vincenzopalazzo
/
rgb-cln
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues 1 Pull Requests Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
rgb-cln/lightningd/peer_htlcs.c

1724 lines
49 KiB
C
Raw Blame History

#include <bitcoin/tx.h>
#include <ccan/build_assert/build_assert.h>
#include <ccan/cast/cast.h>
#include <ccan/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160.h>
#include <ccan/mem/mem.h>
#include <ccan/tal/str/str.h>
#include <channeld/gen_channel_wire.h>
#include <common/json_escaped.h>
#include <common/overflows.h>
#include <common/sphinx.h>
#include <common/timeout.h>
#include <gossipd/gen_gossip_wire.h>
#include <lightningd/chaintopology.h>
#include <lightningd/htlc_end.h>
#include <lightningd/json.h>
#include <lightningd/jsonrpc.h>
#include <lightningd/jsonrpc_errors.h>
#include <lightningd/lightningd.h>
#include <lightningd/log.h>
#include <lightningd/param.h>
#include <lightningd/pay.h>
#include <lightningd/peer_control.h>
#include <lightningd/peer_htlcs.h>
#include <lightningd/subd.h>
#include <onchaind/gen_onchain_wire.h>
#include <onchaind/onchain_wire.h>
#include <wallet/wallet.h>
#include <wire/gen_onion_wire.h>
static bool state_update_ok(struct channel *channel,
enum htlc_state oldstate, enum htlc_state newstate,
u64 htlc_id, const char *dir)
{
enum htlc_state expected = oldstate + 1;
/* We never get told about RCVD_REMOVE_HTLC, so skip over that
* (we initialize in SENT_ADD_HTLC / RCVD_ADD_COMMIT, so those
* work). */
if (expected == RCVD_REMOVE_HTLC)
expected = RCVD_REMOVE_COMMIT;
if (newstate != expected) {
channel_internal_error(channel,
"HTLC %s %"PRIu64" invalid update %s->%s",
dir, htlc_id,
htlc_state_name(oldstate),
htlc_state_name(newstate));
return false;
}
log_debug(channel->log, "HTLC %s %"PRIu64" %s->%s",
dir, htlc_id,
htlc_state_name(oldstate), htlc_state_name(newstate));
return true;
}
static bool htlc_in_update_state(struct channel *channel,
struct htlc_in *hin,
enum htlc_state newstate)
{
if (!state_update_ok(channel, hin->hstate, newstate, hin->key.id, "in"))
return false;
wallet_htlc_update(channel->peer->ld->wallet,
hin->dbid, newstate, hin->preimage);
hin->hstate = newstate;
htlc_in_check(hin, __func__);
return true;
}
static bool htlc_out_update_state(struct channel *channel,
struct htlc_out *hout,
enum htlc_state newstate)
{
if (!state_update_ok(channel, hout->hstate, newstate, hout->key.id,
"out"))
return false;
wallet_htlc_update(channel->peer->ld->wallet, hout->dbid, newstate,
NULL);
hout->hstate = newstate;
htlc_out_check(hout, __func__);
return true;
}
static void fail_in_htlc(struct htlc_in *hin,
enum onion_type failcode,
const u8 *failuremsg,
const struct short_channel_id *out_channelid)
{
struct failed_htlc failed_htlc;
assert(!hin->preimage);
assert(failcode || failuremsg);
hin->failcode = failcode;
if (failuremsg)
hin->failuremsg = tal_dup_arr(hin, u8, failuremsg, tal_count(failuremsg), 0);
/* We need this set, since we send it to channeld. */
if (hin->failcode & UPDATE)
hin->failoutchannel = *out_channelid;
else
memset(&hin->failoutchannel, 0, sizeof(hin->failoutchannel));
/* We update state now to signal it's in progress, for persistence. */
htlc_in_update_state(hin->key.channel, hin, SENT_REMOVE_HTLC);
/* Tell peer, if we can. */
if (!hin->key.channel->owner)
return;
/* onchaind doesn't care, it can't do anything but wait */
if (channel_on_chain(hin->key.channel))
return;
failed_htlc.id = hin->key.id;
failed_htlc.failcode = hin->failcode;
failed_htlc.failreason = cast_const(u8 *, hin->failuremsg);
if (failed_htlc.failcode & UPDATE)
failed_htlc.scid = &hin->failoutchannel;
else
failed_htlc.scid = NULL;
subd_send_msg(hin->key.channel->owner,
take(towire_channel_fail_htlc(NULL, &failed_htlc)));
}
/* This is used for cases where we can immediately fail the HTLC. */
static void local_fail_htlc(struct htlc_in *hin, enum onion_type failcode,
const struct short_channel_id *out_channel)
{
log_info(hin->key.channel->log, "failed htlc %"PRIu64" code 0x%04x (%s)",
hin->key.id, failcode, onion_type_name(failcode));
fail_in_htlc(hin, failcode, NULL, out_channel);
}
/* localfail are for handing to the local payer if it's local. */
static void fail_out_htlc(struct htlc_out *hout, const char *localfail)
{
htlc_out_check(hout, __func__);
assert(hout->failcode || hout->failuremsg);
if (hout->in) {
fail_in_htlc(hout->in, hout->failcode, hout->failuremsg,
hout->key.channel->scid);
} else {
payment_failed(hout->key.channel->peer->ld, hout, localfail);
}
}
/* BOLT #4:
*
* * `amt_to_forward`: The amount, in millisatoshis, to forward to the next
* receiving peer specified within the routing information.
*
* This value amount MUST include the origin node's computed _fee_ for the
* receiving peer. When processing an incoming Sphinx packet and the HTLC
* message that it is encapsulated within, if the following inequality
* doesn't hold, then the HTLC should be rejected as it would indicate that
* a prior hop has deviated from the specified parameters:
*
* incoming_htlc_amt - fee >= amt_to_forward
*
* Where `fee` is either calculated according to the receiving peer's
* advertised fee schema (as described in [BOLT
* #7](07-routing-gossip.md#htlc-fees)) or is 0, if the processing node is
* the final node.
*/
static bool check_amount(struct htlc_in *hin,
u64 amt_to_forward, u64 amt_in_htlc, u64 fee)
{
if (amt_in_htlc - fee >= amt_to_forward)
return true;
log_debug(hin->key.channel->log, "HTLC %"PRIu64" incorrect amount:"
" %"PRIu64" in, %"PRIu64" out, fee reqd %"PRIu64,
hin->key.id, amt_in_htlc, amt_to_forward, fee);
return false;
}
/* BOLT #4:
*
* * `outgoing_cltv_value`: The CLTV value that the _outgoing_ HTLC carrying
* the packet should have.
