1898 lines
65 KiB
C
1898 lines
65 KiB
C
/*~ Welcome to the hsm daemon: keeper of our secrets!
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*
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* This is a separate daemon which keeps a root secret from which all others
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* are generated. It starts with one client: lightningd, which can ask for
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* new sockets for other clients. Each client has a simple capability map
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* which indicates what it's allowed to ask for. We're entirely driven
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* by request, response.
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*/
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#include <bitcoin/address.h>
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#include <bitcoin/privkey.h>
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#include <bitcoin/pubkey.h>
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#include <bitcoin/script.h>
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#include <bitcoin/tx.h>
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#include <ccan/array_size/array_size.h>
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#include <ccan/cast/cast.h>
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#include <ccan/container_of/container_of.h>
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#include <ccan/crypto/hkdf_sha256/hkdf_sha256.h>
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#include <ccan/endian/endian.h>
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#include <ccan/fdpass/fdpass.h>
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#include <ccan/intmap/intmap.h>
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#include <ccan/io/fdpass/fdpass.h>
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#include <ccan/io/io.h>
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#include <ccan/noerr/noerr.h>
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#include <ccan/ptrint/ptrint.h>
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#include <ccan/read_write_all/read_write_all.h>
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#include <ccan/take/take.h>
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#include <ccan/tal/str/str.h>
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#include <common/daemon_conn.h>
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#include <common/derive_basepoints.h>
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#include <common/funding_tx.h>
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#include <common/hash_u5.h>
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#include <common/key_derive.h>
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#include <common/memleak.h>
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#include <common/node_id.h>
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#include <common/status.h>
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#include <common/subdaemon.h>
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#include <common/type_to_string.h>
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#include <common/utils.h>
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#include <common/version.h>
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#include <common/withdraw_tx.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <hsmd/capabilities.h>
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/*~ All gen_ files are autogenerated; in this case by tools/generate-wire.py */
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#include <hsmd/gen_hsm_wire.h>
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#include <inttypes.h>
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#include <secp256k1_ecdh.h>
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#include <sodium/randombytes.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <wally_bip32.h>
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#include <wire/gen_peer_wire.h>
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#include <wire/wire_io.h>
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/*~ Each subdaemon is started with stdin connected to lightningd (for status
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* messages), and stderr untouched (for emergency printing). File descriptors
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* 3 and beyond are set up on other sockets: for hsmd, fd 3 is the request
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* stream from lightningd. */
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#define REQ_FD 3
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/*~ Nobody will ever find it here! hsm_secret is our root secret, the bip32
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* tree is derived from that, and cached here. */
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static struct {
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struct secret hsm_secret;
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struct ext_key bip32;
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} secretstuff;
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/* Version codes for BIP32 extended keys in libwally-core.
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* It's not suitable to add this struct into client struct,
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* so set it static.*/
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static struct bip32_key_version bip32_key_version;
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#if DEVELOPER
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/* If they specify --dev-force-privkey it ends up in here. */
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static struct privkey *dev_force_privkey;
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/* If they specify --dev-force-bip32-seed it ends up in here. */
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static struct secret *dev_force_bip32_seed;
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#endif
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/*~ We keep track of clients, but there's not much to keep. */
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struct client {
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/* The ccan/io async io connection for this client: it closes, we die. */
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struct io_conn *conn;
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/*~ io_read_wire needs a pointer to store incoming messages until
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* it has the complete thing; this is it. */
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u8 *msg_in;
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/*~ Useful for logging, but also used to derive the per-channel seed. */
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struct node_id id;
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/*~ This is a unique value handed to us from lightningd, used for
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* per-channel seed generation (a single id may have multiple channels
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* over time).
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*
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* It's actually zero for the initial lightningd client connection and
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* the ones for gossipd and connectd, which don't have channels
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* associated. */
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u64 dbid;
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/* What is this client allowed to ask for? */
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u64 capabilities;
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/* Params to apply to all transactions for this client */
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const struct chainparams *chainparams;
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};
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/*~ We keep a map of nonzero dbid -> clients, mainly for leak detection.
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* This is ccan/uintmap, which maps u64 to some (non-NULL) pointer.
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* I really dislike these kinds of declaration-via-magic macro things, as
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* tags can't find them without special hacks, but the payoff here is that
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* the map is typesafe: the compiler won't let you put anything in but a
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* struct client pointer. */
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static UINTMAP(struct client *) clients;
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/*~ Plus the three zero-dbid clients: master, gossipd and connnectd. */
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static struct client *dbid_zero_clients[3];
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static size_t num_dbid_zero_clients;
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/*~ We need this deep inside bad_req_fmt, and for memleak, so we make it a
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* global. */
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static struct daemon_conn *status_conn;
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/* This is used for various assertions and error cases. */
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static bool is_lightningd(const struct client *client)
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{
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return client == dbid_zero_clients[0];
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}
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/* FIXME: This is used by debug.c. Doesn't apply to us, but lets us link. */
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extern void dev_disconnect_init(int fd);
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void dev_disconnect_init(int fd UNUSED) { }
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/* Pre-declare this, due to mutual recursion */
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static struct io_plan *handle_client(struct io_conn *conn, struct client *c);
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/*~ ccan/compiler.h defines PRINTF_FMT as the gcc compiler hint so it will
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* check that fmt and other trailing arguments really are the correct type.
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*
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* This is a convenient helper to tell lightningd we've received a bad request
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* and closes the client connection. This should never happen, of course, but
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* we definitely want to log if it does.
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*/
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static PRINTF_FMT(4,5)
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struct io_plan *bad_req_fmt(struct io_conn *conn,
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struct client *c,
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const u8 *msg_in,
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const char *fmt, ...)
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{
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va_list ap;
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char *str;
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va_start(ap, fmt);
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str = tal_fmt(tmpctx, fmt, ap);
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va_end(ap);
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/*~ If the client was actually lightningd, it's Game Over; we actually
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* fail in this case, and it will too. */
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if (is_lightningd(c)) {
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status_broken("%s", str);
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master_badmsg(fromwire_peektype(msg_in), msg_in);
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}
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/*~ Nobody should give us bad requests; it's a sign something is broken */
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status_broken("%s: %s", type_to_string(tmpctx, struct node_id, &c->id), str);
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/*~ Note the use of NULL as the ctx arg to towire_hsmstatus_: only
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* use NULL as the allocation when we're about to immediately free it
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* or hand it off with take(), as here. That makes it clear we don't
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* expect it to linger, and in fact our memleak detection will
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* complain if it does (unlike using the deliberately-transient
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* tmpctx). */
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daemon_conn_send(status_conn,
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take(towire_hsmstatus_client_bad_request(NULL,
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&c->id,
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str,
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msg_in)));
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/*~ The way ccan/io works is that you return the "plan" for what to do
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* next (eg. io_read). io_close() is special: it means to close the
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* connection. */
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return io_close(conn);
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}
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/* Convenience wrapper for when we simply can't parse. */
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static struct io_plan *bad_req(struct io_conn *conn,
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struct client *c,
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const u8 *msg_in)
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{
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return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "could not parse request");
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}
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/*~ This plan simply says: read the next packet into 'c->msg_in' (parent 'c'),
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* and then call handle_client with argument 'c' */
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static struct io_plan *client_read_next(struct io_conn *conn, struct client *c)
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{
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return io_read_wire(conn, c, &c->msg_in, handle_client, c);
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}
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/*~ This is the destructor on our client: we may call it manually, but
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* generally it's called because the io_conn associated with the client is
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* closed by the other end. */
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static void destroy_client(struct client *c)
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{
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if (!uintmap_del(&clients, c->dbid))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
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"Failed to remove client dbid %"PRIu64, c->dbid);
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}
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static struct client *new_client(const tal_t *ctx,
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const struct chainparams *chainparams,
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const struct node_id *id,
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u64 dbid,
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const u64 capabilities,
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int fd)
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{
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struct client *c = tal(ctx, struct client);
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/*~ All-zero pubkey is used for the initial master connection */
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if (id) {
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c->id = *id;
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if (!node_id_valid(id))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
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"Invalid node id %s",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct node_id,
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id));
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} else {
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memset(&c->id, 0, sizeof(c->id));
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}
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c->dbid = dbid;
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c->capabilities = capabilities;
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c->chainparams = chainparams;
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/*~ This is the core of ccan/io: the connection creation calls a
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* callback which returns the initial plan to execute: in our case,
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* read a message.*/
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c->conn = io_new_conn(ctx, fd, client_read_next, c);
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/*~ tal_steal() moves a pointer to a new parent. At this point, the
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* hierarchy is:
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*
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* ctx -> c
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* ctx -> c->conn
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*
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* We want to the c->conn to own 'c', so that if the io_conn closes,
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* the client is freed:
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*
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* ctx -> c->conn -> c.
