rgb-cln/daemon/packets.c

827 lines
24 KiB
C

#include "bitcoin/script.h"
#include "bitcoin/tx.h"
#include "close_tx.h"
#include "controlled_time.h"
#include "find_p2sh_out.h"
#include "lightningd.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "names.h"
#include "peer.h"
#include "protobuf_convert.h"
#include "secrets.h"
#include "state.h"
#include <ccan/crypto/sha256/sha256.h>
#include <ccan/mem/mem.h>
#include <ccan/str/hex/hex.h>
#include <ccan/structeq/structeq.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#define FIXME_STUB(peer) do { log_broken((peer)->dstate->base_log, "%s:%u: Implement %s!", __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); abort(); } while(0)
static char *hex_of(const tal_t *ctx, const void *p, size_t n)
{
char *hex = tal_arr(ctx, char, hex_str_size(n));
hex_encode(p, n, hex, hex_str_size(n));
return hex;
}
static void dump_tx(const char *str, const struct bitcoin_tx *tx)
{
u8 *linear = linearize_tx(NULL, tx);
printf("%s:%s\n", str, hex_of(linear, linear, tal_count(linear)));
tal_free(linear);
}
static void dump_key(const char *str, const struct pubkey *key)
{
printf("%s:%s\n", str, hex_of(NULL, key->der, pubkey_derlen(key)));
}
/* Wrap (and own!) member inside Pkt */
static Pkt *make_pkt(const tal_t *ctx, Pkt__PktCase type, const void *msg)
{
Pkt *pkt = tal(ctx, Pkt);
pkt__init(pkt);
pkt->pkt_case = type;
/* This is a union, so doesn't matter which we assign. */
pkt->error = (Error *)tal_steal(ctx, msg);
/* This makes sure all packets are valid. */
#ifndef NDEBUG
{
size_t len;
u8 *packed;
Pkt *cpy;
len = pkt__get_packed_size(pkt);
packed = tal_arr(pkt, u8, len);
pkt__pack(pkt, packed);
cpy = pkt__unpack(NULL, len, memcheck(packed, len));
assert(cpy);
pkt__free_unpacked(cpy, NULL);
tal_free(packed);
}
#endif
return pkt;
}
Pkt *pkt_open(const tal_t *ctx, const struct peer *peer,
OpenChannel__AnchorOffer anchor)
{
OpenChannel *o = tal(ctx, OpenChannel);
open_channel__init(o);
o->revocation_hash = sha256_to_proto(ctx, &peer->us.revocation_hash);
o->commit_key = pubkey_to_proto(o, &peer->us.commitkey);
o->final_key = pubkey_to_proto(o, &peer->us.finalkey);
o->delay = tal(o, Locktime);
locktime__init(o->delay);
o->delay->locktime_case = LOCKTIME__LOCKTIME_SECONDS;
o->delay->seconds = rel_locktime_to_seconds(&peer->us.locktime);
o->commitment_fee = peer->us.commit_fee;
if (anchor == OPEN_CHANNEL__ANCHOR_OFFER__WILL_CREATE_ANCHOR)
assert(peer->us.offer_anchor == CMD_OPEN_WITH_ANCHOR);
else {
assert(anchor == OPEN_CHANNEL__ANCHOR_OFFER__WONT_CREATE_ANCHOR);
assert(peer->us.offer_anchor == CMD_OPEN_WITHOUT_ANCHOR);
}
o->anch = anchor;
o->min_depth = peer->us.mindepth;
return make_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_OPEN, o);
}
Pkt *pkt_anchor(const tal_t *ctx, const struct peer *peer)
{
struct signature sig;
OpenAnchor *a = tal(ctx, OpenAnchor);
open_anchor__init(a);
a->txid = sha256_to_proto(a, &peer->anchor.txid.sha);
a->output_index = peer->anchor.index;
a->amount = peer->anchor.satoshis;
/* Sign their commit sig */
peer_sign_theircommit(peer, peer->them.commit, &sig);
a->commit_sig = signature_to_proto(a, &sig);
return make_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_OPEN_ANCHOR, a);
}
Pkt *pkt_open_commit_sig(const tal_t *ctx, const struct peer *peer)
{
struct signature sig;
OpenCommitSig *s = tal(ctx, OpenCommitSig);
open_commit_sig__init(s);
dump_tx("Creating sig for:", peer->them.commit);
dump_key("Using key:", &peer->us.commitkey);
peer_sign_theircommit(peer, peer->them.commit, &sig);
s->sig = signature_to_proto(s, &sig);
