer->funding_satoshi = fc->satoshi; /* FIXME: Support push_msat? */ fc->peer->push_msat = 0; fc->peer->cs = tal_free(fc->peer->cs); subd_send_msg(opening, take(msg)); /* FIXME: Real feerate! */ msg = towire_opening_funder(fc, fc->peer->funding_satoshi, fc->peer->push_msat, 15000, max_minimum_depth); subd_req(fc, opening, take(msg), -1, 0, opening_gen_funding, fc); return true; } static void json_fund_channel(struct command *cmd, const char *buffer, const jsmntok_t *params) { struct lightningd *ld = ld_from_dstate(cmd->dstate); jsmntok_t *peertok, *satoshitok; struct funding_channel *fc = tal(cmd, struct funding_channel); u8 *msg; if (!json_get_params(buffer, params, "id", &peertok, "satoshi", &satoshitok, NULL)) { command_fail(cmd, "Need peerid and satoshi"); return; } fc->cmd = cmd; fc->peer = peer_from_json(ld, buffer, peertok); if (!fc->peer) { command_fail(cmd, "Could not find peer with that peerid"); return; } if (fc->peer->owner != ld->gossip) { command_fail(cmd, "Peer not ready for connection"); return; } if (!json_tok_u64(buffer, satoshitok, &fc->satoshi)) { command_fail(cmd, "Invalid satoshis"); return; } /* Try to do this now, so we know if insufficient funds. */ /* FIXME: Feerate & dustlimit */ fc->utxomap = build_utxos(fc, ld, fc->satoshi, 15000, 600, &fc->change, &fc->change_keyindex); if (!fc->utxomap) { command_fail(cmd, "Cannot afford funding transaction"); return; } msg = towire_gossipctl_release_peer(cmd, fc->peer->unique_id); /* Tie this fc lifetime (and hence utxo release) to the peer */ tal_steal(fc->peer, fc); tal_add_destructor(fc, fail_fundchannel_command); subd_req(fc, ld->gossip, msg, -1, 2, gossip_peer_released, fc); } static const struct json_command fund_channel_command = { "fundchannel", json_fund_channel, "Fund channel with {id} using {satoshi} satoshis", "Returns once channel established" }; AUTODATA(json_command, &fund_channel_command); const char *peer_state_name(enum peer_state state) { size_t i; for (i = 0; enum_peer_state_names[i].name; i++) if (enum_peer_state_names[i].v == state) return enum_peer_state_names[i].name; return "unknown"; }