*
* cltv_expiry - cltv_expiry_delta >= outgoing_cltv_value
*
* Inclusion of this field allows a hop to both authenticate the
* information specified by the origin node, and the parameters of the
* HTLC forwarded, and ensure the origin node is using the current
* `cltv_expiry_delta` value. If there is no next hop,
* `cltv_expiry_delta` is 0. If the values don't correspond, then the
* HTLC should be failed and rejected, as this indicates that either a
* forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or that the
* origin node has an obsolete `cltv_expiry_delta` value. The hop MUST be
* consistent in responding to an unexpected `outgoing_cltv_value`,
* whether it is the final node or not, to avoid leaking its position in
* the route.
*/
static bool check_cltv(struct htlc_in *hin,
u32 cltv_expiry, u32 outgoing_cltv_value, u32 delta)
{
if (cltv_expiry - delta >= outgoing_cltv_value)
return true;
log_debug(hin->key.channel->log, "HTLC %"PRIu64" incorrect CLTV:"
" %u in, %u out, delta reqd %u",
hin->key.id, cltv_expiry, outgoing_cltv_value, delta);
return false;
}
static void fulfill_htlc(struct htlc_in *hin, const struct preimage *preimage)
{
u8 *msg;
struct channel *channel = hin->key.channel;
struct wallet *wallet = channel->peer->ld->wallet;
hin->preimage = tal_dup(hin, struct preimage, preimage);
htlc_in_check(hin, __func__);
/* We update state now to signal it's in progress, for persistence. */
htlc_in_update_state(channel, hin, SENT_REMOVE_HTLC);
/* Update channel stats */
wallet_channel_stats_incr_in_fulfilled(wallet,
channel->dbid,
hin->msatoshi);
/* No owner? We'll either send to channeld in peer_htlcs, or
* onchaind in onchaind_tell_fulfill. */
if (!channel->owner) {
log_debug(channel->log, "HTLC fulfilled, but no owner.");
return;
}
if (channel_on_chain(channel)) {
msg = towire_onchain_known_preimage(hin, preimage);
} else {
struct fulfilled_htlc fulfilled_htlc;
fulfilled_htlc.id = hin->key.id;
fulfilled_htlc.payment_preimage = *preimage;
msg = towire_channel_fulfill_htlc(hin, &fulfilled_htlc);
}
subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg));
}
static void handle_localpay(struct htlc_in *hin,
u32 cltv_expiry,
const struct sha256 *payment_hash,
u64 amt_to_forward,
u32 outgoing_cltv_value)
{
enum onion_type failcode;
struct invoice invoice;
const struct invoice_details *details;
struct lightningd *ld = hin->key.channel->peer->ld;
/* BOLT #4:
*
* 1. type: 19 (`final_incorrect_htlc_amount`)
* 2. data:
* * [`4`:`incoming_htlc_amt`]
*
* The amount in the HTLC doesn't match the value in the onion.
*/
if (!check_amount(hin, amt_to_forward, hin->msatoshi, 0)) {
failcode = WIRE_FINAL_INCORRECT_HTLC_AMOUNT;
goto fail;
}
/* BOLT #4:
*
* 1. type: 18 (`final_incorrect_cltv_expiry`)
* 2. data:
* * [`4`:`cltv_expiry`]
*
* The CLTV expiry in the HTLC doesn't match the value in the onion.
*/
if (!check_cltv(hin, cltv_expiry, outgoing_cltv_value, 0)) {
failcode = WIRE_FINAL_INCORRECT_CLTV_EXPIRY;
goto fail;
}
if (!wallet_invoice_find_unpaid(ld->wallet, &invoice, payment_hash)) {
failcode = WIRE_UNKNOWN_PAYMENT_HASH;
goto fail;
}
details = wallet_invoice_details(tmpctx, ld->wallet, invoice);
/* BOLT #4:
*
* An _intermediate hop_ MUST NOT, but the _final node_:
*...
* - if the amount paid is less than the amount expected:
* - MUST fail the HTLC.
*...
* - if the amount paid is more than twice the amount expected:
* - SHOULD fail the HTLC.
* - SHOULD return an `incorrect_payment_amount` error.
* - Note: this allows the origin node to reduce information
* leakage by altering the amount while not allowing for
* accidental gross overpayment.
*/
if (details->msatoshi != NULL && hin->msatoshi < *details->msatoshi) {
failcode = WIRE_INCORRECT_PAYMENT_AMOUNT;
goto fail;
} else if (details->msatoshi != NULL && hin->msatoshi > *details->msatoshi * 2) {
failcode = WIRE_INCORRECT_PAYMENT_AMOUNT;
goto fail;
}
/* BOLT #4:
*
* - if the `cltv_expiry` value is unreasonably near the present:
* - MUST fail the HTLC.
* - MUST return a `final_expiry_too_soon` error.
*/
if (get_block_height(ld->topology) + ld->config.cltv_final
> cltv_expiry) {
log_debug(hin->key.channel->log,
"Expiry cltv too soon %u < %u + %u",
cltv_expiry,
get_block_height(ld->topology),
ld->config.cltv_final);
failcode = WIRE_FINAL_EXPIRY_TOO_SOON;
goto fail;
}
log_info(ld->log, "Resolving invoice '%s' with HTLC %"PRIu64,
details->label->s, hin->key.id);
log_debug(ld->log, "%s: Actual amount %"PRIu64"msat, HTLC expiry %u",
details->label->s, hin->msatoshi, cltv_expiry);
fulfill_htlc(hin, &details->r);
wallet_invoice_resolve(ld->wallet, invoice, hin->msatoshi);
return;
fail:
/* Final hop never sends an UPDATE. */
assert(!(failcode & UPDATE));
local_fail_htlc(hin, failcode, NULL);
}
/*
* A catchall in case outgoing peer disconnects before getting fwd.
*
* We could queue this and wait for it to come back, but this is simple.
