It's an array: we were only saving the single element; if there was more than
one changed HTLC we'd get a bad signature!
The report in #1907 is probably caused by the other side re-requesting
something we considered already finalized; to avoid this particular error,
we should set the field to NULL if there's no last_sent_commit.
I'm increasingly of the opinion we want to just save all the update
packets to the db and blast them out, instead of doing this
second-guessing dance.
Fixes: #1907
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
1. Wait for a 'sendrawtransaction' *after* the dev-fail message; don't be
fooled by a previous one.
2. Turning on estimate fee sets fees exactly; just wait for it to be processed.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
And, reluctantly, default to bitcoind style.
"It's wrong to be right too soon."
Suggested-by: @cdecker
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
The comment was wrong: the channel being locked in was triggering
the fee update and hence the disconnect. But that can actually
happen before fund_channel returns, as that waits for the gossipd
to see the channel active.
Best to do the fee update manually, so it's exactly what we want.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We use feerate in several places, and each one really should react
differently when it's not available (such as when bitcoind is still
catching up):
1. For general fee-enforcement, we use the broadest possible limits.
2. For closingd, we use it as our opening negotiation point: just use half
the last tx feerate.
3. For onchaind, we can use the last tx feerate as a guide for our own txs;
it might be too high, but at least we know it was sufficient to be mined.
4. For withdraw and fund_channel, we can simply refuse.
Fixes: #1836
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Manipulate fees via fake-bitcoin-cli. It's not quite the same, as
these are pre-smoothing, so we need a restart to override that where
we really need an exact change. Or we can wait until it reaches a
certain value in cases we don't care about exact amounts.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We don't respond to fee changes until we're locked in: make sure we catch
up at that point.
Note that we use NORMAL fees during opening, but IMMEDIATE after, so
this often sends a fee update. The tests which break, we set those
feerates to be equal.
This (sometimes) changes the behavior of test_permfail, as we now
get an immediate commit, so that is fixed too so we always wait for
that to complete.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is a noop if we're opening a new channel (channel_fees_can_change(channel)
is false until funding locked in), but important if we're restarting.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
When in this state, we send a canned error "Awaiting unilateral close".
We enter this both when we drop to chain, and when we're trying to get
them to drop to chain due to option_data_loss_protect.
As this state (unlike channel errors) is saved to the database, it means
we will *never* talk to a peer again in this state, so they can't
confuse us.
Since we set this state in channel_fail_permanent() (which is the only
place we call drop_to_chain for a unilateral close), we don't need to
save to the db: channel_set_state() does that for us.
This state change has a subtle effect: we return WIRE_UNKNOWN_NEXT_PEER
instead of WIRE_TEMPORARY_CHANNEL_FAILURE as soon as we get a failure
with a peer. To provoke a temporary failure in test_pay_disconnect we
take the node offline.
Reported-by: Christian Decker @cdecker
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This means we don't try to unilaterally close after a restart, *and*
we can tell onchaind to try to use the point to recover funds when the
peer unilaterally closes.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Firstly, if they claim to know a future value, we ask the HSM; if
they're right, we tell master what the per-commitment-secret it gave
us (we have no way to validate this, though) and it will not broadcast
a unilateral (knowing it will cause them to use a penalty tx!).
Otherwise, we check the results they sent were valid. The spec says
to do this (and close the channel if it's wrong!), because otherwise they
could continually lie and give us a bad per-commitment-secret when we
actually need it.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We ignore incoming for now, but this means we advertize the option and
we send the required fields.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
peer features are only kept for connected peers (as they can change),
but we didn't update them on reconnect. The main effect was that
after a restart we displayed the features as empty, even after
reconnect.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
1. l1 update_fee -> l2
2. l1 commitment_signed -> l2 (using new feerate)
3. l1 <- revoke_and_ack l2
4. l1 <- commitment_signed l2 (using new feerate)
5. l1 -> revoke_and_ack l2
When we break the connection after #3, the reconnection causes #4 to
be retransmitted, but it turns out l1 wasn't telling the master to set
the local feerate until it received the commitment_signed, so on
reconnect it uses the old feerate, with predictable results (bad
signature).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We're going to use it to override specific commands. It's non-valgrinded
already since we use '--trace-children-skip=*bitcoin-cli*' so the overhead
should be minimal.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
In one case, the channel_update which we expected to activate the channel
from l2 was suppressed as redundant. This is certainly valid, so just
check the results.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
connectd tells master about every disconnection, and master knows
whether it's important to reconnect. Just get the master to invoke a new
connect command if it considers the peer important!
The only twist is timeouts: we don't want to immediately reconnect if
we've failed to connect. To solve this, connectd passes a 'delaytime'
to the master when a connection fails, and the master passes it back
when it asks for a connection.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
In particular, all opening_read_peer_msg() callers need to know there
was an error (presumably, negotiating) so they can stop, but we should
not exit.
This lets us reenable the final disabled test.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We now simply maintain a pubkey set for connected peers (we only care
if there's a reconnect), not the entire peer structure.
lightningd no longer queries us for getpeers: it knows more than we do
already.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
There's now a potential race: the source peer connect returns, but in
destination peer the master hasn't read the connect message from
connectd, so the peer isn't in listpeers yet.
(Previously the connection stayed in connectd, so there was no such
window).
This is an occasional issue in a few places.
Note that we take the opportunity to speed up test_disconnectpeer too
while we're there.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Prior to this, lightningd would hand uninteresting peers back to connectd,
which would then return it to lightningd if it sent a non-gossip msg,
or if lightningd asked it to release the peer.
Now connectd hands the peer to lightningd once we've done the init
handshake, which hands it off to openingd.
This is a deep structural change, so we do the minimum here and cleanup
in the following patches.
Lightningd:
1. Remove peer_nongossip handling from connect_control and peer_control.
2. Remove list of outstanding fundchannel command; it was only needed to
find the race between us asking connectd to release the peer and it
reconnecting.
3. We can no longer tell if the remote end has started trying to fund a
channel (until it has succeeded): it's very transitory anyway so not
worth fixing.
4. We now always have a struct peer, and allocate an uncommitted_channel
for it, though it may never be used if neither end funds a channel.
5. We start funding on messages for openingd: we can get a funder_reply
or a fundee, or an error in response to our request to fund a channel.
so we handle all of them.
6. A new peer_start_openingd() is called after connectd hands us a peer.
7. json_fund_channel just looks through local peers; there are none
hidden in connectd any more.
8. We sometimes start a new openingd just to send an error message.
Openingd:
1. We always have information we need to accept them funding a channel (in
the init message).
2. We have to listen for three fds: peer, gossip and master, so we opencode
the poll.
3. We have an explicit message to start trying to fund a channel.
4. We can be told to send a message in our init message.
Testing:
1. We don't handle some things gracefully yet, so two tests are disabled.
2. 'hand_back_peer .*: now local again' from connectd is no longer a message,
openingd says 'Handed peer, entering loop' once its managing it.
3. peer['state'] used to be set to 'GOSSIPING' (otherwise this field doesn't
exist; 'state' is now per-channel. It doesn't exist at all now.
4. Some tests now need to turn on IO logging in openingd, not connectd.
5. There's a gap between connecting on one node and having connectd on
the peer hand over the connection to openingd. Our tests sometimes
checked getpeers() on the peer, and didn't see anything, so line_graph
needed updating.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Rusty Russell
Christian Decker