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*/
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tal_steal(c->conn, c);
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/* We put the special zero-db HSM connections into an array, the rest
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* go into the map. */
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if (dbid == 0) {
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assert(num_dbid_zero_clients < ARRAY_SIZE(dbid_zero_clients));
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dbid_zero_clients[num_dbid_zero_clients++] = c;
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} else {
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struct client *old_client = uintmap_get(&clients, dbid);
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/* Close conn and free any old client of this dbid. */
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if (old_client)
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io_close(old_client->conn);
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if (!uintmap_add(&clients, dbid, c))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
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"Failed inserting dbid %"PRIu64, dbid);
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tal_add_destructor(c, destroy_client);
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}
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return c;
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}
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/* This is the common pattern for the tail of each handler in this file. */
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static struct io_plan *req_reply(struct io_conn *conn,
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struct client *c,
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const u8 *msg_out TAKES)
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{
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/*~ Write this out, then read the next one. This works perfectly for
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* a simple request/response system like this.
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*
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* Internally, the ccan/io subsystem gathers all the file descriptors,
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* figures out which want to write and read, asks the OS which ones
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* are available, and for those file descriptors, tries to do the
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* reads/writes we've asked it. It handles retry in the case where a
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* read or write is done partially.
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*
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* Since the OS does buffering internally (on my system, over 100k
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* worth) writes will normally succeed immediately. However, if the
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* client is slow or malicious, and doesn't read from the socket as
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* fast as we're writing, eventually the socket buffer will fill up;
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* we don't care, because ccan/io will wait until there's room to
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* write this reply before it will read again. The client just hurts
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* themselves, and there's no Denial of Service on us.
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*
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* If we were to queue outgoing messages ourselves, we *would* have to
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* consider such scenarios; this is why our daemons generally avoid
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* buffering from untrusted parties. */
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return io_write_wire(conn, msg_out, client_read_next, c);
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}
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/*~ This returns the secret and/or public key for this node. */
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static void node_key(struct privkey *node_privkey, struct pubkey *node_id)
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{
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u32 salt = 0;
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struct privkey unused_s;
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struct pubkey unused_k;
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/* If caller specifies NULL, they don't want the results. */
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if (node_privkey == NULL)
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node_privkey = &unused_s;
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else if (node_id == NULL)
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node_id = &unused_k;
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/*~ So, there is apparently a 1 in 2^127 chance that a random value is
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* not a valid private key, so this never actually loops. */
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do {
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/*~ ccan/crypto/hkdf_sha256 implements RFC5869 "Hardened Key
|
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* Derivation Functions". That means that if a derived key
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* leaks somehow, the other keys are not compromised. */
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hkdf_sha256(node_privkey, sizeof(*node_privkey),
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&salt, sizeof(salt),
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&secretstuff.hsm_secret,
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sizeof(secretstuff.hsm_secret),
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"nodeid", 6);
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salt++;
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} while (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(secp256k1_ctx, &node_id->pubkey,
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node_privkey->secret.data));
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#if DEVELOPER
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/* In DEVELOPER mode, we can override with --dev-force-privkey */
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if (dev_force_privkey) {
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*node_privkey = *dev_force_privkey;
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if (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(secp256k1_ctx, &node_id->pubkey,
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node_privkey->secret.data))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
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"Failed to derive pubkey for dev_force_privkey");
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}
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#endif
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}
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/*~ This secret is the basis for all per-channel secrets: the per-channel seeds
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* will be generated by mixing in the dbid and the peer node_id. */
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static void hsm_channel_secret_base(struct secret *channel_seed_base)
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{
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hkdf_sha256(channel_seed_base, sizeof(struct secret), NULL, 0,
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&secretstuff.hsm_secret, sizeof(secretstuff.hsm_secret),
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/*~ Initially, we didn't support multiple channels per
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* peer at all: a channel had to be completely forgotten
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* before another could exist. That was slightly relaxed,
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* but the phrase "peer seed" is wired into the seed
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* generation here, so we need to keep it that way for
|
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* existing clients, rather than using "channel seed". */
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"peer seed", strlen("peer seed"));
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}
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/*~ This gets the seed for this particular channel. */
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static void get_channel_seed(const struct node_id *peer_id, u64 dbid,
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struct secret *channel_seed)
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{
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struct secret channel_base;
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u8 input[sizeof(peer_id->k) + sizeof(dbid)];
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/*~ Again, "per-peer" should be "per-channel", but Hysterical Raisins */
|
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const char *info = "per-peer seed";
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|
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/*~ We use the DER encoding of the pubkey, because it's platform
|
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* independent. Since the dbid is unique, however, it's completely
|
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* unnecessary, but again, existing users can't be broken. */
|
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/* FIXME: lnd has a nicer BIP32 method for deriving secrets which we
|
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* should migrate to. */
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hsm_channel_secret_base(&channel_base);
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memcpy(input, peer_id->k, sizeof(peer_id->k));
|
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BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(peer_id->k) == PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN);
|
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/*~ For all that talk about platform-independence, note that this
|
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* field is endian-dependent! But let's face it, little-endian won.
|
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* In related news, we don't support EBCDIC or middle-endian. */
|
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memcpy(input + PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN, &dbid, sizeof(dbid));
|
||
|
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hkdf_sha256(channel_seed, sizeof(*channel_seed),
|
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input, sizeof(input),
|
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&channel_base, sizeof(channel_base),
|
||
info, strlen(info));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ Called at startup to derive the bip32 field. */
|
||
static void populate_secretstuff(void)
|
||
{
|
||
u8 bip32_seed[BIP32_ENTROPY_LEN_256];
|
||
u32 salt = 0;
|
||
struct ext_key master_extkey, child_extkey;
|
||
|
||
assert(bip32_key_version.bip32_pubkey_version == BIP32_VER_MAIN_PUBLIC
|
||
|| bip32_key_version.bip32_pubkey_version == BIP32_VER_TEST_PUBLIC);
|
||
|
||
assert(bip32_key_version.bip32_privkey_version == BIP32_VER_MAIN_PRIVATE
|
||
|| bip32_key_version.bip32_privkey_version == BIP32_VER_TEST_PRIVATE);
|
||
|
||
/* Fill in the BIP32 tree for bitcoin addresses. */
|
||
/* In libwally-core, the version BIP32_VER_TEST_PRIVATE is for testnet/regtest,
|
||
* and BIP32_VER_MAIN_PRIVATE is for mainnet. For litecoin, we also set it like
|
||
* bitcoin else.*/
|
||
do {
|
||
hkdf_sha256(bip32_seed, sizeof(bip32_seed),
|
||
&salt, sizeof(salt),
|
||
&secretstuff.hsm_secret,
|
||
sizeof(secretstuff.hsm_secret),
|
||
"bip32 seed", strlen("bip32 seed"));
|
||
salt++;
|
||
} while (bip32_key_from_seed(bip32_seed, sizeof(bip32_seed),
|
||
bip32_key_version.bip32_privkey_version,
|
||
0, &master_extkey) != WALLY_OK);
|
||
|
||
#if DEVELOPER
|
||
/* In DEVELOPER mode, we can override with --dev-force-bip32-seed */
|
||
if (dev_force_bip32_seed) {
|
||
if (bip32_key_from_seed(dev_force_bip32_seed->data,
|
||
sizeof(dev_force_bip32_seed->data),
|
||
bip32_key_version.bip32_privkey_version,
|
||
0, &master_extkey) != WALLY_OK)
|
||
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||
"Can't derive bip32 master key");
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* DEVELOPER */
|
||
|
||
/* BIP 32:
|
||
*
|
||
* The default wallet layout
|
||
*
|
||
* An HDW is organized as several 'accounts'. Accounts are numbered,
|
||
* the default account ("") being number 0. Clients are not required
|
||
* to support more than one account - if not, they only use the
|
||
* default account.
|
||
*
|
||
* Each account is composed of two keypair chains: an internal and an
|
||
* external one. The external keychain is used to generate new public
|
||
* addresses, while the internal keychain is used for all other
|
||
* operations (change addresses, generation addresses, ..., anything
|
||
* that doesn't need to be communicated). Clients that do not support
|
||
* separate keychains for these should use the external one for
|
||
* everything.
|
||
*
|
||
* - m/iH/0/k corresponds to the k'th keypair of the external chain of
|
||
* account number i of the HDW derived from master m.