return make_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_OPEN_COMMIT_SIG, s);
}
Pkt *pkt_open_complete(const tal_t *ctx, const struct peer *peer)
{
OpenComplete *o = tal(ctx, OpenComplete);
open_complete__init(o);
return make_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_OPEN_COMPLETE, o);
}
Pkt *pkt_htlc_update(const tal_t *ctx, const struct peer *peer,
const struct htlc_progress *htlc_prog)
{
UpdateAddHtlc *u = tal(ctx, UpdateAddHtlc);
update_add_htlc__init(u);
u->revocation_hash = sha256_to_proto(u, &htlc_prog->our_revocation_hash);
u->amount_msat = htlc_prog->htlc->msatoshis;
u->r_hash = sha256_to_proto(u, &htlc_prog->htlc->rhash);
u->expiry = abs_locktime_to_proto(u, &htlc_prog->htlc->expiry);
return make_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_UPDATE_ADD_HTLC, u);
}
Pkt *pkt_htlc_fulfill(const tal_t *ctx, const struct peer *peer,
const struct htlc_progress *htlc_prog)
{
UpdateFulfillHtlc *f = tal(ctx, UpdateFulfillHtlc);
update_fulfill_htlc__init(f);
f->revocation_hash = sha256_to_proto(f, &htlc_prog->our_revocation_hash);
f->r = sha256_to_proto(f, &htlc_prog->r);
return make_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_UPDATE_FULFILL_HTLC, f);
}
Pkt *pkt_htlc_timedout(const tal_t *ctx, const struct peer *peer,
const struct htlc_progress *htlc_prog)
{
UpdateTimedoutHtlc *t = tal(ctx, UpdateTimedoutHtlc);
update_timedout_htlc__init(t);
t->revocation_hash = sha256_to_proto(t, &htlc_prog->our_revocation_hash);
t->r_hash = sha256_to_proto(t, &htlc_prog->htlc->rhash);
return make_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_UPDATE_TIMEDOUT_HTLC, t);
}
Pkt *pkt_htlc_routefail(const tal_t *ctx, const struct peer *peer,
const struct htlc_progress *htlc_prog)
{
UpdateRoutefailHtlc *f = tal(ctx, UpdateRoutefailHtlc);
update_routefail_htlc__init(f);
f->revocation_hash = sha256_to_proto(f, &htlc_prog->our_revocation_hash);
f->r_hash = sha256_to_proto(f, &htlc_prog->htlc->rhash);
return make_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_UPDATE_ROUTEFAIL_HTLC, f);
}
Pkt *pkt_update_accept(const tal_t *ctx, const struct peer *peer)
{
UpdateAccept *u = tal(ctx, UpdateAccept);
const struct htlc_progress *cur = peer->current_htlc;
struct signature sig;
update_accept__init(u);
dump_tx("Signing tx", cur->their_commit);
peer_sign_theircommit(peer, cur->their_commit, &sig);
u->sig = signature_to_proto(u, &sig);
u->revocation_hash
= sha256_to_proto(u, &cur->our_revocation_hash);
return make_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_UPDATE_ACCEPT, u);
}
Pkt *pkt_update_signature(const tal_t *ctx, const struct peer *peer)
{
UpdateSignature *u = tal(ctx, UpdateSignature);
const struct htlc_progress *cur = peer->current_htlc;
struct signature sig;
struct sha256 preimage;
update_signature__init(u);
peer_sign_theircommit(peer, cur->their_commit, &sig);
u->sig = signature_to_proto(u, &sig);
assert(peer->num_htlcs > 0);
peer_get_revocation_preimage(peer, peer->num_htlcs-1, &preimage);
u->revocation_preimage = sha256_to_proto(u, &preimage);
return make_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_UPDATE_SIGNATURE, u);
}
Pkt *pkt_update_complete(const tal_t *ctx, const struct peer *peer)
{
UpdateComplete *u = tal(ctx, UpdateComplete);
struct sha256 preimage;
update_complete__init(u);
peer_get_revocation_preimage(peer, peer->num_htlcs-1, &preimage);
u->revocation_preimage = sha256_to_proto(u, &preimage);
return make_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_UPDATE_COMPLETE, u);
}
Pkt *pkt_err(const tal_t *ctx, const char *msg, ...)
