rgb-cln/lightningd/hsm_control.c

286 lines
8.7 KiB
C

#include "config.h"
#include <ccan/err/err.h>
#include <ccan/fdpass/fdpass.h>
#include <common/ecdh.h>
#include <common/errcode.h>
#include <common/hsm_encryption.h>
#include <common/hsm_version.h>
#include <common/invoice_path_id.h>
#include <common/json_command.h>
#include <common/json_param.h>
#include <common/jsonrpc_errors.h>
#include <common/type_to_string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <hsmd/hsmd_wiregen.h>
#include <lightningd/hsm_control.h>
#include <lightningd/jsonrpc.h>
#include <lightningd/lightningd.h>
#include <lightningd/subd.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <wally_bip32.h>
#include <wire/wire_sync.h>
static int hsm_get_fd(struct lightningd *ld,
const struct node_id *id,
u64 dbid,
u64 permissions)
{
int hsm_fd;
const u8 *msg;
msg = towire_hsmd_client_hsmfd(NULL, id, dbid, permissions);
msg = hsm_sync_req(tmpctx, ld, take(msg));
if (!fromwire_hsmd_client_hsmfd_reply(msg))
fatal("Bad reply from HSM: %s", tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
hsm_fd = fdpass_recv(ld->hsm_fd);
if (hsm_fd < 0)
fatal("Could not read fd from HSM: %s", strerror(errno));
return hsm_fd;
}
int hsm_get_client_fd(struct lightningd *ld,
const struct node_id *id,
u64 dbid,
u64 permissions)
{
assert(dbid);
return hsm_get_fd(ld, id, dbid, permissions);
}
int hsm_get_global_fd(struct lightningd *ld, u64 permissions)
{
return hsm_get_fd(ld, &ld->id, 0, permissions);
}
static unsigned int hsm_msg(struct subd *hsmd,
const u8 *msg, const int *fds UNUSED)
{
/* We only expect one thing from the HSM that's not a STATUS message */
struct node_id client_id;
u8 *bad_msg;
char *desc;
if (!fromwire_hsmstatus_client_bad_request(tmpctx, msg, &client_id,
&desc, &bad_msg))
fatal("Bad status message from hsmd: %s", tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
/* This should, of course, never happen. */
log_broken(hsmd->log, "client %s %s (request %s)",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct node_id, &client_id),
desc, tal_hex(tmpctx, bad_msg));
return 0;
}
/* Is this capability supported by the HSM? (So far, always a message
* number) */
bool hsm_capable(struct lightningd *ld, u32 msgtype)
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(ld->hsm_capabilities); i++) {
if (ld->hsm_capabilities[i] == msgtype)
return true;
}
return false;
}
struct ext_key *hsm_init(struct lightningd *ld)
{
u8 *msg;
int fds[2];
struct ext_key *bip32_base;
u32 hsm_version;
/* We actually send requests synchronously: only status is async. */
if (socketpair(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0, fds) != 0)
err(EXITCODE_HSM_GENERIC_ERROR, "Could not create hsm socketpair");
ld->hsm = new_global_subd(ld, "lightning_hsmd",
hsmd_wire_name,
hsm_msg,
take(&fds[1]), NULL);
if (!ld->hsm)
err(EXITCODE_HSM_GENERIC_ERROR, "Could not subd hsm");
/* If hsm_secret is encrypted and the --encrypted-hsm startup option is
* not passed, don't let hsmd use the first 32 bytes of the cypher as the
* actual secret. */
if (!ld->config.keypass) {
if (is_hsm_secret_encrypted("hsm_secret") == 1)
errx(EXITCODE_HSM_ERROR_IS_ENCRYPT, "hsm_secret is encrypted, you need to pass the "
"--encrypted-hsm startup option.");
}
ld->hsm_fd = fds[0];
if (!wire_sync_write(ld->hsm_fd, towire_hsmd_init(tmpctx,
&chainparams->bip32_key_version,
chainparams,
ld->config.keypass,
ld->dev_force_privkey,
ld->dev_force_bip32_seed,
ld->dev_force_channel_secrets,
ld->dev_force_channel_secrets_shaseed,
HSM_MIN_VERSION,
HSM_MAX_VERSION)))
err(EXITCODE_HSM_GENERIC_ERROR, "Writing init msg to hsm");
bip32_base = tal(ld, struct ext_key);
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, ld->hsm_fd);
if (fromwire_hsmd_init_reply_v4(ld, msg,
&hsm_version,
&ld->hsm_capabilities,
&ld->id, bip32_base,
&ld->bolt12_base)) {
/* nothing to do. */
} else if (fromwire_hsmd_init_reply_v2(msg,
&ld->id, bip32_base,
&ld->bolt12_base)) {
/* implicit version */
hsm_version = 3;
ld->hsm_capabilities = NULL;
} else {
if (ld->config.keypass)
errx(EXITCODE_HSM_BAD_PASSWORD, "Wrong password for encrypted hsm_secret.");
errx(EXITCODE_HSM_GENERIC_ERROR, "HSM did not give init reply");
}
if (hsm_version < HSM_MIN_VERSION)
errx(EXITCODE_HSM_GENERIC_ERROR,
"HSM version %u below minimum %u",
hsm_version, HSM_MIN_VERSION);