|
||
*/
|
||
/* Hence child 0, then child 0 again to get extkey to derive from. */
|
||
if (bip32_key_from_parent(&master_extkey, 0, BIP32_FLAG_KEY_PRIVATE,
|
||
&child_extkey) != WALLY_OK)
|
||
/*~ status_failed() is a helper which exits and sends lightningd
|
||
* a message about what happened. For hsmd, that's fatal to
|
||
* lightningd. */
|
||
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||
"Can't derive child bip32 key");
|
||
|
||
if (bip32_key_from_parent(&child_extkey, 0, BIP32_FLAG_KEY_PRIVATE,
|
||
&secretstuff.bip32) != WALLY_OK)
|
||
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||
"Can't derive private bip32 key");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ Get the keys for this given BIP32 index: if privkey is NULL, we
|
||
* don't fill it in. */
|
||
static void bitcoin_key(struct privkey *privkey, struct pubkey *pubkey,
|
||
u32 index)
|
||
{
|
||
struct ext_key ext;
|
||
struct privkey unused_priv;
|
||
|
||
if (privkey == NULL)
|
||
privkey = &unused_priv;
|
||
|
||
if (index >= BIP32_INITIAL_HARDENED_CHILD)
|
||
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO,
|
||
"Index %u too great", index);
|
||
|
||
/*~ This uses libwally, which doesn't dovetail directly with
|
||
* libsecp256k1 even though it, too, uses it internally. */
|
||
if (bip32_key_from_parent(&secretstuff.bip32, index,
|
||
BIP32_FLAG_KEY_PRIVATE, &ext) != WALLY_OK)
|
||
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||
"BIP32 of %u failed", index);
|
||
|
||
/* libwally says: The private key with prefix byte 0; remove it
|
||
* for libsecp256k1. */
|
||
memcpy(privkey->secret.data, ext.priv_key+1, 32);
|
||
if (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(secp256k1_ctx, &pubkey->pubkey,
|
||
privkey->secret.data))
|
||
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||
"BIP32 pubkey %u create failed", index);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ We store our root secret in a "hsm_secret" file (like all of c-lightning,
|
||
* we run in the user's .lightning directory). */
|
||
static void maybe_create_new_hsm(void)
|
||
{
|
||
/*~ Note that this is opened for write-only, even though the permissions
|
||
* are set to read-only. That's perfectly valid! */
|
||
int fd = open("hsm_secret", O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, 0400);
|
||
if (fd < 0) {
|
||
/* If this is not the first time we've run, it will exist. */
|
||
if (errno == EEXIST)
|
||
return;
|
||
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||
"creating: %s", strerror(errno));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ This is libsodium's cryptographic randomness routine: we assume
|
||
* it's doing a good job. */
|
||
randombytes_buf(&secretstuff.hsm_secret, sizeof(secretstuff.hsm_secret));
|
||
/*~ ccan/read_write_all has a more convenient return than write() where
|
||
* we'd have to check the return value == the length we gave: write()
|
||
* can return short on normal files if we run out of disk space. */
|
||
if (!write_all(fd, &secretstuff.hsm_secret, sizeof(secretstuff.hsm_secret))) {
|
||
/* ccan/noerr contains useful routines like this, which don't
|
||
* clobber errno, so we can use it in our error report. */
|
||
unlink_noerr("hsm_secret");
|
||
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||
"writing: %s", strerror(errno));
|
||
}
|
||
/*~ fsync (mostly!) ensures that the file has reached the disk. */
|
||
if (fsync(fd) != 0) {
|
||
unlink_noerr("hsm_secret");
|
||
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||
"fsync: %s", strerror(errno));
|
||
}
|
||
/*~ This should never fail if fsync succeeded. But paranoia good, and
|
||
* bugs exist. */
|
||
if (close(fd) != 0) {
|
||
unlink_noerr("hsm_secret");
|
||
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||
"closing: %s", strerror(errno));
|
||
}
|
||
/*~ We actually need to sync the *directory itself* to make sure the
|
||
* file exists! You're only allowed to open directories read-only in
|
||
* modern Unix though. */
|
||
fd = open(".", O_RDONLY);
|
||
if (fd < 0) {
|
||
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||
"opening: %s", strerror(errno));
|
||
}
|
||
if (fsync(fd) != 0) {
|
||
unlink_noerr("hsm_secret");
|
||
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||
"fsyncdir: %s", strerror(errno));
|
||
}
|
||
close(fd);
|
||
/*~ status_unusual() is good for things which are interesting and
|
||
* definitely won't spam the logs. Only status_broken() is higher;
|
||
* status_info() is lower, then status_debug() and finally
|
||
* status_io(). */
|
||
status_unusual("HSM: created new hsm_secret file");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ We always load the HSM file, even if we just created it above. This
|
||
* both unifies the code paths, and provides a nice sanity check that the
|
||
* file contents are as they will be for future invocations. */
|
||
static void load_hsm(void)
|
||
{
|
||
int fd = open("hsm_secret", O_RDONLY);
|
||
if (fd < 0)
|
||
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||
"opening: %s", strerror(errno));
|
||
if (!read_all(fd, &secretstuff.hsm_secret, sizeof(secretstuff.hsm_secret)))
|
||
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||
"reading: %s", strerror(errno));
|
||
close(fd);
|
||
|
||
populate_secretstuff();
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ This is the response to lightningd's HSM_INIT request, which is the first
|
||
* thing it sends. */
|
||
static struct io_plan *init_hsm(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
struct node_id node_id;
|
||
struct pubkey key;
|
||
struct privkey *privkey;
|
||
struct secret *seed;
|
||
struct secrets *secrets;
|
||
struct sha256 *shaseed;
|
||
struct bitcoin_blkid chain_hash;
|
||
|
||
/* This must be lightningd. */
|
||
assert(is_lightningd(c));
|
||
|
||
/*~ The fromwire_* routines are autogenerated, based on the message
|
||
* definitions in hsm_client_wire.csv. The format of those files is
|
||
* an extension of the simple comma-separated format output by the
|
||
* BOLT tools/extract-formats.py tool. */
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_init(NULL, msg_in, &bip32_key_version, &chain_hash,
|
||
&privkey, &seed, &secrets, &shaseed))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
#if DEVELOPER
|
||
dev_force_privkey = privkey;
|
||
dev_force_bip32_seed = seed;
|
||
dev_force_channel_secrets = secrets;
|
||
dev_force_channel_secrets_shaseed = shaseed;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
/* Once we have read the init message we know which params the master
|
||
* will use */
|
||
c->chainparams = chainparams_by_chainhash(&chain_hash);
|
||
maybe_create_new_hsm();
|
||
load_hsm();
|
||
|
||
/*~ We tell lightning our node id and (public) bip32 seed. */
|
||
node_key(NULL, &key);
|
||
node_id_from_pubkey(&node_id, &key);
|
||
|
||
/*~ Note: marshalling a bip32 tree only marshals the public side,
|
||
* not the secrets! So we're not actually handing them out here!
|
||
*/
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c,
|
||
take(towire_hsm_init_reply(NULL, &node_id,
|
||
&secretstuff.bip32)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ The client has asked us to extract the shared secret from an EC Diffie
|
||
* Hellman token. This doesn't leak any information, but requires the private
|
||
* key, so the hsmd performs it. It's used to set up an encryption key for the
|
||
* connection handshaking (BOLT #8) and for the onion wrapping (BOLT #4). */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_ecdh(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
struct privkey privkey;
|
||
struct pubkey point;
|
||
struct secret ss;
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_ecdh_req(msg_in, &point))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
/*~ We simply use the secp256k1_ecdh function: if ss.data is invalid,
|
||
* we kill them for bad randomness (~1 in 2^127 if ss.data is random) */
|
||
node_key(&privkey, NULL);
|
||
if (secp256k1_ecdh(secp256k1_ctx, ss.data, &point.pubkey,
|
||
privkey.secret.data, NULL, NULL) != 1) {
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "secp256k1_ecdh fail");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ In the normal case, we return the shared secret, and then read
|
||
* the next msg. */
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c, take(towire_hsm_ecdh_resp(NULL, &ss)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ The specific routine to sign the channel_announcement message. This is
|
||
* defined in BOLT #7, and requires *two* signatures: one from this node's key
|
||
* (to prove it's from us), and one from the bitcoin key used to create the
|
||
* funding transaction (to prove we own the output). */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_cannouncement_sig(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
/*~ Our autogeneration code doesn't define field offsets, so we just
|
||
* copy this from the spec itself.
|
||
*
|
||
* Note that 'check-source' will actually find and check this quote
|
||
* against the spec (if available); whitespace is ignored and
|
||
* "..." means some content is skipped, but it works remarkably well to
|
||
* track spec changes. */
|
||
|
||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||
*
|
||
* - MUST compute the double-SHA256 hash `h` of the message, beginning
|
||
* at offset 256, up to the end of the message.
|
||
* - Note: the hash skips the 4 signatures but hashes the rest of the
|
||
* message, including any future fields appended to the end.
|
||
*/
|
||
/* First type bytes are the msg type */
|
||
size_t offset = 2 + 256;
|
||
struct privkey node_pkey;
|
||
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature node_sig, bitcoin_sig;
|
||
struct sha256_double hash;
|
||
u8 *reply;
|
||
u8 *ca;
|
||
struct pubkey funding_pubkey;
|
||
struct privkey funding_privkey;
|
||
struct secret channel_seed;
|
||
|
||
/*~ You'll find FIXMEs like this scattered through the code.