{
abort();
}
Pkt *pkt_close(const tal_t *ctx, const struct peer *peer)
{
CloseChannel *c = tal(ctx, CloseChannel);
close_channel__init(c);
c->close_fee = peer->close_tx->fee;
c->sig = signature_to_proto(c, &peer->our_close_sig.sig);
return make_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_CLOSE, c);
}
Pkt *pkt_close_complete(const tal_t *ctx, const struct peer *peer)
{
CloseChannelComplete *c = tal(ctx, CloseChannelComplete);
close_channel_complete__init(c);
assert(peer->close_tx);
c->sig = signature_to_proto(c, &peer->our_close_sig.sig);
return make_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_CLOSE_COMPLETE, c);
}
Pkt *pkt_close_ack(const tal_t *ctx, const struct peer *peer)
{
CloseChannelAck *a = tal(ctx, CloseChannelAck);
close_channel_ack__init(a);
return make_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_CLOSE_ACK, a);
}
Pkt *pkt_err_unexpected(const tal_t *ctx, const Pkt *pkt)
{
return pkt_err(ctx, "Unexpected packet %s", state_name(pkt->pkt_case));
}
/* Process various packets: return an error packet on failure. */
Pkt *accept_pkt_open(const tal_t *ctx,
struct peer *peer, const Pkt *pkt)
{
struct rel_locktime locktime;
const OpenChannel *o = pkt->open;
if (!proto_to_rel_locktime(o->delay, &locktime))
return pkt_err(ctx, "Invalid delay");
/* FIXME: handle blocks in locktime */
if (o->delay->locktime_case != LOCKTIME__LOCKTIME_SECONDS)
return pkt_err(ctx, "Delay in blocks not accepted");
if (o->delay->seconds > peer->dstate->config.rel_locktime_max)
return pkt_err(ctx, "Delay too great");
if (o->min_depth > peer->dstate->config.anchor_confirms_max)
return pkt_err(ctx, "min_depth too great");
if (o->commitment_fee < peer->dstate->config.commitment_fee_min)
return pkt_err(ctx, "Commitment fee too low");
if (o->anch == OPEN_CHANNEL__ANCHOR_OFFER__WILL_CREATE_ANCHOR)
peer->them.offer_anchor = CMD_OPEN_WITH_ANCHOR;
else if (o->anch == OPEN_CHANNEL__ANCHOR_OFFER__WONT_CREATE_ANCHOR)
peer->them.offer_anchor = CMD_OPEN_WITHOUT_ANCHOR;
else
return pkt_err(ctx, "Unknown offer anchor value");
if (peer->them.offer_anchor == peer->us.offer_anchor)
return pkt_err(ctx, "Only one side can offer anchor");
if (!proto_to_rel_locktime(o->delay, &peer->them.locktime))
return pkt_err(ctx, "Malformed locktime");
peer->them.mindepth = o->min_depth;
peer->them.commit_fee = o->commitment_fee;
if (!proto_to_pubkey(peer->dstate->secpctx,
o->commit_key, &peer->them.commitkey))
return pkt_err(ctx, "Bad commitkey");
if (!proto_to_pubkey(peer->dstate->secpctx,
o->final_key, &peer->them.finalkey))
return pkt_err(ctx, "Bad finalkey");
proto_to_sha256(o->revocation_hash, &peer->them.revocation_hash);
/* Redeemscript for anchor. */
peer->anchor.redeemscript
= bitcoin_redeem_2of2(peer, &peer->us.commitkey,
&peer->them.commitkey);
return NULL;
}
Pkt *accept_pkt_anchor(const tal_t *ctx,
struct peer *peer,
const Pkt *pkt)
{
const OpenAnchor *a = pkt->open_anchor;
u64 commitfee;
/* They must be offering anchor for us to try accepting */
assert(peer->us.offer_anchor == CMD_OPEN_WITHOUT_ANCHOR);
assert(peer->them.offer_anchor == CMD_OPEN_WITH_ANCHOR);
proto_to_sha256(a->txid, &peer->anchor.txid.sha);
peer->anchor.index = a->output_index;
peer->anchor.satoshis = a->amount;
/* Create funder's cstate, invert to get ours. */