*/
static void destroy_hout_subd_died(struct htlc_out *hout)
{
log_debug(hout->key.channel->log,
"Failing HTLC %"PRIu64" due to peer death",
hout->key.id);
hout->failcode = WIRE_TEMPORARY_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
fail_out_htlc(hout, "Outgoing subdaemon died");
}
/* This is where channeld gives us the HTLC id, and also reports if it
* failed immediately. */
static void rcvd_htlc_reply(struct subd *subd, const u8 *msg, const int *fds UNUSED,
struct htlc_out *hout)
{
u16 failure_code;
u8 *failurestr;
struct lightningd *ld = subd->ld;
if (!fromwire_channel_offer_htlc_reply(msg, msg,
&hout->key.id,
&failure_code,
&failurestr)) {
channel_internal_error(subd->channel,
"Bad channel_offer_htlc_reply");
tal_free(hout);
return;
}
if (failure_code) {
hout->failcode = (enum onion_type) failure_code;
if (!hout->in) {
char *localfail = tal_fmt(msg, "%s: %.*s",
onion_type_name(failure_code),
(int)tal_count(failurestr),
(const char *)failurestr);
payment_failed(ld, hout, localfail);
} else
local_fail_htlc(hout->in, failure_code,
hout->key.channel->scid);
/* Prevent hout from being failed twice. */
tal_del_destructor(hout, destroy_hout_subd_died);
tal_free(hout);
return;
}
if (find_htlc_out(&subd->ld->htlcs_out, hout->key.channel, hout->key.id)
|| hout->key.id == HTLC_INVALID_ID) {
channel_internal_error(subd->channel,
"Bad offer_htlc_reply HTLC id %"PRIu64
" is a duplicate",
hout->key.id);
tal_free(hout);
return;
}
/* Add it to lookup table now we know id. */
connect_htlc_out(&subd->ld->htlcs_out, hout);
/* When channeld includes it in commitment, we'll make it persistent. */
}
static void htlc_offer_timeout(struct channel *channel)
{
/* If owner died, we should already be taken care of. */
if (!channel->owner || channel->state != CHANNELD_NORMAL)
return;
log_unusual(channel->owner->log,
"Adding HTLC too slow: killing channel");
tal_free(channel->owner);
channel_set_billboard(channel, false,
"Adding HTLC timed out: killed channel");
}
enum onion_type send_htlc_out(struct channel *out, u64 amount, u32 cltv,
const struct sha256 *payment_hash,
const u8 *onion_routing_packet,
struct htlc_in *in,
struct htlc_out **houtp)
{
struct htlc_out *hout;
u8 *msg;
if (!channel_can_add_htlc(out)) {
log_info(out->log, "Attempt to send HTLC but not ready (%s)",
channel_state_name(out));
return WIRE_UNKNOWN_NEXT_PEER;
}
if (!out->owner) {
log_info(out->log, "Attempt to send HTLC but unowned (%s)",
channel_state_name(out));
return WIRE_TEMPORARY_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
}
/* Make peer's daemon own it, catch if it dies. */
hout = new_htlc_out(out->owner, out, amount, cltv,
payment_hash, onion_routing_packet, in);
tal_add_destructor(hout, destroy_hout_subd_died);
/* Give channel 30 seconds to commit (first) htlc. */
if (!out->htlc_timeout)
out->htlc_timeout = new_reltimer(&out->peer->ld->timers,
out, time_from_sec(30),
htlc_offer_timeout,
out);
msg = towire_channel_offer_htlc(out, amount, cltv, payment_hash,
onion_routing_packet);
subd_req(out->peer->ld, out->owner, take(msg), -1, 0, rcvd_htlc_reply, hout);
if (houtp)
*houtp = hout;
return 0;
}
static void forward_htlc(struct htlc_in *hin,
u32 cltv_expiry,
u64 amt_to_forward,
u32 outgoing_cltv_value,
const struct pubkey *next_hop,
const u8 next_onion[TOTAL_PACKET_SIZE])
{
enum onion_type failcode;
u64 fee;
struct lightningd *ld = hin->key.channel->peer->ld;
struct channel *next = active_channel_by_id(ld, next_hop, NULL);
/* Unknown peer, or peer not ready. */
if (!next || !next->scid) {
local_fail_htlc(hin, WIRE_UNKNOWN_NEXT_PEER, NULL);
return;
}
/* BOLT #7:
*
* The origin node:
* - SHOULD accept HTLCs that pay a fee equal to or greater than:
* - fee_base_msat + ( amount_msat * fee_proportional_millionths / 1000000 )
*/
if (mul_overflows_u64(amt_to_forward,
ld->config.fee_per_satoshi)) {
failcode = WIRE_FEE_INSUFFICIENT;
goto fail;
}
fee = ld->config.fee_base
+ amt_to_forward * ld->config.fee_per_satoshi / 1000000;
if (!check_amount(hin, amt_to_forward, hin->msatoshi, fee)) {
failcode = WIRE_FEE_INSUFFICIENT;
goto fail;
}
if (!check_cltv(hin, cltv_expiry, outgoing_cltv_value,
ld->config.cltv_expiry_delta)) {
failcode = WIRE_INCORRECT_CLTV_EXPIRY;
goto fail;
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* An offering node:
* - MUST estimate a timeout deadline for each HTLC it offers.
* - MUST NOT offer an HTLC with a timeout deadline before its
* `cltv_expiry`.
*/
/* In our case, G = 1, so we need to expire it one after it's expiration.
* But never offer an expired HTLC; that's dumb. */
if (get_block_height(ld->topology) >= outgoing_cltv_value) {
log_debug(hin->key.channel->log,
"Expiry cltv %u too close to current %u",
outgoing_cltv_value,
get_block_height(ld->topology));
failcode = WIRE_EXPIRY_TOO_SOON;
goto fail;
}
/* BOLT #4:
*
* - if the `cltv_expiry` is unreasonably far in the future:
* - return an `expiry_too_far` error.
*/
if (get_block_height(ld->topology)
+ ld->config.locktime_max < outgoing_cltv_value) {
log_debug(hin->key.channel->log,
"Expiry cltv %u too far from current %u + max %u",
outgoing_cltv_value,
get_block_height(ld->topology),
ld->config.locktime_max);
failcode = WIRE_EXPIRY_TOO_FAR;
goto fail;
}
failcode = send_htlc_out(next, amt_to_forward,
outgoing_cltv_value, &hin->payment_hash,
next_onion, hin, NULL);
if (!failcode)
return;
fail:
local_fail_htlc(hin, failcode, next->scid);
}
/* Temporary information, while we resolve the next hop */
struct gossip_resolve {
struct short_channel_id next_channel;
u64 amt_to_forward;
u32 outgoing_cltv_value;
u8 *next_onion;
struct htlc_in *hin;
};
/* We received a resolver reply, which gives us the node_ids of the
* channel we want to forward over */
static void channel_resolve_reply(struct subd *gossip, const u8 *msg,
const int *fds UNUSED, struct gossip_resolve *gr)
{
struct pubkey *nodes, *peer_id;
if (!fromwire_gossip_resolve_channel_reply(msg, msg, &nodes)) {
log_broken(gossip->log,
"bad fromwire_gossip_resolve_channel_reply %s",
tal_hex(msg, msg));
return;
}
if (tal_count(nodes) == 0) {
local_fail_htlc(gr->hin, WIRE_UNKNOWN_NEXT_PEER, NULL);
return;
} else if (tal_count(nodes) != 2) {
log_broken(gossip->log,
"fromwire_gossip_resolve_channel_reply has %zu nodes",
tal_count(nodes));
return;
}
/* Get the other peer matching the id that is not us */
if (pubkey_cmp(&nodes[0], &gossip->ld->id) == 0) {
peer_id = &nodes[1];
} else {
peer_id = &nodes[0];
}
forward_htlc(gr->hin, gr->hin->cltv_expiry,
gr->amt_to_forward, gr->outgoing_cltv_value, peer_id,
gr->next_onion);
tal_free(gr);
}
/* Everyone is committed to this htlc of theirs */
static bool peer_accepted_htlc(struct channel *channel,
u64 id,
enum onion_type *failcode)
{
struct htlc_in *hin;
u8 *req;
struct route_step *rs;
struct onionpacket *op;
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
hin = find_htlc_in(&ld->htlcs_in, channel, id);
if (!hin) {
channel_internal_error(channel,
"peer_got_revoke unknown htlc %"PRIu64, id);
return false;
}
if (!htlc_in_update_state(channel, hin, RCVD_ADD_ACK_REVOCATION))
return false;
#if DEVELOPER
if (channel->peer->ignore_htlcs) {
log_debug(channel->log, "their htlc %"PRIu64" dev_ignore_htlcs",
id);
return true;
}
#endif
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - SHOULD fail to route any HTLC added after it has sent `shutdown`.