|
||
* Sometimes they suggest simple improvements which someone like
|
||
* yourself should go ahead an implement. Sometimes they're deceptive
|
||
* quagmires which will cause you nothing but grief. You decide! */
|
||
|
||
/*~ Christian uses TODO(cdecker) or FIXME(cdecker), but I'm sure he won't
|
||
* mind if you fix this for him! */
|
||
|
||
/* FIXME: We should cache these. */
|
||
get_channel_seed(&c->id, c->dbid, &channel_seed);
|
||
derive_funding_key(&channel_seed, &funding_pubkey, &funding_privkey);
|
||
|
||
/*~ fromwire_ routines which need to do allocation take a tal context
|
||
* as their first field; tmpctx is good here since we won't need it
|
||
* after this function. */
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_cannouncement_sig_req(tmpctx, msg_in, &ca))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
if (tal_count(ca) < offset)
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"bad cannounce length %zu",
|
||
tal_count(ca));
|
||
|
||
if (fromwire_peektype(ca) != WIRE_CHANNEL_ANNOUNCEMENT)
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"Invalid channel announcement");
|
||
|
||
node_key(&node_pkey, NULL);
|
||
sha256_double(&hash, ca + offset, tal_count(ca) - offset);
|
||
|
||
sign_hash(&node_pkey, &hash, &node_sig);
|
||
sign_hash(&funding_privkey, &hash, &bitcoin_sig);
|
||
|
||
reply = towire_hsm_cannouncement_sig_reply(NULL, &node_sig,
|
||
&bitcoin_sig);
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c, take(reply));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ The specific routine to sign the channel_update message. */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_channel_update_sig(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||
*
|
||
* - MUST set `signature` to the signature of the double-SHA256 of the
|
||
* entire remaining packet after `signature`, using its own
|
||
* `node_id`.
|
||
*/
|
||
/* 2 bytes msg type + 64 bytes signature */
|
||
size_t offset = 66;
|
||
struct privkey node_pkey;
|
||
struct sha256_double hash;
|
||
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig;
|
||
struct short_channel_id scid;
|
||
u32 timestamp, fee_base_msat, fee_proportional_mill;
|
||
struct amount_msat htlc_minimum, htlc_maximum;
|
||
u8 message_flags, channel_flags;
|
||
u16 cltv_expiry_delta;
|
||
struct bitcoin_blkid chain_hash;
|
||
u8 *cu;
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_cupdate_sig_req(tmpctx, msg_in, &cu))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_channel_update_option_channel_htlc_max(cu, &sig,
|
||
&chain_hash, &scid, ×tamp, &message_flags,
|
||
&channel_flags, &cltv_expiry_delta,
|
||
&htlc_minimum, &fee_base_msat,
|
||
&fee_proportional_mill, &htlc_maximum)) {
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "Bad inner channel_update");
|
||
}
|
||
if (tal_count(cu) < offset)
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"inner channel_update too short");
|
||
|
||
node_key(&node_pkey, NULL);
|
||
sha256_double(&hash, cu + offset, tal_count(cu) - offset);
|
||
|
||
sign_hash(&node_pkey, &hash, &sig);
|
||
|
||
cu = towire_channel_update_option_channel_htlc_max(tmpctx, &sig, &chain_hash,
|
||
&scid, timestamp, message_flags, channel_flags,
|
||
cltv_expiry_delta, htlc_minimum,
|
||
fee_base_msat, fee_proportional_mill,
|
||
htlc_maximum);
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c, take(towire_hsm_cupdate_sig_reply(NULL, cu)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ This gets the basepoints for a channel; it's not private information really
|
||
* (we tell the peer this to establish a channel, as it sets up the keys used
|
||
* for each transaction).
|
||
*
|
||
* Note that this is asked by lightningd, so it tells us what channels it wants.
|
||
*/
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_get_channel_basepoints(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
struct node_id peer_id;
|
||
u64 dbid;
|
||
struct secret seed;
|
||
struct basepoints basepoints;
|
||
struct pubkey funding_pubkey;
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_get_channel_basepoints(msg_in, &peer_id, &dbid))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
get_channel_seed(&peer_id, dbid, &seed);
|
||
derive_basepoints(&seed, &funding_pubkey, &basepoints, NULL, NULL);
|
||
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c,
|
||
take(towire_hsm_get_channel_basepoints_reply(NULL,
|
||
&basepoints,
|
||
&funding_pubkey)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ This is another lightningd-only interface; signing a commit transaction.
|
||
* This is dangerous, since if we sign a revoked commitment tx we'll lose
|
||
* funds, thus it's only available to lightningd.
|
||
*
|
||
*
|
||
* Oh look, another FIXME! */
|
||
/* FIXME: Ensure HSM never does this twice for same dbid! */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_sign_commitment_tx(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
struct pubkey remote_funding_pubkey, local_funding_pubkey;
|
||
struct node_id peer_id;
|
||
u64 dbid;
|
||
struct amount_sat funding;
|
||
struct secret channel_seed;
|
||
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
|
||
struct bitcoin_signature sig;
|
||
struct secrets secrets;
|
||
const u8 *funding_wscript;
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_sign_commitment_tx(tmpctx, msg_in,
|
||
&peer_id, &dbid,
|
||
&tx,
|
||
&remote_funding_pubkey,
|
||
&funding))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
tx->chainparams = c->chainparams;
|
||
|
||
/* Basic sanity checks. */
|
||
if (tx->wtx->num_inputs != 1)
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "tx must have 1 input");
|
||
if (tx->wtx->num_outputs == 0)
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "tx must have > 0 outputs");
|
||
|
||
get_channel_seed(&peer_id, dbid, &channel_seed);
|
||
derive_basepoints(&channel_seed,
|
||
&local_funding_pubkey, NULL, &secrets, NULL);
|
||
|
||
/*~ Bitcoin signatures cover the (part of) the script they're
|
||
* executing; the rules are a bit complex in general, but for
|
||
* Segregated Witness it's simply the current script. */
|
||
funding_wscript = bitcoin_redeem_2of2(tmpctx,
|
||
&local_funding_pubkey,
|
||
&remote_funding_pubkey);
|
||
/*~ Segregated Witness also added the input amount to the signing
|
||
* algorithm; it's only part of the input implicitly (it's part of the
|
||
* output it's spending), so in our 'bitcoin_tx' structure it's a
|
||
* pointer, as we don't always know it (and zero is a valid amount, so
|
||
* NULL is better to mean 'unknown' and has the nice property that
|
||
* you'll crash if you assume it's there and you're wrong.) */
|
||
tx->input_amounts[0] = tal_dup(tx, struct amount_sat, &funding);
|
||
sign_tx_input(tx, 0, NULL, funding_wscript,
|
||
&secrets.funding_privkey,
|
||
&local_funding_pubkey,
|
||
SIGHASH_ALL,
|
||
&sig);
|
||
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c,
|
||
take(towire_hsm_sign_commitment_tx_reply(NULL, &sig)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ This is used by channeld to create signatures for the remote peer's
|
||
* commitment transaction. It's functionally identical to signing our own,
|
||
* but we expect to do this repeatedly as commitment transactions are
|
||
* updated.
|
||
*
|
||
* The HSM almost certainly *should* do more checks before signing!