commitfee = commit_fee(peer->them.commit_fee, peer->us.commit_fee);
peer->cstate = initial_funding(peer,
peer->us.offer_anchor,
peer->anchor.satoshis,
commitfee);
if (!peer->cstate)
return pkt_err(ctx, "Insufficient funds for fee");
invert_cstate(peer->cstate);
/* Now we can make initial (unsigned!) commit txs. */
make_commit_txs(peer, peer,
&peer->us.revocation_hash,
&peer->them.revocation_hash,
peer->cstate,
&peer->us.commit,
&peer->them.commit);
peer->cur_commit_theirsig.stype = SIGHASH_ALL;
if (!proto_to_signature(a->commit_sig, &peer->cur_commit_theirsig.sig))
return pkt_err(ctx, "Malformed signature");
/* Their sig should sign our commit tx. */
if (!check_tx_sig(peer->dstate->secpctx,
peer->us.commit, 0,
peer->anchor.redeemscript,
tal_count(peer->anchor.redeemscript),
&peer->them.commitkey,
&peer->cur_commit_theirsig))
return pkt_err(ctx, "Bad signature");
return NULL;
}
Pkt *accept_pkt_open_commit_sig(const tal_t *ctx,
struct peer *peer, const Pkt *pkt)
{
const OpenCommitSig *s = pkt->open_commit_sig;
peer->cur_commit_theirsig.stype = SIGHASH_ALL;
if (!proto_to_signature(s->sig, &peer->cur_commit_theirsig.sig))
return pkt_err(ctx, "Malformed signature");
dump_tx("Checking sig for:", peer->us.commit);
dump_key("Using key:", &peer->them.commitkey);
/* Their sig should sign our commit tx. */
if (!check_tx_sig(peer->dstate->secpctx,
peer->us.commit, 0,
peer->anchor.redeemscript,
tal_count(peer->anchor.redeemscript),
&peer->them.commitkey,
&peer->cur_commit_theirsig))
return pkt_err(ctx, "Bad signature");
return NULL;
}
static Pkt *decline_htlc(const tal_t *ctx, const char *why)
{
UpdateDeclineHtlc *d = tal(ctx, UpdateDeclineHtlc);
update_decline_htlc__init(d);
/* FIXME: Define why in protocol! */
d->reason_case = UPDATE_DECLINE_HTLC__REASON_CANNOT_ROUTE;
d->cannot_route = true;
return make_pkt(ctx, PKT__PKT_UPDATE_DECLINE_HTLC, d);
}
Pkt *accept_pkt_htlc_update(const tal_t *ctx,
struct peer *peer, const Pkt *pkt,
Pkt **decline)
{
const UpdateAddHtlc *u = pkt->update_add_htlc;
struct htlc_progress *cur = tal(peer, struct htlc_progress);
Pkt *err;
cur->htlc = tal(cur, struct channel_htlc);
cur->htlc->msatoshis = u->amount_msat;
proto_to_sha256(u->r_hash, &cur->htlc->rhash);
proto_to_sha256(u->revocation_hash, &cur->their_revocation_hash);
if (!proto_to_abs_locktime(u->expiry, &cur->htlc->expiry)) {
err = pkt_err(ctx, "Invalid HTLC expiry");
goto fail;
}
/* FIXME: Handle block-based expiry! */
if (!abs_locktime_is_seconds(&cur->htlc->expiry)) {
*decline = decline_htlc(ctx,
"HTLC expiry in blocks not supported!");
goto decline;
}
if (abs_locktime_to_seconds(&cur->htlc->expiry) <
controlled_time().ts.tv_sec + peer->dstate->config.min_expiry) {
*decline = decline_htlc(ctx, "HTLC expiry too soon!");
goto decline;
}
if (abs_locktime_to_seconds(&cur->htlc->expiry) >
controlled_time().ts.tv_sec + peer->dstate->config.max_expiry) {
*decline = decline_htlc(ctx, "HTLC expiry too far!");
goto decline;
}
cur->cstate = copy_funding(cur, peer->cstate);
if (!funding_delta(peer->them.offer_anchor == CMD_OPEN_WITH_ANCHOR,
peer->anchor.satoshis,
0, cur->htlc->msatoshis,
&cur->cstate->b, &cur->cstate->a)) {
err = pkt_err(ctx, "Cannot afford %"PRIu64" milli-satoshis",
cur->htlc->msatoshis);
goto fail;
}
/* Add the htlc to their side of channel. */