*/
if (channel->state == CHANNELD_SHUTTING_DOWN) {
*failcode = WIRE_PERMANENT_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
goto out;
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* A fulfilling node:
* - for each HTLC it is attempting to fulfill:
* - MUST estimate a fulfillment deadline.
* - MUST fail (and not forward) an HTLC whose fulfillment deadline is
* already past.
*/
/* Our deadline is half the cltv_delta we insist on, so this check is
* a subset of the cltv check done in handle_localpay and
* forward_htlc. */
/* channeld tests this, so it should have set ss to zeroes. */
op = parse_onionpacket(tmpctx, hin->onion_routing_packet,
sizeof(hin->onion_routing_packet));
if (!op) {
if (!memeqzero(&hin->shared_secret, sizeof(hin->shared_secret))){
channel_internal_error(channel,
"bad onion in got_revoke: %s",
tal_hexstr(channel, hin->onion_routing_packet,
sizeof(hin->onion_routing_packet)));
return false;
}
/* FIXME: could be bad version, bad key. */
*failcode = WIRE_INVALID_ONION_VERSION;
goto out;
}
/* Channeld sets this to zero if HSM won't ecdh it */
if (memeqzero(&hin->shared_secret, sizeof(hin->shared_secret))) {
*failcode = WIRE_INVALID_ONION_KEY;
goto out;
}
/* If it's crap, not channeld's fault, just fail it */
rs = process_onionpacket(tmpctx, op, hin->shared_secret.data,
hin->payment_hash.u.u8,
sizeof(hin->payment_hash));
if (!rs) {
*failcode = WIRE_INVALID_ONION_HMAC;
goto out;
}
/* Unknown realm isn't a bad onion, it's a normal failure. */
if (rs->hop_data.realm != 0) {
*failcode = WIRE_INVALID_REALM;
goto out;
}
if (rs->nextcase == ONION_FORWARD) {
struct gossip_resolve *gr = tal(ld, struct gossip_resolve);
gr->next_onion = serialize_onionpacket(gr, rs->next);
gr->next_channel = rs->hop_data.channel_id;
gr->amt_to_forward = rs->hop_data.amt_forward;
gr->outgoing_cltv_value = rs->hop_data.outgoing_cltv;
gr->hin = hin;
req = towire_gossip_resolve_channel_request(tmpctx,
&gr->next_channel);
log_debug(channel->log, "Asking gossip to resolve channel %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct short_channel_id,
&gr->next_channel));
subd_req(hin, ld->gossip, req, -1, 0,
channel_resolve_reply, gr);
} else
handle_localpay(hin, hin->cltv_expiry, &hin->payment_hash,
rs->hop_data.amt_forward,
rs->hop_data.outgoing_cltv);
*failcode = 0;
out:
log_debug(channel->log, "their htlc %"PRIu64" %s",
id, *failcode ? onion_type_name(*failcode) : "locked");
return true;
}
static void fulfill_our_htlc_out(struct channel *channel, struct htlc_out *hout,
const struct preimage *preimage)
{
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
assert(!hout->preimage);
hout->preimage = tal_dup(hout, struct preimage, preimage);
htlc_out_check(hout, __func__);
wallet_htlc_update(ld->wallet, hout->dbid, hout->hstate, preimage);
/* Update channel stats */
wallet_channel_stats_incr_out_fulfilled(ld->wallet,
channel->dbid,
hout->msatoshi);
if (hout->in)
fulfill_htlc(hout->in, preimage);
else
payment_succeeded(ld, hout, preimage);
}
static bool peer_fulfilled_our_htlc(struct channel *channel,
const struct fulfilled_htlc *fulfilled)
{
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
struct htlc_out *hout;
hout = find_htlc_out(&ld->htlcs_out, channel, fulfilled->id);
if (!hout) {
channel_internal_error(channel,
"fulfilled_our_htlc unknown htlc %"PRIu64,
fulfilled->id);
return false;
}
if (!htlc_out_update_state(channel, hout, RCVD_REMOVE_COMMIT))
return false;
fulfill_our_htlc_out(channel, hout, &fulfilled->payment_preimage);
return true;
}
void onchain_fulfilled_htlc(struct channel *channel,
const struct preimage *preimage)
{
struct htlc_out_map_iter outi;
struct htlc_out *hout;
struct sha256 payment_hash;
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
sha256(&payment_hash, preimage, sizeof(*preimage));
/* FIXME: use db to look this up! */
for (hout = htlc_out_map_first(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi);
hout;
hout = htlc_out_map_next(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi)) {
if (hout->key.channel != channel)
continue;
/* It's possible that we failed some and succeeded one,
* if we got multiple errors. */
if (hout->failcode != 0 || hout->failuremsg)
continue;
if (!sha256_eq(&hout->payment_hash, &payment_hash))
continue;
/* We may have already fulfilled before going onchain, or
* we can fulfill onchain multiple times. */
if (!hout->preimage)
fulfill_our_htlc_out(channel, hout, preimage);
/* We keep going: this is something of a leak, but onchain
* we have no real way of distinguishing HTLCs anyway */
}
}
static bool peer_failed_our_htlc(struct channel *channel,
const struct failed_htlc *failed)
{
struct htlc_out *hout;
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
hout = find_htlc_out(&ld->htlcs_out, channel, failed->id);
if (!hout) {
channel_internal_error(channel,
"failed_our_htlc unknown htlc %"PRIu64,
failed->id);
return false;
}
if (!htlc_out_update_state(channel, hout, RCVD_REMOVE_COMMIT))
return false;
hout->failcode = failed->failcode;
if (!failed->failcode)
hout->failuremsg = tal_dup_arr(hout, u8, failed->failreason,
tal_count(failed->failreason), 0);
else
hout->failuremsg = NULL;
log_debug(channel->log, "Our HTLC %"PRIu64" failed (%u)", failed->id,
hout->failcode);
htlc_out_check(hout, __func__);
return true;
}
/* FIXME: Crazy slow! */
struct htlc_out *find_htlc_out_by_ripemd(const struct channel *channel,
const struct ripemd160 *ripemd)
{
struct htlc_out_map_iter outi;
struct htlc_out *hout;
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
for (hout = htlc_out_map_first(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi);
hout;
hout = htlc_out_map_next(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi)) {
struct ripemd160 hash;
if (hout->key.channel != channel)
continue;
ripemd160(&hash,
&hout->payment_hash, sizeof(hout->payment_hash));
if (ripemd160_eq(&hash, ripemd))
return hout;
}
return NULL;
}
void onchain_failed_our_htlc(const struct channel *channel,
const struct htlc_stub *htlc,
const char *why)
{
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
struct htlc_out *hout = find_htlc_out_by_ripemd(channel, &htlc->ripemd);
/* Don't fail twice! */
if (hout->failuremsg || hout->failcode)
return;
hout->failcode = WIRE_PERMANENT_CHANNEL_FAILURE;
if (!hout->in) {
assert(why != NULL);
char *localfail = tal_fmt(channel, "%s: %s",
onion_type_name(WIRE_PERMANENT_CHANNEL_FAILURE),
why);
payment_failed(ld, hout, localfail);
tal_free(localfail);
} else
local_fail_htlc(hout->in, WIRE_PERMANENT_CHANNEL_FAILURE,
hout->key.channel->scid);
}
static void remove_htlc_in(struct channel *channel, struct htlc_in *hin)
{