|
||
*/
|
||
/* FIXME: make sure it meets some criteria? */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_sign_remote_commitment_tx(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
struct pubkey remote_funding_pubkey, local_funding_pubkey;
|
||
struct amount_sat funding;
|
||
struct secret channel_seed;
|
||
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
|
||
struct bitcoin_signature sig;
|
||
struct secrets secrets;
|
||
const u8 *funding_wscript;
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_sign_remote_commitment_tx(tmpctx, msg_in,
|
||
&tx,
|
||
&remote_funding_pubkey,
|
||
&funding))
|
||
bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
tx->chainparams = c->chainparams;
|
||
|
||
/* Basic sanity checks. */
|
||
if (tx->wtx->num_inputs != 1)
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "tx must have 1 input");
|
||
if (tx->wtx->num_outputs == 0)
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "tx must have > 0 outputs");
|
||
|
||
get_channel_seed(&c->id, c->dbid, &channel_seed);
|
||
derive_basepoints(&channel_seed,
|
||
&local_funding_pubkey, NULL, &secrets, NULL);
|
||
|
||
funding_wscript = bitcoin_redeem_2of2(tmpctx,
|
||
&local_funding_pubkey,
|
||
&remote_funding_pubkey);
|
||
/* Need input amount for signing */
|
||
tx->input_amounts[0] = tal_dup(tx, struct amount_sat, &funding);
|
||
sign_tx_input(tx, 0, NULL, funding_wscript,
|
||
&secrets.funding_privkey,
|
||
&local_funding_pubkey,
|
||
SIGHASH_ALL,
|
||
&sig);
|
||
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c, take(towire_hsm_sign_tx_reply(NULL, &sig)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ This is used by channeld to create signatures for the remote peer's
|
||
* HTLC transactions. */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_sign_remote_htlc_tx(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
struct secret channel_seed;
|
||
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
|
||
struct bitcoin_signature sig;
|
||
struct secrets secrets;
|
||
struct basepoints basepoints;
|
||
struct pubkey remote_per_commit_point;
|
||
struct amount_sat amount;
|
||
u8 *wscript;
|
||
struct privkey htlc_privkey;
|
||
struct pubkey htlc_pubkey;
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_sign_remote_htlc_tx(tmpctx, msg_in,
|
||
&tx, &wscript, &amount,
|
||
&remote_per_commit_point))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
tx->chainparams = c->chainparams;
|
||
get_channel_seed(&c->id, c->dbid, &channel_seed);
|
||
derive_basepoints(&channel_seed, NULL, &basepoints, &secrets, NULL);
|
||
|
||
if (!derive_simple_privkey(&secrets.htlc_basepoint_secret,
|
||
&basepoints.htlc,
|
||
&remote_per_commit_point,
|
||
&htlc_privkey))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"Failed deriving htlc privkey");
|
||
|
||
if (!derive_simple_key(&basepoints.htlc,
|
||
&remote_per_commit_point,
|
||
&htlc_pubkey))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"Failed deriving htlc pubkey");
|
||
|
||
/* Need input amount for signing */
|
||
tx->input_amounts[0] = tal_dup(tx, struct amount_sat, &amount);
|
||
sign_tx_input(tx, 0, NULL, wscript, &htlc_privkey, &htlc_pubkey,
|
||
SIGHASH_ALL, &sig);
|
||
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c, take(towire_hsm_sign_tx_reply(NULL, &sig)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ This covers several cases where onchaind is creating a transaction which
|
||
* sends funds to our internal wallet. */
|
||
/* FIXME: Derive output address for this client, and check it here! */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_sign_to_us_tx(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in,
|
||
struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
|
||
const struct privkey *privkey,
|
||
const u8 *wscript,
|
||
struct amount_sat input_sat)
|
||
{
|
||
struct bitcoin_signature sig;
|
||
struct pubkey pubkey;
|
||
|
||
if (!pubkey_from_privkey(privkey, &pubkey))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "bad pubkey_from_privkey");
|
||
|
||
if (tx->wtx->num_inputs != 1)
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "bad txinput count");
|
||
|
||
tx->input_amounts[0] = tal_dup(tx, struct amount_sat, &input_sat);
|
||
sign_tx_input(tx, 0, NULL, wscript, privkey, &pubkey, SIGHASH_ALL, &sig);
|
||
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c, take(towire_hsm_sign_tx_reply(NULL, &sig)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ When we send a commitment transaction onchain (unilateral close), there's
|
||
* a delay before we can spend it. onchaind does an explicit transaction to
|
||
* transfer it to the wallet so that doesn't need to remember how to spend
|
||
* this complex transaction. */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_sign_delayed_payment_to_us(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
u64 commit_num;
|
||
struct amount_sat input_sat;
|
||
struct secret channel_seed, basepoint_secret;
|
||
struct pubkey basepoint;
|
||
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
|
||
struct sha256 shaseed;
|
||
struct pubkey per_commitment_point;
|
||
struct privkey privkey;
|
||
u8 *wscript;
|
||
|
||
/*~ We don't derive the wscript ourselves, but perhaps we should? */
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_sign_delayed_payment_to_us(tmpctx, msg_in,
|
||
&commit_num,
|
||
&tx, &wscript,
|
||
&input_sat))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
tx->chainparams = c->chainparams;
|
||
get_channel_seed(&c->id, c->dbid, &channel_seed);
|
||
|
||
/*~ ccan/crypto/shachain how we efficiently derive 2^48 ordered
|
||
* preimages from a single seed; the twist is that as the preimages
|
||
* are revealed, you can generate the previous ones yourself, needing
|
||
* to only keep log(N) of them at any time. */
|
||
if (!derive_shaseed(&channel_seed, &shaseed))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "bad derive_shaseed");
|
||
|
||
/*~ BOLT #3 describes exactly how this is used to generate the Nth
|
||
* per-commitment point. */
|
||
if (!per_commit_point(&shaseed, &per_commitment_point, commit_num))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"bad per_commitment_point %"PRIu64,
|
||
commit_num);
|
||
|
||
/*~ ... which is combined with the basepoint to generate then N'th key.
|
||
*/
|
||
if (!derive_delayed_payment_basepoint(&channel_seed,
|
||
&basepoint,
|
||
&basepoint_secret))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "failed deriving basepoint");
|
||
|
||
if (!derive_simple_privkey(&basepoint_secret,
|
||
&basepoint,
|
||
&per_commitment_point,
|
||
&privkey))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "failed deriving privkey");
|
||
|
||
return handle_sign_to_us_tx(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
tx, &privkey, wscript, input_sat);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ This is used when a commitment transaction is onchain, and has an HTLC
|
||
* output paying to us (because we have the preimage); this signs that
|
||
* transaction, which lightningd will broadcast to collect the funds. */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_sign_remote_htlc_to_us(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
struct amount_sat input_sat;
|
||
struct secret channel_seed, htlc_basepoint_secret;
|
||
struct pubkey htlc_basepoint;
|
||
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
|
||
struct pubkey remote_per_commitment_point;
|
||
struct privkey privkey;
|
||
u8 *wscript;
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_sign_remote_htlc_to_us(tmpctx, msg_in,
|
||
&remote_per_commitment_point,
|
||
&tx, &wscript,
|
||
&input_sat))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
tx->chainparams = c->chainparams;
|
||
get_channel_seed(&c->id, c->dbid, &channel_seed);
|
||
|
||
if (!derive_htlc_basepoint(&channel_seed, &htlc_basepoint,
|
||
&htlc_basepoint_secret))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"Failed derive_htlc_basepoint");
|
||
|
||
if (!derive_simple_privkey(&htlc_basepoint_secret,
|
||
&htlc_basepoint,
|
||
&remote_per_commitment_point,
|
||
&privkey))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"Failed deriving htlc privkey");
|
||
|
||
return handle_sign_to_us_tx(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
tx, &privkey, wscript, input_sat);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ This is used when the remote peer's commitment transaction is revoked;
|
||
* we can use the revocation secret to spend the outputs. For simplicity,
|
||
* we do them one at a time, though. */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_sign_penalty_to_us(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
struct amount_sat input_sat;
|
||
struct secret channel_seed, revocation_secret, revocation_basepoint_secret;
|
||
struct pubkey revocation_basepoint;
|
||
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
|
||
struct pubkey point;
|
||
struct privkey privkey;
|
||
u8 *wscript;
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_sign_penalty_to_us(tmpctx, msg_in,
|
||
&revocation_secret,
|
||
&tx, &wscript,
|
||
&input_sat))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
tx->chainparams = c->chainparams;
|
||
|
||
if (!pubkey_from_secret(&revocation_secret, &point))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "Failed deriving pubkey");
|
||
|
||
get_channel_seed(&c->id, c->dbid, &channel_seed);
|
||
if (!derive_revocation_basepoint(&channel_seed,
|
||
&revocation_basepoint,
|
||
&revocation_basepoint_secret))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"Failed deriving revocation basepoint");
|
||
|
||
if (!derive_revocation_privkey(&revocation_basepoint_secret,
|
||
&revocation_secret,
|
||
&revocation_basepoint,
|
||
&point,
|
||
&privkey))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"Failed deriving revocation privkey");
|
||
|
||
return handle_sign_to_us_tx(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
tx, &privkey, wscript, input_sat);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ This is used when a commitment transaction is onchain, and has an HTLC
|
||
* output paying to them, which has timed out; this signs that transaction,
|
||
* which lightningd will broadcast to collect the funds. */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_sign_local_htlc_tx(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
u64 commit_num;
|
||
struct amount_sat input_sat;
|
||
struct secret channel_seed, htlc_basepoint_secret;
|
||
struct sha256 shaseed;
|
||
struct pubkey per_commitment_point, htlc_basepoint;
|
||
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
|
||
u8 *wscript;
|
||
struct bitcoin_signature sig;
|
||
struct privkey htlc_privkey;
|
||
struct pubkey htlc_pubkey;
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_sign_local_htlc_tx(tmpctx, msg_in,
|
||
&commit_num, &tx, &wscript,
|
||
&input_sat))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
tx->chainparams = c->chainparams;
|
||
get_channel_seed(&c->id, c->dbid, &channel_seed);
|
||
|
||