funding_add_htlc(&cur->cstate->b, cur->htlc->msatoshis,
&cur->htlc->expiry, &cur->htlc->rhash);
peer_add_htlc_expiry(peer, &cur->htlc->expiry);
peer_get_revocation_hash(peer, peer->num_htlcs+1,
&cur->our_revocation_hash);
/* Now we create the commit tx pair. */
make_commit_txs(cur, peer, &cur->our_revocation_hash,
&cur->their_revocation_hash,
cur->cstate,
&cur->our_commit, &cur->their_commit);
/* FIXME: Fees must be sufficient. */
*decline = NULL;
assert(!peer->current_htlc);
peer->current_htlc = cur;
return NULL;
fail:
tal_free(cur);
return err;
decline:
assert(*decline);
tal_free(cur);
return NULL;
};
Pkt *accept_pkt_htlc_routefail(const tal_t *ctx,
struct peer *peer, const Pkt *pkt)
{
const UpdateRoutefailHtlc *f = pkt->update_routefail_htlc;
struct htlc_progress *cur = tal(peer, struct htlc_progress);
Pkt *err;
size_t i;
struct sha256 rhash;
proto_to_sha256(f->revocation_hash, &cur->their_revocation_hash);
proto_to_sha256(f->r_hash, &rhash);
i = funding_find_htlc(&peer->cstate->a, &rhash);
if (i == tal_count(peer->cstate->a.htlcs)) {
err = pkt_err(ctx, "Unknown HTLC");
goto fail;
}
cur->htlc = &peer->cstate->a.htlcs[i];
/* Removing it should not fail: we regain HTLC amount */
cur->cstate = copy_funding(cur, peer->cstate);
if (!funding_delta(peer->us.offer_anchor == CMD_OPEN_WITH_ANCHOR,
peer->anchor.satoshis,
0, -cur->htlc->msatoshis,
&cur->cstate->a, &cur->cstate->b)) {
fatal("Unexpected failure fulfilling HTLC of %"PRIu64
" milli-satoshis", cur->htlc->msatoshis);
}
funding_remove_htlc(&cur->cstate->a, i);
/* FIXME: Remove timer. */
peer_get_revocation_hash(peer, peer->num_htlcs+1,
&cur->our_revocation_hash);
/* Now we create the commit tx pair. */
make_commit_txs(cur, peer, &cur->our_revocation_hash,
&cur->their_revocation_hash,
cur->cstate,
&cur->our_commit, &cur->their_commit);
assert(!peer->current_htlc);
peer->current_htlc = cur;
return NULL;
fail:
tal_free(cur);
return err;
}
Pkt *accept_pkt_htlc_timedout(const tal_t *ctx,
struct peer *peer, const Pkt *pkt)
{
const UpdateTimedoutHtlc *t = pkt->update_timedout_htlc;
struct htlc_progress *cur = tal(peer, struct htlc_progress);
Pkt *err;
size_t i;
struct sha256 rhash;
proto_to_sha256(t->revocation_hash, &cur->their_revocation_hash);
proto_to_sha256(t->r_hash, &rhash);
i = funding_find_htlc(&peer->cstate->a, &rhash);
if (i == tal_count(peer->cstate->a.htlcs)) {
err = pkt_err(ctx, "Unknown HTLC");
goto fail;
}
cur->htlc = &peer->cstate->a.htlcs[i];
/* Do we agree it has timed out? */
if (controlled_time().ts.tv_sec < abs_locktime_to_seconds(&cur->htlc->expiry)) {
err = pkt_err(ctx, "HTLC has not yet expired!");
goto fail;
}
/* Removing it should not fail: we regain HTLC amount */
cur->cstate = copy_funding(cur, peer->cstate);
if (!funding_delta(peer->us.offer_anchor == CMD_OPEN_WITH_ANCHOR,
peer->anchor.satoshis,
0, -cur->htlc->msatoshis,
&cur->cstate->a, &cur->cstate->b)) {
fatal("Unexpected failure fulfilling HTLC of %"PRIu64
" milli-satoshis", cur->htlc->msatoshis);
}
funding_remove_htlc(&cur->cstate->a, i);
/* FIXME: Remove timer. */
peer_get_revocation_hash(peer, peer->num_htlcs+1,
&cur->our_revocation_hash);
/* Now we create the commit tx pair. */
make_commit_txs(cur, peer, &cur->our_revocation_hash,
&cur->their_revocation_hash,
cur->cstate,
&cur->our_commit, &cur->their_commit);