htlc_in_check(hin, __func__);
assert(hin->failuremsg || hin->preimage || hin->failcode);
log_debug(channel->log, "Removing in HTLC %"PRIu64" state %s %s",
hin->key.id, htlc_state_name(hin->hstate),
hin->preimage ? "FULFILLED"
: hin->failcode ? onion_type_name(hin->failcode)
: "REMOTEFAIL");
/* If we fulfilled their HTLC, credit us. */
if (hin->preimage) {
log_debug(channel->log, "Balance %"PRIu64" -> %"PRIu64,
channel->our_msatoshi,
channel->our_msatoshi + hin->msatoshi);
channel->our_msatoshi += hin->msatoshi;
if (channel->our_msatoshi > channel->msatoshi_to_us_max)
channel->msatoshi_to_us_max = channel->our_msatoshi;
}
tal_free(hin);
}
static void remove_htlc_out(struct channel *channel, struct htlc_out *hout)
{
htlc_out_check(hout, __func__);
assert(hout->failuremsg || hout->preimage || hout->failcode);
log_debug(channel->log, "Removing out HTLC %"PRIu64" state %s %s",
hout->key.id, htlc_state_name(hout->hstate),
hout->preimage ? "FULFILLED"
: hout->failcode ? onion_type_name(hout->failcode)
: "REMOTEFAIL");
/* If it's failed, now we can forward since it's completely locked-in */
if (!hout->preimage) {
fail_out_htlc(hout, NULL);
} else {
/* We paid for this HTLC, so deduct balance. */
log_debug(channel->log, "Balance %"PRIu64" -> %"PRIu64,
channel->our_msatoshi,
channel->our_msatoshi - hout->msatoshi);
channel->our_msatoshi -= hout->msatoshi;
if (channel->our_msatoshi < channel->msatoshi_to_us_min)
channel->msatoshi_to_us_min = channel->our_msatoshi;
}
tal_free(hout);
}
static bool update_in_htlc(struct channel *channel,
u64 id, enum htlc_state newstate)
{
struct htlc_in *hin;
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
hin = find_htlc_in(&ld->htlcs_in, channel, id);
if (!hin) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "Can't find in HTLC %"PRIu64, id);
return false;
}
if (!htlc_in_update_state(channel, hin, newstate))
return false;
if (newstate == SENT_REMOVE_ACK_REVOCATION)
remove_htlc_in(channel, hin);
return true;
}
static bool update_out_htlc(struct channel *channel,
u64 id, enum htlc_state newstate)
{
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
struct htlc_out *hout;
hout = find_htlc_out(&ld->htlcs_out, channel, id);
if (!hout) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "Can't find out HTLC %"PRIu64, id);
return false;
}
if (!hout->dbid) {
wallet_htlc_save_out(ld->wallet, channel, hout);
/* Update channel stats */
wallet_channel_stats_incr_out_offered(ld->wallet,
channel->dbid,
hout->msatoshi);
/* For our own HTLCs, we commit payment to db lazily */
if (hout->origin_htlc_id == 0)
payment_store(ld,
&hout->payment_hash);
}
if (!htlc_out_update_state(channel, hout, newstate))
return false;
/* First transition into commitment; now it outlives peer. */
if (newstate == SENT_ADD_COMMIT) {
tal_del_destructor(hout, destroy_hout_subd_died);
tal_steal(ld, hout);
} else if (newstate == RCVD_REMOVE_ACK_REVOCATION) {
remove_htlc_out(channel, hout);
}
return true;
}
static bool changed_htlc(struct channel *channel,
const struct changed_htlc *changed)
{
if (htlc_state_owner(changed->newstate) == LOCAL)
return update_out_htlc(channel, changed->id, changed->newstate);
else
return update_in_htlc(channel, changed->id, changed->newstate);
}
static bool peer_save_commitsig_received(struct channel *channel, u64 commitnum,
struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *commit_sig)
{
if (commitnum != channel->next_index[LOCAL]) {
channel_internal_error(channel,
"channel_got_commitsig: expected commitnum %"PRIu64
" got %"PRIu64,
channel->next_index[LOCAL], commitnum);
return false;
}
channel->next_index[LOCAL]++;
/* Update channel->last_sig and channel->last_tx before saving to db */
channel_set_last_tx(channel, tx, commit_sig);
return true;
}
static bool peer_save_commitsig_sent(struct channel *channel, u64 commitnum)
{
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
if (commitnum != channel->next_index[REMOTE]) {
channel_internal_error(channel,
"channel_sent_commitsig: expected commitnum %"PRIu64
" got %"PRIu64,
channel->next_index[REMOTE], commitnum);
return false;
}
channel->next_index[REMOTE]++;
/* FIXME: Save to database, with sig and HTLCs. */
wallet_channel_save(ld->wallet, channel);
return true;
}
void peer_sending_commitsig(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
{
u64 commitnum;
u32 feerate;
struct changed_htlc *changed_htlcs;
size_t i, maxid = 0, num_local_added = 0;
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature commit_sig;
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *htlc_sigs;
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
channel->htlc_timeout = tal_free(channel->htlc_timeout);
if (!fromwire_channel_sending_commitsig(msg, msg,
&commitnum,
&feerate,
&changed_htlcs,
&commit_sig, &htlc_sigs)) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "bad channel_sending_commitsig %s",
tal_hex(channel, msg));
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(changed_htlcs); i++) {
if (!changed_htlc(channel, changed_htlcs + i)) {
channel_internal_error(channel,
"channel_sending_commitsig: update failed");
return;
}
/* While we're here, sanity check added ones are in
* ascending order. */
if (changed_htlcs[i].newstate == SENT_ADD_COMMIT) {
num_local_added++;
if (changed_htlcs[i].id > maxid)
maxid = changed_htlcs[i].id;
}
}
if (num_local_added != 0) {
if (maxid != channel->next_htlc_id + num_local_added - 1) {
channel_internal_error(channel,
"channel_sending_commitsig:"
" Added %"PRIu64", maxid now %"PRIu64
" from %"PRIu64,
num_local_added, maxid, channel->next_htlc_id);
return;
}
channel->next_htlc_id += num_local_added;
}
/* Update their feerate. */
channel->channel_info.feerate_per_kw[REMOTE] = feerate;
if (feerate > channel->max_possible_feerate)
channel->max_possible_feerate = feerate;
if (feerate < channel->min_possible_feerate)
channel->min_possible_feerate = feerate;
if (!peer_save_commitsig_sent(channel, commitnum))
return;
/* Last was commit. */
channel->last_was_revoke = false;
tal_free(channel->last_sent_commit);
channel->last_sent_commit = tal_steal(channel, changed_htlcs);
wallet_channel_save(ld->wallet, channel);
/* Tell it we've got it, and to go ahead with commitment_signed. */
subd_send_msg(channel->owner,
take(towire_channel_sending_commitsig_reply(msg)));
}
static bool channel_added_their_htlc(struct channel *channel,
const struct added_htlc *added,
const struct secret *shared_secret)
{
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
struct htlc_in *hin;
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - receiving an `amount_msat` equal to 0, OR less than its own `htlc_minimum_msat`:
* - SHOULD fail the channel.