if (!derive_shaseed(&channel_seed, &shaseed))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "bad derive_shaseed");
|
||
|
||
if (!per_commit_point(&shaseed, &per_commitment_point, commit_num))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"bad per_commitment_point %"PRIu64,
|
||
commit_num);
|
||
|
||
if (!derive_htlc_basepoint(&channel_seed,
|
||
&htlc_basepoint,
|
||
&htlc_basepoint_secret))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"Failed deriving htlc basepoint");
|
||
|
||
if (!derive_simple_privkey(&htlc_basepoint_secret,
|
||
&htlc_basepoint,
|
||
&per_commitment_point,
|
||
&htlc_privkey))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"Failed deriving htlc privkey");
|
||
|
||
if (!pubkey_from_privkey(&htlc_privkey, &htlc_pubkey))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "bad pubkey_from_privkey");
|
||
|
||
if (tx->wtx->num_inputs != 1)
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "bad txinput count");
|
||
|
||
/* FIXME: Check that output script is correct! */
|
||
tx->input_amounts[0] = tal_dup(tx, struct amount_sat, &input_sat);
|
||
sign_tx_input(tx, 0, NULL, wscript, &htlc_privkey, &htlc_pubkey,
|
||
SIGHASH_ALL, &sig);
|
||
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c, take(towire_hsm_sign_tx_reply(NULL, &sig)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ This get the Nth a per-commitment point, and for N > 2, returns the
|
||
* grandparent per-commitment secret. This pattern is because after
|
||
* negotiating commitment N-1, we send them the next per-commitment point,
|
||
* and reveal the previous per-commitment secret as a promise not to spend
|
||
* the previous commitment transaction. */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_get_per_commitment_point(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
struct secret channel_seed;
|
||
struct sha256 shaseed;
|
||
struct pubkey per_commitment_point;
|
||
u64 n;
|
||
struct secret *old_secret;
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_get_per_commitment_point(msg_in, &n))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
get_channel_seed(&c->id, c->dbid, &channel_seed);
|
||
if (!derive_shaseed(&channel_seed, &shaseed))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "bad derive_shaseed");
|
||
|
||
if (!per_commit_point(&shaseed, &per_commitment_point, n))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"bad per_commit_point %"PRIu64, n);
|
||
|
||
if (n >= 2) {
|
||
old_secret = tal(tmpctx, struct secret);
|
||
if (!per_commit_secret(&shaseed, old_secret, n - 2)) {
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"Cannot derive secret %"PRIu64,
|
||
n - 2);
|
||
}
|
||
} else
|
||
old_secret = NULL;
|
||
|
||
/*~ hsm_client_wire.csv marks the secret field here optional, so it only
|
||
* gets included if the parameter is non-NULL. We violate 80 columns
|
||
* pretty badly here, but it's a recommendation not a religion. */
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c,
|
||
take(towire_hsm_get_per_commitment_point_reply(NULL,
|
||
&per_commitment_point,
|
||
old_secret)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ This is used when the remote peer claims to have knowledge of future
|
||
* commitment states (option_data_loss_protect in the spec) which means we've
|
||
* been restored from backup or something, and may have already revealed
|
||
* secrets. We carefully check that this is true, here. */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_check_future_secret(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
struct secret channel_seed;
|
||
struct sha256 shaseed;
|
||
u64 n;
|
||
struct secret secret, suggested;
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_check_future_secret(msg_in, &n, &suggested))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
get_channel_seed(&c->id, c->dbid, &channel_seed);
|
||
if (!derive_shaseed(&channel_seed, &shaseed))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "bad derive_shaseed");
|
||
|
||
if (!per_commit_secret(&shaseed, &secret, n))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"bad commit secret #%"PRIu64, n);
|
||
|
||
/*~ Note the special secret_eq_consttime: we generate foo_eq for many
|
||
* types using ccan/structeq, but not 'struct secret' because any
|
||
* comparison risks leaking information about the secret if it is
|
||
* timing dependent. */
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c,
|
||
take(towire_hsm_check_future_secret_reply(NULL,
|
||
secret_eq_consttime(&secret, &suggested))));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* This is used by closingd to sign off on a mutual close tx. */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_sign_mutual_close_tx(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
struct secret channel_seed;
|
||
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
|
||
struct pubkey remote_funding_pubkey, local_funding_pubkey;
|
||
struct bitcoin_signature sig;
|
||
struct secrets secrets;
|
||
struct amount_sat funding;
|
||
const u8 *funding_wscript;
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_sign_mutual_close_tx(tmpctx, msg_in,
|
||
&tx,
|
||
&remote_funding_pubkey,
|
||
&funding))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
tx->chainparams = c->chainparams;
|
||
/* FIXME: We should know dust level, decent fee range and
|
||
* balances, and final_keyindex, and thus be able to check tx
|
||
* outputs! */
|
||
get_channel_seed(&c->id, c->dbid, &channel_seed);
|
||
derive_basepoints(&channel_seed,
|
||
&local_funding_pubkey, NULL, &secrets, NULL);
|
||
|
||
funding_wscript = bitcoin_redeem_2of2(tmpctx,
|
||
&local_funding_pubkey,
|
||
&remote_funding_pubkey);
|
||
/* Need input amount for signing */
|
||
tx->input_amounts[0] = tal_dup(tx, struct amount_sat, &funding);
|
||
sign_tx_input(tx, 0, NULL, funding_wscript,
|
||
&secrets.funding_privkey,
|
||
&local_funding_pubkey,
|
||
SIGHASH_ALL, &sig);
|
||
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c, take(towire_hsm_sign_tx_reply(NULL, &sig)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ Since we process requests then service them in strict order, and because
|
||
* only lightningd can request a new client fd, we can get away with a global
|
||
* here! But because we are being tricky, I set it to an invalid value when
|
||
* not in use, and sprinkle assertions around. */
|
||
static int pending_client_fd = -1;
|
||
|
||
/*~ This is the callback from below: having sent the reply, we now send the
|
||
* fd for the client end of the new socketpair. */
|
||
static struct io_plan *send_pending_client_fd(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *master)
|
||
{
|
||
int fd = pending_client_fd;
|
||
/* This must be the master. */
|
||
assert(is_lightningd(master));
|
||
assert(fd != -1);
|
||
|
||
/* This sanity check shouldn't be necessary, but it's cheap. */
|
||
pending_client_fd = -1;
|
||
|
||
/*~There's arcane UNIX magic to send an open file descriptor over a
|
||
* UNIX domain socket. There's no great way to autogenerate this
|
||
* though; especially for the receive side, so we always pass these
|
||
* manually immediately following the message.
|
||
*
|
||
* io_send_fd()'s third parameter is whether to close the local one
|
||
* after sending; that saves us YA callback.
|
||
*/
|
||
return io_send_fd(conn, fd, true, client_read_next, master);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ This is used by the master to create a new client connection (which
|
||
* becomes the HSM_FD for the subdaemon after forking). */
|
||
static struct io_plan *pass_client_hsmfd(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
int fds[2];
|
||
u64 dbid, capabilities;
|
||
struct node_id id;
|
||
|
||
/* This must be lightningd itself. */
|
||
assert(is_lightningd(c));
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_client_hsmfd(msg_in, &id, &dbid, &capabilities))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
/* socketpair is a bi-directional pipe, which is what we want. */
|
||
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, fds) != 0)
|
||
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR, "creating fds: %s",
|
||
strerror(errno));
|
||
|
||
status_debug("new_client: %"PRIu64, dbid);
|
||
new_client(c, c->chainparams, &id, dbid, capabilities, fds[0]);
|
||
|
||
/*~ We stash this in a global, because we need to get both the fd and
|
||
* the client pointer to the callback. The other way would be to
|
||
* create a boutique structure and hand that, but we don't need to. */
|
||
pending_client_fd = fds[1];
|
||
return io_write_wire(conn, take(towire_hsm_client_hsmfd_reply(NULL)),
|
||
send_pending_client_fd, c);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ For almost every wallet tx we use the BIP32 seed, but not for onchain
|
||
* unilateral closes from a peer: they (may) have an output to us using a
|
||
* public key based on the channel basepoints. It's a bit spammy to spend
|
||
* those immediately just to make the wallet simpler, and we didn't appreciate
|
||
* the problem when we designed the protocol for commitment transaction keys.
|
||
*
|
||
* So we store just enough about the channel it came from (which may be
|
||
* long-gone) to regenerate the keys here. That has the added advantage that
|
||
* the secrets themselves stay within the HSM. */
|
||
static void hsm_unilateral_close_privkey(struct privkey *dst,
|
||
struct unilateral_close_info *info)
|
||
{
|
||
struct secret channel_seed;
|
||
struct basepoints basepoints;
|
||
struct secrets secrets;
|
||
|
||
get_channel_seed(&info->peer_id, info->channel_id, &channel_seed);
|
||
derive_basepoints(&channel_seed, NULL, &basepoints, &secrets, NULL);
|
||
|
||
if (!derive_simple_privkey(&secrets.payment_basepoint_secret,
|
||
&basepoints.payment, &info->commitment_point,
|
||
dst)) {
|
||
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||
"Deriving unilateral_close_privkey");
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* This gets the bitcoin private key needed to spend from our wallet. */
|
||
static void hsm_key_for_utxo(struct privkey *privkey, struct pubkey *pubkey,
|
||
const struct utxo *utxo)
|
||
{
|
||
if (utxo->close_info != NULL) {
|
||
/* This is a their_unilateral_close/to-us output, so
|
||
* we need to derive the secret the long way */
|
||
status_debug("Unilateral close output, deriving secrets");
|
||
hsm_unilateral_close_privkey(privkey, utxo->close_info);
|
||
pubkey_from_privkey(privkey, pubkey);
|
||
status_debug("Derived public key %s from unilateral close",
|
||
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, pubkey));
|
||
} else {
|
||
/* Simple case: just get derive via HD-derivation */
|
||
bitcoin_key(privkey, pubkey, utxo->keyindex);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* This completes the tx by filling in the input scripts with signatures. */
|
||
static void sign_all_inputs(struct bitcoin_tx *tx, struct utxo **utxos)
|
||
{
|
||
/*~ Deep in my mind there's a continuous battle: should arrays be
|
||
* named as singular or plural? Is consistency the sign of a weak
|
||
* mind?