if (hsm_version > HSM_MAX_VERSION)
errx(EXITCODE_HSM_GENERIC_ERROR,
"HSM version %u above maximum %u",
hsm_version, HSM_MAX_VERSION);
/* Debugging help */
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(ld->hsm_capabilities); i++) {
log_debug(ld->hsm->log, "capability +%s",
hsmd_wire_name(ld->hsm_capabilities[i]));
}
if (feature_offered(ld->our_features->bits[INIT_FEATURE],
OPT_ANCHORS_ZERO_FEE_HTLC_TX)
&& !hsm_capable(ld, WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_ANCHORSPEND)) {
fatal("--experimental-anchors needs HSM capable of signing anchors!");
}
if (feature_offered(ld->our_features->bits[INIT_FEATURE],
OPT_EXPERIMENTAL_SPLICE)
&& !hsm_capable(ld, WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_SPLICE_TX)) {
fatal("--experimental-splicing needs HSM capable of signing splices!");
}
/* This is equivalent to makesecret("bolt12-invoice-base") */
msg = towire_hsmd_derive_secret(NULL, tal_dup_arr(tmpctx, u8,
(const u8 *)INVOICE_PATH_BASE_STRING,
strlen(INVOICE_PATH_BASE_STRING), 0));
if (!wire_sync_write(ld->hsm_fd, take(msg)))
err(EXITCODE_HSM_GENERIC_ERROR, "Writing derive_secret msg to hsm");
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, ld->hsm_fd);
if (!fromwire_hsmd_derive_secret_reply(msg, &ld->invoicesecret_base))
err(EXITCODE_HSM_GENERIC_ERROR, "Bad derive_secret_reply");
return bip32_base;
}
/*~ There was a nasty LND bug report where the user issued an address which it
* couldn't spend, presumably due to a bitflip. We check every address using our
* hsm, to be sure it's valid. Expensive, but not as expensive as losing BTC! */
void bip32_pubkey(struct lightningd *ld, struct pubkey *pubkey, u32 index)
{
const uint32_t flags = BIP32_FLAG_KEY_PUBLIC | BIP32_FLAG_SKIP_HASH;
struct ext_key ext;
if (index >= BIP32_INITIAL_HARDENED_CHILD)
fatal("Can't derive keu %u (too large!)", index);
if (bip32_key_from_parent(ld->bip32_base, index, flags, &ext) != WALLY_OK)
fatal("Can't derive key %u", index);
if (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(secp256k1_ctx, &pubkey->pubkey,
ext.pub_key, sizeof(ext.pub_key)))
fatal("Can't parse derived key %u", index);
/* Don't assume hsmd supports it! */
if (hsm_capable(ld, WIRE_HSMD_CHECK_PUBKEY)) {
bool ok;
const u8 *msg = towire_hsmd_check_pubkey(NULL, index, pubkey);
msg = hsm_sync_req(tmpctx, ld, take(msg));
if (!fromwire_hsmd_check_pubkey_reply(msg, &ok))
fatal("Invalid check_pubkey_reply from hsm");
if (!ok)
fatal("HSM said key derivation of %u != %s",
index, type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, pubkey));
}
}
const u8 *hsm_sync_req(const tal_t *ctx, struct lightningd *ld, const u8 *msg)
{
int type = fromwire_peektype(msg);
if (!wire_sync_write(ld->hsm_fd, msg))
fatal("Writing %s hsm", hsmd_wire_name(type));
msg = wire_sync_read(ctx, ld->hsm_fd);
if (!msg)
fatal("EOF reading from HSM after %s",
hsmd_wire_name(type));
return msg;
}
static struct command_result *json_makesecret(struct command *cmd,
const char *buffer,
const jsmntok_t *obj UNNEEDED,
const jsmntok_t *params)
{
u8 *data;
const char *strdata;
struct json_stream *response;
struct secret secret;
if (!param_check(cmd, buffer, params,
p_opt("hex", param_bin_from_hex, &data),
p_opt("string", param_string, &strdata),
NULL))
return command_param_failed();
if (strdata) {
if (data)
return command_fail(cmd, JSONRPC2_INVALID_PARAMS,
"Cannot have both hex and string");
data = tal_dup_arr(cmd, u8, (u8 *)strdata, strlen(strdata), 0);
} else {
if (!data)
return command_fail(cmd, JSONRPC2_INVALID_PARAMS,
"Must have either hex or string");
}
if (command_check_only(cmd))
return command_check_done(cmd);
u8 *msg = towire_hsmd_derive_secret(cmd, data);
if (!wire_sync_write(cmd->ld->hsm_fd, take(msg)))
return command_fail(cmd, LIGHTNINGD,
"Could not write to HSM: %s", strerror(errno));
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, cmd->ld->hsm_fd);
if (!fromwire_hsmd_derive_secret_reply(msg, &secret))
return command_fail(cmd, LIGHTNINGD,
"Bad reply from HSM: %s", strerror(errno));
response = json_stream_success(cmd);
json_add_secret(response, "secret", &secret);
return command_success(cmd, response);
}
static const struct json_command makesecret_command = {
"makesecret",
"utility",
&json_makesecret,
"Get a pseudorandom secret key, using some {hex} data."
};
AUTODATA(json_command, &makesecret_command);