*/
if (added->amount_msat == 0
|| added->amount_msat < channel->our_config.htlc_minimum_msat) {
channel_internal_error(channel,
"trying to add HTLC msat %"PRIu64
" but minimum is %"PRIu64,
added->amount_msat,
channel->our_config.htlc_minimum_msat);
return false;
}
/* This stays around even if we fail it immediately: it *is*
* part of the current commitment. */
hin = new_htlc_in(channel, channel, added->id, added->amount_msat,
added->cltv_expiry, &added->payment_hash,
shared_secret, added->onion_routing_packet);
/* Save an incoming htlc to the wallet */
wallet_htlc_save_in(ld->wallet, channel, hin);
/* Update channel stats */
wallet_channel_stats_incr_in_offered(ld->wallet, channel->dbid,
added->amount_msat);
log_debug(channel->log, "Adding their HTLC %"PRIu64, added->id);
connect_htlc_in(&channel->peer->ld->htlcs_in, hin);
return true;
}
/* The peer doesn't tell us this separately, but logically it's a separate
* step to receiving commitsig */
static bool peer_sending_revocation(struct channel *channel,
struct added_htlc *added,
struct fulfilled_htlc *fulfilled,
struct failed_htlc **failed,
struct changed_htlc *changed)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(added); i++) {
if (!update_in_htlc(channel, added[i].id, SENT_ADD_REVOCATION))
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(fulfilled); i++) {
if (!update_out_htlc(channel, fulfilled[i].id,
SENT_REMOVE_REVOCATION))
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(failed); i++) {
if (!update_out_htlc(channel, failed[i]->id, SENT_REMOVE_REVOCATION))
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(changed); i++) {
if (changed[i].newstate == RCVD_ADD_ACK_COMMIT) {
if (!update_out_htlc(channel, changed[i].id,
SENT_ADD_ACK_REVOCATION))
return false;
} else {
if (!update_in_htlc(channel, changed[i].id,
SENT_REMOVE_ACK_REVOCATION))
return false;
}
}
channel->last_was_revoke = true;
return true;
}
/* This also implies we're sending revocation */
void peer_got_commitsig(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
{
u64 commitnum;
u32 feerate;
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature commit_sig;
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *htlc_sigs;
struct added_htlc *added;
struct secret *shared_secrets;
struct fulfilled_htlc *fulfilled;
struct failed_htlc **failed;
struct changed_htlc *changed;
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
size_t i;
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
if (!fromwire_channel_got_commitsig(msg, msg,
&commitnum,
&feerate,
&commit_sig,
&htlc_sigs,
&added,
&shared_secrets,
&fulfilled,
&failed,
&changed,
&tx)) {
channel_internal_error(channel,
"bad fromwire_channel_got_commitsig %s",
tal_hex(channel, msg));
return;
}
log_debug(channel->log,
"got commitsig %"PRIu64
": feerate %u, %zu added, %zu fulfilled, %zu failed, %zu changed",
commitnum, feerate, tal_count(added), tal_count(fulfilled),
tal_count(failed), tal_count(changed));
/* New HTLCs */
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(added); i++) {
if (!channel_added_their_htlc(channel, &added[i], &shared_secrets[i]))
return;
}
/* Save information now for fulfilled & failed HTLCs */
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(fulfilled); i++) {
if (!peer_fulfilled_our_htlc(channel, &fulfilled[i]))
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(failed); i++) {
if (!peer_failed_our_htlc(channel, failed[i]))
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(changed); i++) {
if (!changed_htlc(channel, &changed[i])) {
channel_internal_error(channel,
"got_commitsig: update failed");
return;
}
}
/* Update both feerates: if we're funder, REMOTE should already be
* that feerate, if we're not, we're about to ACK anyway. */
channel->channel_info.feerate_per_kw[LOCAL]
= channel->channel_info.feerate_per_kw[REMOTE]
= feerate;
if (feerate > channel->max_possible_feerate)
channel->max_possible_feerate = feerate;
if (feerate < channel->min_possible_feerate)
channel->min_possible_feerate = feerate;
/* Since we're about to send revoke, bump state again. */
if (!peer_sending_revocation(channel, added, fulfilled, failed, changed))
return;
if (!peer_save_commitsig_received(channel, commitnum, tx, &commit_sig))
return;
wallet_channel_save(ld->wallet, channel);
tal_free(channel->last_htlc_sigs);
channel->last_htlc_sigs = tal_steal(channel, htlc_sigs);
wallet_htlc_sigs_save(ld->wallet, channel->dbid,
channel->last_htlc_sigs);
/* Tell it we've committed, and to go ahead with revoke. */
msg = towire_channel_got_commitsig_reply(msg);
subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg));
}
/* Shuffle them over, forgetting the ancient one. */
void update_per_commit_point(struct channel *channel,
const struct pubkey *per_commitment_point)
{
struct channel_info *ci = &channel->channel_info;
ci->old_remote_per_commit = ci->remote_per_commit;
ci->remote_per_commit = *per_commitment_point;
}
void peer_got_revoke(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
{
u64 revokenum;
struct secret per_commitment_secret;
struct pubkey next_per_commitment_point;
struct changed_htlc *changed;
enum onion_type *failcodes;
size_t i;
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
if (!fromwire_channel_got_revoke(msg, msg,
&revokenum, &per_commitment_secret,
&next_per_commitment_point,
&changed)) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "bad fromwire_channel_got_revoke %s",
tal_hex(channel, msg));
return;
}
log_debug(channel->log,
"got revoke %"PRIu64": %zu changed",
revokenum, tal_count(changed));
/* Save any immediate failures for after we reply. */
failcodes = tal_arrz(msg, enum onion_type, tal_count(changed));
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(changed); i++) {
/* If we're doing final accept, we need to forward */
if (changed[i].newstate == RCVD_ADD_ACK_REVOCATION) {
if (!peer_accepted_htlc(channel, changed[i].id,
&failcodes[i]))
return;
} else {
if (!changed_htlc(channel, &changed[i])) {
channel_internal_error(channel,
"got_revoke: update failed");
return;
}
}
}
if (revokenum >= (1ULL << 48)) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "got_revoke: too many txs %"PRIu64,
revokenum);
return;
}
if (revokenum != revocations_received(&channel->their_shachain.chain)) {
channel_internal_error(channel, "got_revoke: expected %"PRIu64
" got %"PRIu64,
revocations_received(&channel->their_shachain.chain), revokenum);
return;
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - if the `per_commitment_secret` was not generated by the protocol
* in [BOLT #3](03-transactions.md#per-commitment-secret-requirements):
* - MAY fail the channel.