|
||
*
|
||
* ZmnSCPxj answers thusly: One must make peace with the fact, that
|
||
* the array itself is singular, yet its contents are plural. Do you
|
||
* name the array, or do you name its contents? Is the array itself
|
||
* the thing and the whole of the thing, or is it its contents that
|
||
* define what it is?
|
||
*
|
||
*... I'm not sure that helps! */
|
||
assert(tx->wtx->num_inputs == tal_count(utxos));
|
||
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(utxos); i++) {
|
||
struct pubkey inkey;
|
||
struct privkey inprivkey;
|
||
const struct utxo *in = utxos[i];
|
||
u8 *subscript, *wscript, *script;
|
||
struct bitcoin_signature sig;
|
||
|
||
/* Figure out keys to spend this. */
|
||
hsm_key_for_utxo(&inprivkey, &inkey, in);
|
||
|
||
/* It's either a p2wpkh or p2sh (we support that so people from
|
||
* the last bitcoin era can put funds into the wallet) */
|
||
wscript = p2wpkh_scriptcode(tmpctx, &inkey);
|
||
if (in->is_p2sh) {
|
||
/* For P2SH-wrapped Segwit, the (implied) redeemScript
|
||
* is defined in BIP141 */
|
||
subscript = bitcoin_redeem_p2sh_p2wpkh(tmpctx, &inkey);
|
||
script = bitcoin_scriptsig_p2sh_p2wpkh(tx, &inkey);
|
||
bitcoin_tx_input_set_script(tx, i, script);
|
||
} else {
|
||
/* Pure segwit uses an empty inputScript; NULL has
|
||
* tal_count() == 0, so it works great here. */
|
||
subscript = NULL;
|
||
bitcoin_tx_input_set_script(tx, i, NULL);
|
||
}
|
||
/* This is the core crypto magic. */
|
||
sign_tx_input(tx, i, subscript, wscript, &inprivkey, &inkey,
|
||
SIGHASH_ALL, &sig);
|
||
|
||
/* The witness is [sig] [key] */
|
||
bitcoin_tx_input_set_witness(
|
||
tx, i, take(bitcoin_witness_p2wpkh(tx, &sig, &inkey)));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ lightningd asks us to sign the transaction to fund a channel; it feeds us
|
||
* the set of inputs and the local and remote pubkeys, and we sign it. */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_sign_funding_tx(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
struct amount_sat satoshi_out, change_out;
|
||
u32 change_keyindex;
|
||
struct pubkey local_pubkey, remote_pubkey;
|
||
struct utxo **utxos;
|
||
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
|
||
u16 outnum;
|
||
struct pubkey *changekey;
|
||
|
||
/* FIXME: Check fee is "reasonable" */
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_sign_funding(tmpctx, msg_in,
|
||
&satoshi_out, &change_out,
|
||
&change_keyindex, &local_pubkey,
|
||
&remote_pubkey, &utxos))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
if (amount_sat_greater(change_out, AMOUNT_SAT(0))) {
|
||
changekey = tal(tmpctx, struct pubkey);
|
||
bitcoin_key(NULL, changekey, change_keyindex);
|
||
} else
|
||
changekey = NULL;
|
||
|
||
tx = funding_tx(tmpctx, c->chainparams, &outnum,
|
||
/*~ For simplicity, our generated code is not const
|
||
* correct. The C rules around const and
|
||
* pointer-to-pointer are a bit weird, so we use
|
||
* ccan/cast which ensures the type is correct and
|
||
* we're not casting something random */
|
||
cast_const2(const struct utxo **, utxos),
|
||
satoshi_out, &local_pubkey, &remote_pubkey,
|
||
change_out, changekey,
|
||
NULL);
|
||
|
||
sign_all_inputs(tx, utxos);
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c, take(towire_hsm_sign_funding_reply(NULL, tx)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ lightningd asks us to sign a withdrawal; same as above but in theory
|
||
* we can do more to check the previous case is valid. */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_sign_withdrawal_tx(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
struct amount_sat satoshi_out, change_out;
|
||
u32 change_keyindex;
|
||
struct utxo **utxos;
|
||
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
|
||
struct pubkey changekey;
|
||
struct bitcoin_tx_output **outputs;
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_sign_withdrawal(tmpctx, msg_in, &satoshi_out,
|
||
&change_out, &change_keyindex,
|
||
&outputs, &utxos))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
if (!bip32_pubkey(&secretstuff.bip32, &changekey, change_keyindex))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"Failed to get key %u", change_keyindex);
|
||
|
||
tx = withdraw_tx(tmpctx, c->chainparams,
|
||
cast_const2(const struct utxo **, utxos), outputs,
|
||
&changekey, change_out, NULL, NULL);
|
||
|
||
sign_all_inputs(tx, utxos);
|
||
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c,
|
||
take(towire_hsm_sign_withdrawal_reply(NULL, tx)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ Lightning invoices, defined by BOLT 11, are signed. This has been
|
||
* surprisingly controversial; it means a node needs to be online to create
|
||
* invoices. However, it seems clear to me that in a world without
|
||
* intermedaries you need proof that you have received an offer (the
|
||
* signature), as well as proof that you've paid it (the preimage). */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_sign_invoice(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
/*~ We make up a 'u5' type to represent BOLT11's 5-bits-per-byte
|
||
* format: it's only for human consumption, as typedefs are almost
|
||
* entirely transparent to the C compiler. */
|
||
u5 *u5bytes;
|
||
u8 *hrpu8;
|
||
char *hrp;
|
||
struct sha256 sha;
|
||
secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsig;
|
||
struct hash_u5 hu5;
|
||
struct privkey node_pkey;
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_sign_invoice(tmpctx, msg_in, &u5bytes, &hrpu8))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
/* BOLT #11:
|
||
*
|
||
* A writer... MUST set `signature` to a valid 512-bit
|
||
* secp256k1 signature of the SHA2 256-bit hash of the
|
||
* human-readable part, represented as UTF-8 bytes,
|
||
* concatenated with the data part (excluding the signature)
|
||
* with 0 bits appended to pad the data to the next byte
|
||
* boundary, with a trailing byte containing the recovery ID
|
||
* (0, 1, 2, or 3).
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
/* FIXME: Check invoice! */
|
||
|
||
/*~ tal_dup_arr() does what you'd expect: allocate an array by copying
|
||
* another; the cast is needed because the hrp is a 'char' array, not
|
||
* a 'u8' (unsigned char) as it's the "human readable" part.
|
||
*
|
||
* The final arg of tal_dup_arr() is how many extra bytes to allocate:
|
||
* it's so often zero that I've thought about dropping the argument, but
|
||
* in cases like this (adding a NUL terminator) it's perfect. */
|
||
hrp = tal_dup_arr(tmpctx, char, (char *)hrpu8, tal_count(hrpu8), 1);
|
||
hrp[tal_count(hrpu8)] = '\0';
|
||
|
||
hash_u5_init(&hu5, hrp);
|
||
hash_u5(&hu5, u5bytes, tal_count(u5bytes));
|
||
hash_u5_done(&hu5, &sha);
|
||
|
||
node_key(&node_pkey, NULL);
|
||
/*~ By no small coincidence, this libsecp routine uses the exact
|
||
* recovery signature format mandated by BOLT 11. */
|
||
if (!secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(secp256k1_ctx, &rsig,
|
||
(const u8 *)&sha,
|
||
node_pkey.secret.data,
|
||
NULL, NULL)) {
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "Failed to sign invoice");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c,
|
||
take(towire_hsm_sign_invoice_reply(NULL, &rsig)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ It's optional for nodes to send node_announcement, but it lets us set our
|
||
* favourite color and cool alias! Plus other minor details like how to
|
||
* connect to us. */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_sign_node_announcement(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||
*
|
||
* The origin node:
|
||
*...
|
||
* - MUST set `signature` to the signature of the double-SHA256 of the
|
||
* entire remaining packet after `signature` (using the key given by
|
||
* `node_id`).