assert(!peer->current_htlc);
peer->current_htlc = cur;
return NULL;
fail:
tal_free(cur);
return err;
}
Pkt *accept_pkt_htlc_fulfill(const tal_t *ctx,
struct peer *peer, const Pkt *pkt)
{
const UpdateFulfillHtlc *f = pkt->update_fulfill_htlc;
struct htlc_progress *cur = tal(peer, struct htlc_progress);
Pkt *err;
size_t i;
struct sha256 rhash, r;
proto_to_sha256(f->r, &r);
proto_to_sha256(f->revocation_hash, &cur->their_revocation_hash);
sha256(&rhash, &r, sizeof(r));
i = funding_find_htlc(&peer->cstate->a, &rhash);
if (i == tal_count(peer->cstate->a.htlcs)) {
err = pkt_err(ctx, "Unknown HTLC");
goto fail;
}
cur->htlc = &peer->cstate->a.htlcs[i];
/* Removing it should not fail: they gain HTLC amount */
cur->cstate = copy_funding(cur, peer->cstate);
if (!funding_delta(peer->us.offer_anchor == CMD_OPEN_WITH_ANCHOR,
peer->anchor.satoshis,
-cur->htlc->msatoshis,
-cur->htlc->msatoshis,
&cur->cstate->a, &cur->cstate->b)) {
fatal("Unexpected failure fulfilling HTLC of %"PRIu64
" milli-satoshis", cur->htlc->msatoshis);
}
funding_remove_htlc(&cur->cstate->a, i);
peer_get_revocation_hash(peer, peer->num_htlcs+1,
&cur->our_revocation_hash);
/* Now we create the commit tx pair. */
make_commit_txs(cur, peer, &cur->our_revocation_hash,
&cur->their_revocation_hash,
cur->cstate,
&cur->our_commit, &cur->their_commit);
assert(!peer->current_htlc);
peer->current_htlc = cur;
return NULL;
fail:
tal_free(cur);
return err;
}
static u64 total_funds(const struct channel_oneside *c)
{
u64 total = (u64)c->pay_msat + c->fee_msat;
size_t i, n = tal_count(c->htlcs);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
total += c->htlcs[i].msatoshis;
return total;
}
static void update_to_new_htlcs(struct peer *peer)
{
struct htlc_progress *cur = peer->current_htlc;
/* FIXME: Add to shachain too. */
/* HTLCs can't change total balance in channel! */
if (total_funds(&peer->cstate->a) + total_funds(&peer->cstate->b)
!= total_funds(&cur->cstate->a) + total_funds(&cur->cstate->b))
fatal("Illegal funding transition from %u/%u (total %"PRIu64")"
" to %u/%u (total %"PRIu64")",
peer->cstate->a.pay_msat, peer->cstate->a.fee_msat,
total_funds(&peer->cstate->a),
peer->cstate->b.pay_msat, peer->cstate->b.fee_msat,
total_funds(&peer->cstate->b));
/* Now, we consider this channel_state current one. */
tal_free(peer->cstate);
peer->cstate = tal_steal(peer, cur->cstate);
tal_free(peer->us.commit);
peer->us.commit = tal_steal(peer, cur->our_commit);
/* FIXME: Save their old commit details, to steal funds. */
tal_free(peer->them.commit);
peer->them.commit = tal_steal(peer, cur->their_commit);
peer->us.revocation_hash = cur->our_revocation_hash;
peer->them.revocation_hash = cur->their_revocation_hash;
peer->num_htlcs++;
}
Pkt *accept_pkt_update_accept(const tal_t *ctx,
struct peer *peer, const Pkt *pkt)
{
const UpdateAccept *a = pkt->update_accept;
struct htlc_progress *cur = peer->current_htlc;
proto_to_sha256(a->revocation_hash, &cur->their_revocation_hash);
cur->their_sig.stype = SIGHASH_ALL;
if (!proto_to_signature(a->sig, &cur->their_sig.sig))
return pkt_err(ctx, "Malformed signature");
/* Now we can make commit tx pair. */
make_commit_txs(cur, peer, &cur->our_revocation_hash,
&cur->their_revocation_hash,
cur->cstate,
&cur->our_commit, &cur->their_commit);
/* Their sig should sign our new commit tx. */