*/
if (!wallet_shachain_add_hash(ld->wallet,
&channel->their_shachain,
shachain_index(revokenum),
&per_commitment_secret)) {
channel_fail_permanent(channel,
"Bad per_commitment_secret %s for %"PRIu64,
type_to_string(msg, struct secret,
&per_commitment_secret),
revokenum);
return;
}
/* FIXME: Check per_commitment_secret -> per_commit_point */
update_per_commit_point(channel, &next_per_commitment_point);
/* Tell it we've committed, and to go ahead with revoke. */
msg = towire_channel_got_revoke_reply(msg);
subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg));
/* Now, any HTLCs we need to immediately fail? */
for (i = 0; i < tal_count(changed); i++) {
struct htlc_in *hin;
if (!failcodes[i])
continue;
/* These are all errors before finding next hop. */
assert(!(failcodes[i] & UPDATE));
hin = find_htlc_in(&ld->htlcs_in, channel, changed[i].id);
local_fail_htlc(hin, failcodes[i], NULL);
}
wallet_channel_save(ld->wallet, channel);
}
static void *tal_arr_append_(void **p, size_t size)
{
size_t n = tal_bytelen(*p) / size;
tal_resize_(p, size, n+1, false);
return (char *)(*p) + n * size;
}
#define tal_arr_append(p) tal_arr_append_((void **)(p), sizeof(**(p)))
static void add_htlc(struct added_htlc **htlcs,
enum htlc_state **htlc_states,
u64 id,
u64 amount_msat,
const struct sha256 *payment_hash,
u32 cltv_expiry,
const u8 onion_routing_packet[TOTAL_PACKET_SIZE],
enum htlc_state state)
{
struct added_htlc *a;
enum htlc_state *h;
a = tal_arr_append(htlcs);
h = tal_arr_append(htlc_states);
a->id = id;
a->amount_msat = amount_msat;
a->payment_hash = *payment_hash;
a->cltv_expiry = cltv_expiry;
memcpy(a->onion_routing_packet, onion_routing_packet,
sizeof(a->onion_routing_packet));
*h = state;
}
static void add_fulfill(u64 id, enum side side,
const struct preimage *payment_preimage,
struct fulfilled_htlc **fulfilled_htlcs,
enum side **fulfilled_sides)
{
struct fulfilled_htlc *f;
enum side *s;
f = tal_arr_append(fulfilled_htlcs);
s = tal_arr_append(fulfilled_sides);
f->id = id;
f->payment_preimage = *payment_preimage;
*s = side;
}
static void add_fail(u64 id, enum side side,
enum onion_type failcode,
const struct short_channel_id *failing_channel,
const u8 *failuremsg,
const struct failed_htlc ***failed_htlcs,
enum side **failed_sides)
{
struct failed_htlc **f;
enum side *s;
f = tal_arr_append(failed_htlcs);
s = tal_arr_append(failed_sides);
*f = tal(*failed_htlcs, struct failed_htlc);
(*f)->id = id;
(*f)->failcode = failcode;
if (failcode & UPDATE) {
assert(failing_channel);
(*f)->scid = tal_dup(*f, struct short_channel_id,
failing_channel);
} else
(*f)->scid = NULL;
if (failuremsg)
(*f)->failreason
= tal_dup_arr(*f, u8, failuremsg, tal_count(failuremsg), 0);
else
(*f)->failreason = NULL;
*s = side;
}
/* FIXME: Load direct from db. */
void peer_htlcs(const tal_t *ctx,
const struct channel *channel,
struct added_htlc **htlcs,
enum htlc_state **htlc_states,
struct fulfilled_htlc **fulfilled_htlcs,
enum side **fulfilled_sides,
const struct failed_htlc ***failed_htlcs,
enum side **failed_sides)
{
struct htlc_in_map_iter ini;
struct htlc_out_map_iter outi;
struct htlc_in *hin;
struct htlc_out *hout;
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
*htlcs = tal_arr(ctx, struct added_htlc, 0);
*htlc_states = tal_arr(ctx, enum htlc_state, 0);
*fulfilled_htlcs = tal_arr(ctx, struct fulfilled_htlc, 0);
*fulfilled_sides = tal_arr(ctx, enum side, 0);
*failed_htlcs = tal_arr(ctx, const struct failed_htlc *, 0);
*failed_sides = tal_arr(ctx, enum side, 0);
for (hin = htlc_in_map_first(&ld->htlcs_in, &ini);
hin;
hin = htlc_in_map_next(&ld->htlcs_in, &ini)) {
if (hin->key.channel != channel)
continue;
add_htlc(htlcs, htlc_states,
hin->key.id, hin->msatoshi, &hin->payment_hash,
hin->cltv_expiry, hin->onion_routing_packet,
hin->hstate);
if (hin->failuremsg || hin->failcode)
add_fail(hin->key.id, REMOTE, hin->failcode,
&hin->failoutchannel,
hin->failuremsg, failed_htlcs, failed_sides);
if (hin->preimage)
add_fulfill(hin->key.id, REMOTE, hin->preimage,
fulfilled_htlcs, fulfilled_sides);
}
for (hout = htlc_out_map_first(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi);
hout;
hout = htlc_out_map_next(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi)) {
if (hout->key.channel != channel)
continue;
add_htlc(htlcs, htlc_states,
hout->key.id, hout->msatoshi, &hout->payment_hash,
hout->cltv_expiry, hout->onion_routing_packet,
hout->hstate);
if (hout->failuremsg || hout->failcode)
add_fail(hout->key.id, LOCAL, hout->failcode,
hout->key.channel->scid,
hout->failuremsg, failed_htlcs, failed_sides);
if (hout->preimage)
add_fulfill(hout->key.id, LOCAL, hout->preimage,
fulfilled_htlcs, fulfilled_sides);
}
}
/* If channel is NULL, free them all (for shutdown) */
void free_htlcs(struct lightningd *ld, const struct channel *channel)
{
struct htlc_out_map_iter outi;
struct htlc_out *hout;
struct htlc_in_map_iter ini;
struct htlc_in *hin;
bool deleted;
/* FIXME: Implement check_htlcs to ensure no dangling hout->in ptrs! */
do {
deleted = false;
for (hout = htlc_out_map_first(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi);