|
||
*/
|
||
/* 2 bytes msg type + 64 bytes signature */
|
||
size_t offset = 66;
|
||
struct sha256_double hash;
|
||
struct privkey node_pkey;
|
||
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig;
|
||
u8 *reply;
|
||
u8 *ann;
|
||
|
||
if (!fromwire_hsm_node_announcement_sig_req(tmpctx, msg_in, &ann))
|
||
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
if (tal_count(ann) < offset)
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"Node announcement too short");
|
||
|
||
if (fromwire_peektype(ann) != WIRE_NODE_ANNOUNCEMENT)
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in,
|
||
"Invalid announcement");
|
||
|
||
node_key(&node_pkey, NULL);
|
||
sha256_double(&hash, ann + offset, tal_count(ann) - offset);
|
||
|
||
sign_hash(&node_pkey, &hash, &sig);
|
||
|
||
reply = towire_hsm_node_announcement_sig_reply(NULL, &sig);
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c, take(reply));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#if DEVELOPER
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_memleak(struct io_conn *conn,
|
||
struct client *c,
|
||
const u8 *msg_in)
|
||
{
|
||
struct htable *memtable;
|
||
bool found_leak;
|
||
u8 *reply;
|
||
|
||
memtable = memleak_enter_allocations(tmpctx, msg_in, msg_in);
|
||
|
||
/* Now delete clients and anything they point to. */
|
||
memleak_remove_referenced(memtable, c);
|
||
memleak_scan_region(memtable,
|
||
dbid_zero_clients, sizeof(dbid_zero_clients));
|
||
memleak_remove_uintmap(memtable, &clients);
|
||
memleak_scan_region(memtable, status_conn, tal_bytelen(status_conn));
|
||
|
||
memleak_scan_region(memtable, dev_force_privkey, 0);
|
||
memleak_scan_region(memtable, dev_force_bip32_seed, 0);
|
||
|
||
found_leak = dump_memleak(memtable);
|
||
reply = towire_hsm_dev_memleak_reply(NULL, found_leak);
|
||
return req_reply(conn, c, take(reply));
|
||
}
|
||
#endif /* DEVELOPER */
|
||
|
||
/*~ This routine checks that a client is allowed to call the handler. */
|
||
static bool check_client_capabilities(struct client *client,
|
||
enum hsm_wire_type t)
|
||
{
|
||
/*~ Here's a useful trick: enums in C are not real types, they're
|
||
* semantic sugar sprinkled over an int, bascally (in fact, older
|
||
* versions of gcc used to convert the values ints in the parser!).
|
||
*
|
||
* But GCC will do one thing for us: if we have a switch statement
|
||
* with a controlling expression which is an enum, it will warn us
|
||
* if a declared enum value is *not* handled in the switch, eg:
|
||
* enumeration value ‘FOOBAR’ not handled in switch [-Werror=switch]
|
||
*
|
||
* This only works if there's no 'default' label, which is sometimes
|
||
* hard, as we *can* have non-enum values in our enum. But the tradeoff
|
||
* is worth it so the compiler tells us everywhere we have to fix when
|
||
* we add a new enum identifier!
|
||
*/
|
||
switch (t) {
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_ECDH_REQ:
|
||
return (client->capabilities & HSM_CAP_ECDH) != 0;
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_CANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REQ:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_CUPDATE_SIG_REQ:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_NODE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REQ:
|
||
return (client->capabilities & HSM_CAP_SIGN_GOSSIP) != 0;
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_DELAYED_PAYMENT_TO_US:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_REMOTE_HTLC_TO_US:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_PENALTY_TO_US:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_LOCAL_HTLC_TX:
|
||
return (client->capabilities & HSM_CAP_SIGN_ONCHAIN_TX) != 0;
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_GET_PER_COMMITMENT_POINT:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_CHECK_FUTURE_SECRET:
|
||
return (client->capabilities & HSM_CAP_COMMITMENT_POINT) != 0;
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_REMOTE_COMMITMENT_TX:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_REMOTE_HTLC_TX:
|
||
return (client->capabilities & HSM_CAP_SIGN_REMOTE_TX) != 0;
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_MUTUAL_CLOSE_TX:
|
||
return (client->capabilities & HSM_CAP_SIGN_CLOSING_TX) != 0;
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_INIT:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_CLIENT_HSMFD:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_FUNDING:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_WITHDRAWAL:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_INVOICE:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_COMMITMENT_TX:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_GET_CHANNEL_BASEPOINTS:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_DEV_MEMLEAK:
|
||
return (client->capabilities & HSM_CAP_MASTER) != 0;
|
||
|
||
/*~ These are messages sent by the HSM so we should never receive them. */
|
||
/* FIXME: Since we autogenerate these, we should really generate separate
|
||
* enums for replies to avoid this kind of clutter! */
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_ECDH_RESP:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_CANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_CUPDATE_SIG_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_CLIENT_HSMFD_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_FUNDING_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_NODE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_WITHDRAWAL_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_INVOICE_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_INIT_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSMSTATUS_CLIENT_BAD_REQUEST:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_COMMITMENT_TX_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_TX_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_GET_PER_COMMITMENT_POINT_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_CHECK_FUTURE_SECRET_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_GET_CHANNEL_BASEPOINTS_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_DEV_MEMLEAK_REPLY:
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ This is the core of the HSM daemon: handling requests. */
|
||
static struct io_plan *handle_client(struct io_conn *conn, struct client *c)
|
||
{
|
||
enum hsm_wire_type t = fromwire_peektype(c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
status_debug("Client: Received message %d from client", t);
|
||
|
||
/* Before we do anything else, is this client allowed to do
|
||
* what he asks for? */
|
||
if (!check_client_capabilities(c, t))
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, c->msg_in,
|
||
"does not have capability to run %d", t);
|
||
|
||
/* Now actually go and do what the client asked for */
|
||
switch (t) {
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_INIT:
|
||
return init_hsm(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_CLIENT_HSMFD:
|
||
return pass_client_hsmfd(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_GET_CHANNEL_BASEPOINTS:
|
||
return handle_get_channel_basepoints(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_ECDH_REQ:
|
||
return handle_ecdh(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_CANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REQ:
|
||
return handle_cannouncement_sig(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_CUPDATE_SIG_REQ:
|
||
return handle_channel_update_sig(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_FUNDING:
|
||
return handle_sign_funding_tx(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_NODE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REQ:
|
||
return handle_sign_node_announcement(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_INVOICE:
|
||
return handle_sign_invoice(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_WITHDRAWAL:
|
||
return handle_sign_withdrawal_tx(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_COMMITMENT_TX:
|
||
return handle_sign_commitment_tx(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_DELAYED_PAYMENT_TO_US:
|
||
return handle_sign_delayed_payment_to_us(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_REMOTE_HTLC_TO_US:
|
||
return handle_sign_remote_htlc_to_us(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_PENALTY_TO_US:
|
||
return handle_sign_penalty_to_us(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_LOCAL_HTLC_TX:
|
||
return handle_sign_local_htlc_tx(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_GET_PER_COMMITMENT_POINT:
|
||
return handle_get_per_commitment_point(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_CHECK_FUTURE_SECRET:
|
||
return handle_check_future_secret(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_REMOTE_COMMITMENT_TX:
|
||
return handle_sign_remote_commitment_tx(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_REMOTE_HTLC_TX:
|
||
return handle_sign_remote_htlc_tx(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_MUTUAL_CLOSE_TX:
|
||
return handle_sign_mutual_close_tx(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
|
||
#if DEVELOPER
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_DEV_MEMLEAK:
|
||
return handle_memleak(conn, c, c->msg_in);
|
||
#else
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_DEV_MEMLEAK:
|
||
#endif /* DEVELOPER */
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_ECDH_RESP:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_CANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_CUPDATE_SIG_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_CLIENT_HSMFD_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_FUNDING_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_NODE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_WITHDRAWAL_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_INVOICE_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_INIT_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSMSTATUS_CLIENT_BAD_REQUEST:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_COMMITMENT_TX_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_SIGN_TX_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_GET_PER_COMMITMENT_POINT_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_CHECK_FUTURE_SECRET_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_GET_CHANNEL_BASEPOINTS_REPLY:
|
||
case WIRE_HSM_DEV_MEMLEAK_REPLY:
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, c->msg_in, "Unknown request");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static void master_gone(struct io_conn *unused UNUSED, struct client *c UNUSED)
|
||
{
|
||
daemon_shutdown();
|
||
/* Can't tell master, it's gone. */
|
||
exit(2);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||
{
|
||
struct client *master;
|
||
|
||
setup_locale();
|
||
|
||
/* This sets up tmpctx, various DEVELOPER options, backtraces, etc. */
|
||
subdaemon_setup(argc, argv);
|
||
|
||
/* A trivial daemon_conn just for writing. */
|
||
status_conn = daemon_conn_new(NULL, STDIN_FILENO, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
||
status_setup_async(status_conn);
|
||
uintmap_init(&clients);
|
||
|
||
master = new_client(NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, HSM_CAP_MASTER | HSM_CAP_SIGN_GOSSIP,
|
||
REQ_FD);
|
||
|
||
/* First client == lightningd. */
|
||
assert(is_lightningd(master));
|
||
|
||
/* When conn closes, everything is freed. */
|
||
io_set_finish(master->conn, master_gone, master);
|
||
|
||
/*~ The two NULL args are a list of timers, and the timer which expired:
|
||
* we don't have any timers. */
|
||
io_loop(NULL, NULL);
|
||
|
||
/*~ This should never be reached: io_loop only exits on io_break which
|
||
* we don't call, a timer expiry which we don't have, or all connections
|
||
* being closed, and closing the master calls master_gone. */
|
||
abort();
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/*~ Congratulations on making it through the first of the seven dwarves!
|
||
* (And Christian wondered why I'm so fond of having separate daemons!).
|
||
*
|
||
* We continue our story in the next-more-complex daemon: connectd/connectd.c
|
||
*/
|