if (!check_tx_sig(peer->dstate->secpctx,
cur->our_commit, 0,
peer->anchor.redeemscript,
tal_count(peer->anchor.redeemscript),
&peer->them.commitkey,
&cur->their_sig))
return pkt_err(ctx, "Bad signature");
/* Our next step will be to send the revocation preimage, so
* update to new HTLC now so we never use the old one. */
update_to_new_htlcs(peer);
return NULL;
}
static bool check_preimage(const Sha256Hash *preimage, const struct sha256 *hash)
{
struct sha256 h;
proto_to_sha256(preimage, &h);
sha256(&h, &h, sizeof(h));
return structeq(&h, hash);
}
Pkt *accept_pkt_update_complete(const tal_t *ctx,
struct peer *peer, const Pkt *pkt)
{
/* FIXME: Check preimage against old tx! */
return NULL;
}
Pkt *accept_pkt_update_signature(const tal_t *ctx,
struct peer *peer,
const Pkt *pkt)
{
const UpdateSignature *s = pkt->update_signature;
struct htlc_progress *cur = peer->current_htlc;
cur->their_sig.stype = SIGHASH_ALL;
if (!proto_to_signature(s->sig, &cur->their_sig.sig))
return pkt_err(ctx, "Malformed signature");
/* Their sig should sign our new commit tx. */
if (!check_tx_sig(peer->dstate->secpctx,
cur->our_commit, 0,
peer->anchor.redeemscript,
tal_count(peer->anchor.redeemscript),
&peer->them.commitkey,
&cur->their_sig))
return pkt_err(ctx, "Bad signature");
/* Check their revocation preimage. */
if (!check_preimage(s->revocation_preimage, &peer->them.revocation_hash))
return pkt_err(ctx, "Bad revocation preimage");
/* Our next step will be to send the revocation preimage, so
* update to new HTLC now so we never use the old one. */
update_to_new_htlcs(peer);
return NULL;
}
static bool peer_sign_close_tx(struct peer *peer, const Signature *theirs)
{
struct bitcoin_signature theirsig;
/* We never sign twice! */
assert(peer->close_tx->input[0].script_length == 0);
theirsig.stype = SIGHASH_ALL;
if (!proto_to_signature(theirs, &theirsig.sig))
return false;
/* Their sig + ours should sign the close tx. */
if (!check_2of2_sig(peer->dstate->secpctx,
peer->close_tx, 0,
peer->anchor.redeemscript,
tal_count(peer->anchor.redeemscript),
&peer->them.commitkey, &peer->us.commitkey,
&theirsig, &peer->our_close_sig))
return false;
/* Complete the close_tx, using signatures. */
peer->close_tx->input[0].script
= scriptsig_p2sh_2of2(peer->close_tx,
&theirsig, &peer->our_close_sig,
&peer->them.commitkey,
&peer->us.commitkey);
peer->close_tx->input[0].script_length
= tal_count(peer->close_tx->input[0].script);
return true;
}
Pkt *accept_pkt_close(const tal_t *ctx, struct peer *peer, const Pkt *pkt)
{
const CloseChannel *c = pkt->close;
/* FIXME: Don't accept tiny close fee! */
if (!peer_create_close_tx(peer, c->close_fee))
return pkt_err(ctx, "Invalid close fee");
if (!peer_sign_close_tx(peer, c->sig))
return pkt_err(ctx, "Invalid signature");
return NULL;
}
Pkt *accept_pkt_close_complete(const tal_t *ctx,
struct peer *peer, const Pkt *pkt)
{
const CloseChannelComplete *c = pkt->close_complete;
if (!peer_sign_close_tx(peer, c->sig))
return pkt_err(ctx, "Invalid signature");
return NULL;
}
Pkt *accept_pkt_simultaneous_close(const tal_t *ctx,
struct peer *peer,
const Pkt *pkt)
{
FIXME_STUB(peer);
}
/* FIXME: Since this packet is empty, is it worth having? */
Pkt *accept_pkt_close_ack(const tal_t *ctx, struct peer *peer, const Pkt *pkt)
{
return NULL;
}