hout;
hout = htlc_out_map_next(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi)) {
if (channel && hout->key.channel != channel)
continue;
tal_free(hout);
deleted = true;
}
for (hin = htlc_in_map_first(&ld->htlcs_in, &ini);
hin;
hin = htlc_in_map_next(&ld->htlcs_in, &ini)) {
if (channel && hin->key.channel != channel)
continue;
tal_free(hin);
deleted = true;
}
/* Can skip over elements due to iterating while deleting. */
} while (deleted);
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* 2. the deadline for offered HTLCs: the deadline after which the channel has
* to be failed and timed out on-chain. This is `G` blocks after the HTLC's
* `cltv_expiry`: 1 block is reasonable.
*/
static u32 htlc_out_deadline(const struct htlc_out *hout)
{
return hout->cltv_expiry + 1;
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* 3. the deadline for received HTLCs this node has fulfilled: the deadline
* after which the channel has to be failed and the HTLC fulfilled on-chain
* before its `cltv_expiry`. See steps 4-7 above, which imply a deadline of
* `2R+G+S` blocks before `cltv_expiry`: 7 blocks is reasonable.
*/
/* We approximate this, by using half the cltv_expiry_delta (3R+2G+2S),
* rounded up. */
static u32 htlc_in_deadline(const struct lightningd *ld,
const struct htlc_in *hin)
{
return hin->cltv_expiry - (ld->config.cltv_expiry_delta + 1)/2;
}
void htlcs_notify_new_block(struct lightningd *ld, u32 height)
{
bool removed;
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - if an HTLC which it offered is in either node's current
* commitment transaction, AND is past this timeout deadline:
* - MUST fail the channel.
*/
/* FIXME: use db to look this up in one go (earliest deadline per-peer) */
do {
struct htlc_out *hout;
struct htlc_out_map_iter outi;
removed = false;
for (hout = htlc_out_map_first(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi);
hout;
hout = htlc_out_map_next(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi)) {
/* Not timed out yet? */
if (height < htlc_out_deadline(hout))
continue;
/* Peer on chain already? */
if (channel_on_chain(hout->key.channel))
continue;
/* Peer already failed, or we hit it? */
if (hout->key.channel->error)
continue;
channel_fail_permanent(hout->key.channel,
"Offered HTLC %"PRIu64
" %s cltv %u hit deadline",
hout->key.id,
htlc_state_name(hout->hstate),
hout->cltv_expiry);
removed = true;
}
/* Iteration while removing is safe, but can skip entries! */
} while (removed);
/* BOLT #2:
*
* - for each HTLC it is attempting to fulfill:
* - MUST estimate a fulfillment deadline.
*...
* - if an HTLC it has fulfilled is in either node's current commitment
* transaction, AND is past this fulfillment deadline:
* - MUST fail the connection.
*/
do {
struct htlc_in *hin;
struct htlc_in_map_iter ini;
removed = false;
for (hin = htlc_in_map_first(&ld->htlcs_in, &ini);
hin;
hin = htlc_in_map_next(&ld->htlcs_in, &ini)) {
struct channel *channel = hin->key.channel;
/* Not fulfilled? If overdue, that's their problem... */
if (!hin->preimage)
continue;
/* Not timed out yet? */
if (height < htlc_in_deadline(ld, hin))
continue;
/* Peer on chain already? */
if (channel_on_chain(channel))
continue;
/* Peer already failed, or we hit it? */
if (channel->error)
continue;
channel_fail_permanent(channel,
"Fulfilled HTLC %"PRIu64
" %s cltv %u hit deadline",
hin->key.id,
htlc_state_name(hin->hstate),
hin->cltv_expiry);
removed = true;
}
/* Iteration while removing is safe, but can skip entries! */
} while (removed);
}
void notify_feerate_change(struct lightningd *ld)
{
struct peer *peer;
/* FIXME: We should notify onchaind about NORMAL fee change in case
* it's going to generate more txs. */
list_for_each(&ld->peers, peer, list) {
struct channel *channel = peer_active_channel(peer);
u8 *msg;
if (!channel || !channel_fees_can_change(channel))
continue;
/* FIXME: We choose not to drop to chain if we can't contact
* peer. We *could* do so, however. */
if (!channel->owner)
continue;
msg = towire_channel_feerates(channel,
get_feerate(ld->topology,
FEERATE_IMMEDIATE),
feerate_min(ld),
feerate_max(ld));
subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg));
}
}
#if DEVELOPER
static void json_dev_ignore_htlcs(struct command *cmd, const char *buffer,
const jsmntok_t *params)
{
struct pubkey peerid;
struct peer *peer;
bool ignore;
if (!param(cmd, buffer, params,
p_req("id", json_tok_pubkey, &peerid),
p_req("ignore", json_tok_bool, &ignore),
NULL))
return;
peer = peer_by_id(cmd->ld, &peerid);
if (!peer) {
command_fail(cmd, LIGHTNINGD,
"Could not find channel with that peer");
return;
}
peer->ignore_htlcs = ignore;
command_success(cmd, null_response(cmd));
}
static const struct json_command dev_ignore_htlcs = {
"dev-ignore-htlcs", json_dev_ignore_htlcs,
"Set ignoring incoming HTLCs for peer {id} to {ignore}", false,
"Set/unset ignoring of all incoming HTLCs. For testing only."
};
AUTODATA(json_command, &dev_ignore_htlcs);
#endif /* DEVELOPER */
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink